

THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

NO. 2. — APRIL, 1905.

I.

CHAMBERLAIN, OUR NEW PROPHET.

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Within the last fifty years England has furnished four great intellectual forces which have shaken modern civilization from center to circumference. The names of Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Henry Thomas Buckle and Houston Stewart Chamberlain are indelibly written upon the latest tables from Mount Sinai. Whatever our position with reference to Spencer and Darwin may be we surely must reckon with them in our dealings with the great problems of life. Buckle is only known to a smaller circle, since scarcely a fragment of his projected life-work has been transmitted to us. But, when this cotemporary of the author of the "Synthetic Philosophy" sums up his task in these significant words: "To solve the great problem of things; to discover these hidden circumstances which determine the development and fate of nations, and to find in the events of the past a key to the happenings of the future, means nothing less than to unite in a single science all the laws of the moral and physical world. Whoever accomplishes this will erect anew the structure of our knowledge, arrange anew its different parts and transform its apparent contradictions into harmony"—we must certainly recognize at

least sameness of purpose with Herbert Spencer. Unfortunately, Buckle never realized his desires; death called him away in the prime of his manhood and his "History of Civilization" remained a fragment. But even this fragment of two volumes confined to the "History of Civilization in England" sufficiently testifies that, had he lived, his fame would have easily rivalled that of the author of the "Origin of Species." The two books appeared in the same year; that of Buckle being the more widely read, passed in a short time through five editions. However, what was denied to Buckle seems to have been granted in recent years to his countryman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain. In 1899, just forty years after the publication of Buckle's epoch-making work, appeared Chamberlain's "Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts."* Many an eminent German in England and America has written English works, but never before has an Englishman, though residing in a German country, written a great work in German—and such German, idiomatic and explicit to the core! Within five years this work of more than a thousand pages has passed through four large editions. It is undoubtedly the most remarkable book which has been published for the last forty years; no matter how often one may read it, it always seems fresh and eminently suggestive. Chamberlain, like Buckle, seems to have read and digested almost every book of note in all the civilized languages. Buckle read and annotated, according to his biographer, something like 20,000 books in fourteen years, an almost incredible accomplishment, apparently repeated in modern times by Chamberlain. Therefore, a careful study of the latter's work, including the examination into his sources, means getting acquainted with a well-selected first-class library, it means a complete education in itself. But in order to receive the full benefit of this compendious work one should read it consecutively, in one sitting as it were, first as a whole and then in its parts; for its distinctive virtue lies in its symmetry as a work of art, no part

* *Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts.* München. Verlagsanstalt F. Bruckmann A.-G.

of which can be fully understood and appreciated, unless it is read in the light of the unifying principle which is its peculiar charm. This principle, however, is not as it was with Darwin, Spencer and perhaps also with Buckle, the principle of evolution. Chamberlain ridicules the idea of evolution; it is just this fact which makes him *our new prophet*. A prophet he is: like the other three, he does not belong to the professional sanhedrim of the learned; he asserts that he is not a specialist in any department of knowledge, although a naturalist by early choice, but, he adds, that for this very reason he has reserved to himself the unbiased sympathy for *all* spheres of human thought. Like a prophet he desires above all to illumine the understanding and to fire the hearts; it is not his aim to instruct, but to stimulate thinking and to awaken definite judgments, and with the courage of the prophets he demolishes ancient values and recasts them into new forms.

What then is Chamberlain's prophetic mission? He wants, exactly what Buckle wanted, to solve the great problem of things; inquire into the whence and whither of our development; to analyze the value of our intellectual and material inheritance, to help coining new culture values, to create new culture factors—but these only for his chosen people, viz., the Germanic race. He desires to give new and firm supports to the belief in the future of Germanic culture and in that of all the nations who have come under Germanic influence. He cherishes the hope that these nations will in the future be better, happier and more energetic than the nations of the antique world; he insists that they are approaching a new and harmonious state of culture, incomparably more beautiful than any of which history tells us. Certainly, the human will cannot aim at anything higher, the goal cannot be more absolutely circumscribed; it presupposes absolute knowledge of the most remote past as well as of the most distant future; it requires the capability of absolute judgments for moral superiority, a perfect insight into the plasticity of the human will, the highest appreciation for the beautiful and capacity for artistic creations, all suffused by the inspiration from on high.

Like a prophet, Chamberlain has the will and the courage to remove ancient landmarks which stand only for the continuity of mediocrity. He does not hesitate in the choice of his means to bring antiquated maxims and notions into disrepute. He is an explosive nature, intense in the statement of his impressions, passionate in his wrath with which he assaults the foundations of a worn-out system. His ideas loom up high above the logic of his chain of reasoning; they are filled with blood, the blood of great affections; they exhibit the storm and stress of a great heart violently beating with the anguish of a new revelation. He cares nothing for the historical method, which demands first a statement of fact before passing judgment on its value, and lays stress upon the idea of historical development as the fundamental requisite for final appraisal. He, indeed, declares that an artistic creator of a work like his should be guided by a thoroughly positive trend of mind and a strictly scientific conscience, adding "before he gives an opinion he should know, before he creates he should test. He dare not boast being master, but servant, viz., servant of the truth." But almost in the same breath his prophetic vision gets the better of his intentions and his judgment comes with sledge-hammer force upon current opinions before they are fully stated. His prophetic heart goes out towards his beloved Germanic race—taken in its widest sense as celto-germano-slavic—to awaken it to its world-wide mission as the founder of an entirely new civilization, and an entirely new culture is the great burden of his book. He does not merely endeavor to show how, with the entrance of the Germanic race, a new and powerful factor begins to shape the world's history; he is not satisfied to characterize this vigorous race as receptive for all that is grand and noble, as richly endowed on the one hand and limited one-sided on the other; in order to prove in a quiet, matter of fact way, how this race had to change the inheritance and legacy of the ancient world and how it actually has changed it; no, he boldly maintains that real history only begins with the appearance of the Germanic

people to whom we owe all the progress of the last fifteen hundred years. His judgment upon Greek, Roman and Oriental civilizations are very positive, very original and, one might say, very refreshing. He demolishes the shrines, where we have worshipped so long and so fervently with marvellous accuracy of aim and intensity of conviction, but assigns them their rightful and proper place among the formative forces which have made the modern world possible.

Chamberlain has divided his work into two parts. In the *first part* he discusses the *origins*, in the *second* the *rise of the new world*. Under origins he discusses the *inheritance* from the old world, the *heirs* and the *conflict*; under the *second head* he first describes *the Germanic race as the creator of a new culture*, and then gives a historical survey of *the new civilization and culture as produced by the new race*. He makes a distinction between culture and civilization, assigning to the former industry, social economy, politics and ecclesiasticism, to the latter philosophy, morals, religion and art. The inheritance from the old world embraces Hellenic art and philosophy, Roman law and the religion of Jesus. Upon these foundations rests the character of the nineteenth century, they are the formative forces with which everyone must reckon who wants to understand modern times, they must be accepted as factors of necessity. I shall confine myself in the present article to this first part of Chamberlain's work and discuss the Germanic question in a second article.

Although Chamberlain is a disciple of the modern biological laboratory no trace of its methods is found in his historical valuations. Every organic being is with him a new creation and personality is the newest and greatest of all, it is the *mysterium magnum*. We hear nothing of the struggle for existence, or the adaptation to environment or the survival of the fittest. The minutiae with which the Greeks, the Romans and above all the Jews are treated, do not at all suggest evolutionary stages pointing to a final culmination in the Germanic race, they are purely value-statements—*Werthschaetzungen*—

discussed rather to show Germanic supremacy than ancient influences. The values of our whole educational system are shaken to the very foundations. It has been hammered into us for many a decade, that our current moral categories, such as stoical, epicurean, cynical, sceptical and a host of others are borrowed from the Greeks, and that our religious symbols have their source in semitic traditions. We were taught that these moral and religious ideas have inspired our western literatures and arts, and that our philosophical thinking has been predetermined by the poetic genius of Greek philosophy, as Kant's platonic modes of thinking sufficiently prove. We have cherished the belief that the Germanic character developed upon these given historical foundations, creating indeed a new culture, but only new in the specific, never in the material sense. Pure classic students have pointed with pride to the coöperative harmony of all culture founding forces, no matter how far apart in space and time they have shown how Plato's idea of the intelligible world, of the freedom of conscience and the autonomy of reason have penetrated into the very heart of German metaphysics. Every college professor of philosophy delights in reiterating how much Kant owes to Plato, or Leibnitz to Aristotle, or natural philosophers like Grotius, Hobbes, Gentilis, Pufendorf and others to the Stoa, and sceptics like Montaigne to Pyrrho and Anesidemus, or Gassendi to Epicurus; nay, how even now long after the ages of Scholasticism, Reformation and Renaissance all thinking men owe much of what is best in their thoughts to Greek philosophy. Still Chamberlain boldly maintains that the Greeks were no metaphysicians at all and the Jews absolutely without religion. He very profoundly tests the value of tradition, he feels that historical traditions and transmissions are a positive evil, an amalgamation of noble and common metals and decides that analysis has become a necessity. Life is a constant assimilation and excretion of foodstuffs even in the intellectual world. We have suffered from the overfeeding of ancient ideals, from the eternal tutelage and mediatorship of ancient intellectual-

ism; we are therefore impeded in our progress by the undigested elements of our inheritance. This is especially true of the Jewish inheritance. Chamberlain is right when he says: "We westerners are all slaves of the Jews." The Bible is still the most powerful book. The whole Christian world owes to it almost exclusively its highest ethical ideals and laws of conduct. In the treatment of this latter phase of his work Chamberlain exhibits extraordinary skill. With a master's hand he shows us what the religion of Judaism was, especially how it developed, how in the course of time all sorts of encrustations formed around the original kernel of Christ's teachings, such as Judaistic chronology, materialistic messianism, Egyptian asceticism, Platonism, the gruesome mysticism and cabalistic practices of the national chaos which arose in the early centuries after Christ, until finally the church dogma, catholicism had fully developed and scholasticism became the ruling passion of the European intellect. Such is the method of Chamberlain. Let us examine his statements.

In Greece personality was born, individualism developed. From the semimythological times of the Trojan war to the time of Rome's supremacy Greek history is the history of personalities, of heroes, rulers, warriors, thinkers, poets, creators. In Rome the intellect turns from the sublime in art and philosophy to the pure mental process of organization. Rome creates the family, the community, the state. In Israel human wretchedness is emphasized, man becomes conscious not merely of his power but especially of his weakness. There the sense of depreciation for the things of this world originated and with it the feeling of man's higher spiritual destiny. Out of the midst of this people courageous men arise denouncing worldly greatness and wealth, worldly wisdom and enjoyment, until after centuries of time this renunciation becomes a positive principle and the sublimest of the prophets dies for it on the cross. Thus renunciation assumes the significance of a real factor in historic development, an acquisition of greater importance than either the Greek or the Roman factor.

Chamberlain acknowledges that without these three formative principles developed by Greece, Rome and Israel the history of the nineteenth century cannot be written, but they are only of real value, when we assign to them their proper setting in relation to Germanic culture. In a very original and fascinating manner he discourses on the value of Greek art for modern culture, claiming that with it a new element, a new form of existence enters into the cosmos. Schiller's dictum, "nature has only made creatures, but art has made men" throws a flood of light upon the concept of art, implying the conquest of nature by man, his struggle for freedom from the tyranny of nature, his acquisition of creative energy, of independent thought, the establishment of true science and the birth of philosophy. Nevertheless this fine, subtle, characteristically German conception of art has after all its source in Greek art and philosophy. Art, however, is not primarily the invention of tools dictated by the constant attacks of man's natural environment; the full height of manhood is only reached when the necessity for invention no longer comes merely from without but from within, when it is the free expression of his consciousness, then only the artist is born. Homer creates gods according to his own free will; Democritus "invents" the idea of the atom; Plato, the meditative seer, throws with undaunted courage the whole visible nature overboard and puts in its place the subjective realm of ideas, declaring man to be a new creature with much more reproductive energy in his soul than in his body. This free creative energy of the human imagination was the source of all the infinite wealth of Greek life: of its language, its religion, its government, its philosophy, its science, its historiography, its geography; of all forms of poetry in words and sounds, of its whole public life as well as of the inner life of the individual—all radiates from this center and all unites in it. Homer is the central figure, a real concrete personality, in whose genius religion, language, government, manners and morals become concrete and harmonious. In him the power of personality is

revealed as the secret of Greek influence. In Egypt, Phœnicia or Rome, Homer would have been forgotten, but in Greece a whole host of poets and artists and a rich scala of poetic production gathered around this radiating center until we get Hellenic art as the composite product of national life. Greece is to this day the home of every great artist, because here alone can be found the artistic element, artistic culture, not as a luxury as among us, but as the fundamental trait of the whole national life.

So far Chamberlain acknowledges Greek leadership and Greek influence as fundamental for the nineteenth century, but beyond that Greek tutelage must cease, the so-called Greek inheritance must be demolished. A thorough historical investigation of the Graeco-Persian wars, to take only one example, has shown traditional Greek history to be a gigantic mystification and many of our own modern teachers have still more mystified it. Herodotus himself tells us that wherever in the battle of Marathon Greeks met Persians and not Greeks they met ignominious defeat, on account, as we must conclude, of the universal cowardice which was a distinctive characteristic of the Greeks. And cowardice went hand in hand with lack of truthfulness, of faithfulness and of trustworthiness. Juvenal already mockingly exclaims: "*creditur quidquid Graecia mendax audet in historia.*" Worse still is the admiration, so often forced upon us, for their political conditions. Where the political characters, both individual and in groups, are so miserable a wise political system could never have flourished. To say that the idea of freedom is of Greek origin is idle delusion, for freedom requires above all things patriotism, dignity, a sense of duty and of self-sacrifice. Even Solon sells himself to Pisistratus and Themistocles, the so-called hero of Salamis, bargains shortly before the battle for the price for which he was willing to betray Athens, while with Alcibiades treachery had become so much the habit of his life that Plutarch sneeringly remarks that he changed color more quickly than a chameleon. All this was so much a matter of

course among the Greeks that they hardly ever get ruffled about it. The chief reason why Socrates had to empty the cup of poison was not his theological heresy but solely his persistent advocacy of political reform. The individual Greek was essentially a tyrant and a slaveholder, the freedom which he has given us is not political freedom, but the freedom for artistic creations.

But however ardently our scholastic schoolmen have labored to revivify corpses and to force mummies upon us as models to be imitated, our theologians have far outstripped them in their endeavor to edify our souls with the reiteration of Greek superstitions. Our modern doctrine of angels and devils, our horrible conception of hell, the hypostases of the Demiurgos and of the Logos, the definition of the divine, the doctrine of the Trinity together with the whole substratum of the dogmatics of the day, all this and more is largely Greek inheritance. The beautiful religious structure which Homer had erected, with its poetic symbolism free from all rationalism and its inquiry into cause and effect, free from all priestcraft and superstition, became gradually undermined through barbarian, especially Thracian, influences from the north and through so-called philosophy which displaced the fable of poetry with history and the symbolism of religion with pure reason, until poetry and religion perished. Chamberlain ridicules the idea of an upward evolution in Greek religion. "Who has pointed the path to freedom and beauty," he exclaims, "and who the path to servitude and ugliness!" When the philosophers displaced the artists a sound, empirical science had to yield to mysticism and nonsense which tyrannized the world for two thousand years afterwards. Our author refers here especially to the philosophy of Aristotle, with which the decadence of true Hellenism began, or, rather which was the fruit of that sophistry inherent in the Greek mind from the beginning. Thales, Anaximander, Pythagoras and Aristotle were not philosophers, they were naturalists, theorists, encyclopædists, but not philosophers; even Plato, the metaphysician par excellence among

the Greeks, whose ideology surpasses anything we have in mental creativeness, is preëminently statesman, moralist, practical reformer, but his psychology certainly weakens his claim to philosophical honors in the modern sense. "It is not true," says Chamberlain, "that the Greeks have done the thinking for the whole world: before them, along with them and after them men have thought more profoundly, more keenly and more accurately. It is not true, that the mysterious theology of Aristotle as a social prop is the best that could be said on the subject, this jesuistic, scholastic sophistry has become the black plague of philosophy. It is not true, that the Greek thinkers have purified the old religion; they have on the contrary attacked that in it which deserves eternal admiration, viz., its untrammelled, purely artistic beauty; and when they claimed to put rational truth in place of symbolic truth, they in reality took refuge to popular superstition and placed it on the throne, from which they together with the mob had cast poetry, the eternal messenger of truth."

In discussing the Roman inheritance as a foundation factor in the nineteenth century structure Chamberlain emphasizes Roman law and the Roman state as two of the most precious possessions of civilized humanity. But to understand either of them one must thoroughly understand the characters of the Roman people. On the surface Roman history represents a grand and cruel sport of politicians and generals, who conquer the world for sport; the most brilliant but also the most dangerous of them was Julius Cæsar. Neither the struggle between Patricians and Plebeians nor the passion of a Marius or the cruelty of a Sulla could shake the Roman constitution to its foundations. Cæsar alone, in whom politician and general were wonderfully blended, whose powerful personality with its abnormal will-power decided in favor of his ambition and against Rome, could accomplish Rome's ruin. But the history of politicians and generals is not the history of a people. The life of nations rests upon its hidden forces, national greatness, especially Rome's greatness, is collective and

not individual. Rome is not the creation of individual men but of a whole people; in contradistinction from Greece none of Rome's great men comes up to the greatness of the entire Roman people as Cicero already says: "our Roman commonwealth rests not upon the genius of a single man but of many men; it is the work of centuries and of many consecutive generations." But Roman superiority rested primarily upon intellectual and moral strength, both of which were combined in behalf of their home; an unquenchable love of home was the fundamental feature of the old Roman character; no Roman man or woman ever hesitated to sacrifice his or her life for their country. This love had its source in their fine instinct for law with its reflex influences upon the marriage and family relations. Only Rome has produced the ideal family, more beautiful than the world has ever beheld it either before or after. Every Roman citizen, whether patrician or plebeian, was king in his own house, while the mater familias was honored like a queen. The Roman's ideal was to consider his freedom, his rights, his marriage and friendship relations as absolutely sacred as the most precious gift of life. Rome's conquests were all made in defense of this home, but Roman law, Roman ideals of liberty and civilization gained with their conquests world-wide recognition. The destruction of Carthage broke the world power of Phœnicia and with it the world power of shop keepers, bare of every higher ideal; so did the destruction of Jerusalem put an end to the destruction of the religious monopoly of the Jews. Otherwise all freedom of thought and belief would have forever vanished out of the world under the leaden pressure of these born dogmaticians and fanaticists. Without Rome no modern Europe, no Indo-germanic culture, which gradually gravitated from Asia to western Europe and became the brain of all humanity. But when Rome's destiny began to be shaped by the professional politicians it fell, the majesty of the Roman people and its inherent instinct died, only the *idea* of the Roman state remained and survived. The majesty of the people became in-

corporated in the majesty of the individual Cæsars, Roman citizenship was granted to all the inhabitants of the empire and Rome ceased to be Rome, the word *civis* lost its meaning and yielded to the term *subjectus*, and as the majesty of the people was concentrated in the person of the Cæsar so also all the rights and privileges. The papacy is the last fragment of this primitive pagan world which has kept alive to the present day; in the person of the pope is still embodied the majesty of the Cæsars usurped from the majesty of a whole people, to him must be paid universal homage and reverence.

As long as Rome was creatively active—over five hundred years till Cæsar and another century during a period of agony—it is the creator of Europe destroying its nearest and most dangerous enemies. *This is the positive inheritance of this age.* The invention and establishment of a free, well organized state is the most difficult problem which was ever solved, it could not be solved by a single hero, only by a whole nation of heroes, every one strong enough to command, every one proud enough to obey, all one in their aims, each defending his own personal right. But when this heroic people died out and foreigners usurped its power a second period of Roman politics begins, during which the living issues of the incomparable civil law were sublimed into principles and crystallized into stiff dogmas, the destructive influence of Rome makes its beginning. When the majesty of the people was transferred to the individual Cæsar a theory of transmission gradually evolved which has exercised its pernicious influence throughout all modern times. Upon it rests the character of the European monarchies; the character of European armies as the king's armies, the state officials as the king's servants, the people as the king's subjects, all expressions from the time of Rome's decay. Chamberlain, however, does not condemn the monarchy as such; on the contrary, he maintains that the strengthening of the monarchy was absolutely necessary for the establishment of well ordered social conditions and civic freedom and from this point of view the monarchy is one of

the blessed inheritances of old Rome. But the most essential gift transmitted to us from ancient Rome, indispensable to life and learning alike, is the incomparable Roman law—both the *jus publicum* and the *jus privatum*. Discussing jurisprudence not as a science nor as an art but purely as technique or skilled handicraft, which does not rest upon fundamental verities but solely on opinion, Chamberlain demolishes Cicero's oratorical confused and confusing definitions on the same subject, claiming with Mommsen that he was after only a yellow journalist of the worst sort with a superabundance of words and a marked lack in thoughts. Now, since law is purely arbitrariness displacing instinct in the relations of man to man, that nation will have the most equitable law whose moral character rests upon the irrevocable respect for the claims of others to freedom and possessions. This consciousness of right and wrong was nowhere so highly developed as among the Italian Areans, whose virtues centered in their capacity for self-control and self-sacrifice. Capable of mastering himself, the Roman was eminently capable of mastering others. This Roman law is as incomparable and as inimitable as Hellenic art. As every Greek knew his art so knew every Roman farmer 500 years before Christ his law and handled it with as much skill as his plow and his oxen. It grew with the growth of the nation, it was as flexible as the ever changing conditions and yet became as compact as the great Roman republic. While the Greek started his civilization with the idea of the state as the supreme source the Roman started with the family, erecting the structure of state and law upon it as the most solid foundation. This very difference caused the misery and downfall of the former and the endurance of the latter. The family was to the Greeks more of an evil than a good; with the Romans it was the indestructible unit upon which rested the Roman state and Roman law. Therefore, the sacredness of Roman family life; the morality of men, the respect for woman, the obedience of the children are of Roman, not of Greek or Jewish origin. Here is the center of Roman law,

Christianity does not strengthen the family idea; on the contrary, it dissolves all political and legal ties, emphasizing only the individual values. Here also lies the chief merit of the Latin language; it is the only language in which legal ideas can be most fully and most precisely expressed. Neither poetry, nor genius, nor personality could thrive in Rome—even Horace is after all only a mechanic in verse making—but civic character, the ideal state, the supreme law and the sacredness of marriage are all positive gifts from Rome to our nineteenth century.

Perhaps the finest chapter in Chamberlain's whole work is the chapter on the appearance of the Christ. He is the incomparable inheritance of our fathers, not, however, the Christ of the church dogma, but a much sublimer, much more conspicuous Christ, the Christ separated from all historic Christianity. If it took fully two thousand years for the purely mathematical intellect to comprehend the concrete structure of the universe, how difficult must it be for blind, selfish human heart to comprehend a life, a personality through whom the moral significance of man, the entire moral world-view has been transformed, through whom the individual and his relation to his fellow individuals and to nature received an entirely new setting, reconstructing all motives of action, all ideals, all desires and hopes upon a new foundation. Chamberlain maintains that the first eighteen hundred years of Christian history with its misunderstandings and deceptions, its political intrigues and ecumenic councils, its royal edicts and priestly ambitions, its three thousand volumes of scholastic argumentation, its fanaticism and noble aspirations, its murders and stakes must be considered as the period of childhood diseases of Christianity. He, therefore, ignores the chaos of confessions and presents to his readers the historic Christ untrammelled by supernatural considerations. He introduces a comparison between Buddha and Christ, two personalities absolutely unique in the history of mankind. Neither of them is the result of a gradual evolution, neither the product

of a poetic genius. Nature, inexhaustible, resourceful nature has given us here something radically new. If the Christ had been a historical necessity we should have had a thousand Christs instead of one. But the thousands of volumes of inquiry into the documents treating of the life and character of Jesus have only resulted in the one final conclusion, that this wonderful personality becomes more and more unique and unexplainable the more we learn about him. Comparing Jesus and Buddha does not imply the possibility of a parallel between the two, it simply emphasizes the contrast. Buddha stands for the senile termination of a culture which has reached the limit of its power; there is nothing of value in life except suffering and the only salvation from suffering is the entrance into Nirvana, not the ordinary death followed by a continuous new birth in other forms, but the death followed by the absolute nothing, possible only through the utter denial of everything which binds the individual to this life; this is the essence of Buddhism. Buddha only lives in order to die. Christ, on the other hand, dies only to enter into eternal life; this life lived in God is only the outer court to the kingdom of heaven. And this kingdom is, according to Christ's own words, within the heart of man. It is a mystery, which he so wonderfully illustrates in his incomparable parables of the mustard seed, the leaven and the hidden treasure. But this mystery of the kingdom of heaven is at the same time the mystery of his own life. The burden of His message is not the turning away from life but the turning around, so to speak, the reverting of the trend of life. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, unless you be converted (*i. e.*, your tendencies be reversed) you will not enter the kingdom of heaven." There is a mysterious something about Christ which we cannot explain, but we feel instinctively that the kingdom of heaven, eternal life, means to be as Christ was, to live as Christ lived, to die as Christ died. Christ was not merely wise, but divine; he, therefore, did not turn away from life but towards life, so that his witnesses call Him the tree of life, the water of life, the bread of life, the

light of life, the light of the world; in his presence the dead and the sick return to life and health and the sorrowing are comforted. There was no trace of Buddhistic monasticism in Him. He did not even fast like John the Baptist; on the contrary, his enemies called Him a glutton and a winebibber. He is, indeed, the example of an absolute turning away from much which fills out the life of many, but it is all done for the sake of life. None of the vows of chastity, of poverty and of obedience constitute a part of His doctrine. He participates in wedding feasts, declares marriage an institution of God and mercifully deals with the sins of the flesh, so that He has no word of condemnation even for the adulteress. He, indeed, declares riches as an impediment in the search for the kingdom of heaven, but he adds "what is impossible with men is possible with God." Nowhere in the wide world do we find a similar doctrine. Diatribes against wealth there were in abundance, but wealth is not irreconcilable with the inner conversion, emphasized by Christ; and when he says to the rich young man "sell all thou hast and give it to the poor" we must accept this as interpreted by the words of His greatest Apostle: "And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." He who seeks death as the escape from this life may well content himself with poverty, chastity and obedience, but he who chooses life sets his mind upon quite different things.

In full accord with Christ's emphasis of life is His love of conflict. His admonitions to humble oneself, to be patient, to love one's enemies have their counterparts in Buddha, but with the latter every suffered wrong is a chastisement of the flesh; for Christ it is a means to obtain the true life, the vision of the kingdom within us. But when we enter into the sphere of will development we hear Him say: "Think ye that I have come to bring peace upon earth? I tell you no, but discord. I have come to arouse son against father, and daughter against mother; I have come not to bring peace but the sword." His life is an open declaration of war, not against

the forms of civilization, of culture and of religion which he found around him, but against the inner spirit of man, against men's motives for action, against the goal which they have placed for themselves. *The appearance of Jesus Christ signifies, from the standpoint of the world's history, the appearance of a new type of man.* The love of enemy is not for his sake, but only for the development of this inner kingdom; the reversion of will includes a complete reversion of sentiment. It is not weak humanitarianism, when Christ prays for His enemies on the cross; it is that will power which in the face of death forgets its own pain and anguish and beholding only the selfishness, superstition, envy, prejudice and hatred of the human ape, crucifying the divine in Himself, destroying the seed of the kingdom of heaven, exclaims: "they do not know what they do."

From the standpoint of the world's history Christ's deed must be paralleled with those of the Greeks. What Hellenism did for the intellect Christ did for moral life; moral culture made possible only through Him. In Christ man awakens to his moral calling, he breaks with the moral tyranny of nature and creates his own sublime morality. In art and philosophy man becomes conscious of himself as an intellectual being, in marriage and law as a social being, in Christ as a moral being. He who wants to follow Christ needs above all things courage, a courage not born of the battlefield, but of patience and suffering, a master's humility and not a slave's.

But Chamberlain makes a strenuous effort to credit the Arian race with the character of the Christ. He endeavors to prove at some length and marshalling a large array of facts that the Galileans were Arians and not Hebrews and that Christ had nothing in common with the Jewish character, whose chief trait was materialism and an insatiable will focused upon the wealth of this world, while the Galilean type was noted for its idealism, its unrivalled bravery and its peculiar language, a type Israelitic, indeed, in the beginning but gradually merged into a multitude of Arian mixtures.

Chamberlain likewise demolishes the old notion that the Jewish race stands for the religious genius par excellence. Jew and Semite are not identical terms, nor are Israelite and Jew, the latter being largely a mixtum compositum of Hittite, Amonite and the scant remnant of the tribe of Juda. They were born rationalists with an abnormally strong will power, lacking absolutely the religious instinct expressed in the Rig-veda thousands of years before Christ; but religion is purely a matter of the heart. The Jew's relation to his Jahve is pre-eminently political. Jahve assures the Jews the supremacy over the world on the condition that they fulfill a multitude of commandments. Everything was forbidden except the lust for power and dominion; the Jew's energy was bent upon that one aim, his faith upon Jahve, from whom alone he could expect to receive this dominion. The whole nation lived on this one ideal. Christ grew up in the midst of this cult. Here he found what he could not have found anywhere else in the world, at least not in the Arian's nature cult, viz., the complete scaffolding for his entirely new idea of God and of religion, an idea which was foreshadowed, indeed, by the Rig-veda and the Israelitic prophets but in its formulation and application it was solely Christ's. It was the very opposite of the Jewish conception. God's kingdom was not of this world, it was purely an ideal kingdom of spirit. Surely such a doctrine must undermine the very foundation of all Jewish life and hope and its promoter deserved death.

The reader will have clearly perceived by this time that Chamberlain has his distinctive race values; they are not without auto-suggestions, illusions and deceptions; in fact they reflect all the ideals of the market-place so masterfully presented by Bacon. The Arian element certainly seems to be the source of all the highest values, the *sine qua non* of modern culture. Whatever does not correspond to Chamberlain's ideal of Germanic world views and Germanic culture is ascribed to the after effects of Semitic influences and the ever recurring scape-goat of the "*Voelkerchaos*." The origins of

Christianity, however, date back to those chaotic times of the mixing of races and ideas. Augustine and a large number of the church fathers are certainly closely allied to them. Every step forward passed through them. The Cæsarean papacy, this indispensable, organizing, upbuilding power of the Middle Ages grew out of them; it certainly was for a century the great school of culture for the Germanic races as well as for the Romanic states partly cemented with Germanic blood. Were not both the good and the evil, the permanent and the perishable, the valuable and the worthless born out of the same historic conditions? Can we separate the one from the other? So separate them, as though the one could have arisen or become effective without the other? Can Chamberlain maintain his value-theories without contradicting himself? We shall discuss that at another time.

II.

THE CODE OF HAMMURABI AND THE MOSAIC BOOK OF THE COVENANT. (SECOND PAPER.)

BY PROF. A. S. ZERBE, PH.D., D.D.

VII. SPECIAL COMPARISON OF THE CODE AND THE COVENANT.

The relation of the Book of the Covenant to the Hammurabic Code can be determined only by a critical comparison of the laws and principles of the two systems. As seen from the analysis of the Code, laws on the same subject, as well as different aspects of the same cases, are frequently separated. The Book of the Covenant, though more symmetrical, likewise separates parts usually treated together. Accordingly, only a general classification is possible. The following scheme, though not strictly scientific or exhaustive, is designed to bring out the prominent features of the two systems: A. *Similar Legal Conceptions*; B. *Similar Cases and Similar Laws*.

A. *Similar Legal Conceptions.*

1. FALSE ACCUSATION.

At the head of the CH are four laws on false accusation.* "If a man charge another with a capital crime, but cannot prove it, the accuser shall be put to death" (§ 1). "If a man bear false witness, and if the case involve life, that man shall be put to death" (§ 3). "If a man bear witness for grain or money he shall himself bear the penalty imposed" (§ 4). Similar laws occur in the Mosaic legislation. One of the Ten Words tersely commands: "Thou shalt not bear

* In the interest of brevity we shall frequently employ CH for Code Hammurabi, and BC for Book of the Covenant.

false witness against thy neighbor" (Ex. 20: 16). The BC confirms this: "Thou shalt not take up a false report, put not thy hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness. * * * Keep thee far from a false matter. * * * And thou shalt take no bribe: for a bribe blindeth them that have sight, and perverteth the words of the righteous" (Ex. 23: 1, 7, 8). The BC does not specify the penalty, but the parallel passage in Deut. 19: 18, 19, reads: "If the witness be a false witness, and have testified falsely against his brother; then ye shall do unto him, as he had thought to do unto his brother: so shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee."

Here the fundamental thought, prohibition of false testimony and of bribery, is the same. The CH is, however, more severe in adjudging punishment according to the strict *jus talionis*. No direct connection is discoverable. Perhaps both legislations reflect a common Semitic law. The fact that in the Old Testament the prohibition forms a part of the original organic law indicates a higher ethical aim and content than in the CH. This is further shown in the Deuteronomic law, which emphasizes the motives. For easier comparison we arrange the remaining laws in parallel columns.

2. BURGLARY.

CH. If a man make a breach in a house, they shall put him to death in front of that breach and they shall thrust him therein (§ 21).

BC. If the thief be found breaking in and shall be smitten so that he dieth, there shall be no blood guiltiness for him. If the sun be risen upon him, there shall be blood guiltiness for him: if he have nothing then he shall be sold for his theft (Ex. 22: 2, 3).

In the BC the "breaking in" is assumed to be during the night when the owner's life is placed in jeopardy and when he is unable to recognize the intruder. Nor can he know whether merely theft, or murder is involved. The CH contemplates a similar case with like summary punishment. If the sun be risen the occupant of the house according to the BC is not warranted in taking the life of the burglar. Herein the BC is more discriminating than the CH. The natural

law of self-defense is recognized, though in different form in both systems. A similar law occurs in the XII. Tables: *Furem nancitor endoque plorato. Si nox furtum factum est, si im occisit, iure cæsus esto; si luce, nisi se telo defendit, ne occidito.*

3. SON SMITING HIS FATHER.

CH. If a son strike his father, they shall cut off his fingers (§195). BC. He that smiteth his father or his mother shall be surly put to death (Ex. 21: 15).

The BC includes the mother with the father as worthy of filial respect; the CH omits the mother and thus differs from the Bedouin and presumably primitive Semitic custom, according to which the mother stands nearer the children than the father. The BC regards the offense as meriting death, because it destroys authority in the tribal government and so is revolutionary in a high degree. The CH, though less severe, lacks a moral purpose.

4. MAIMING A SERVANT.

CH. If one destroy the eye of a man's slave or break a bone of a man's slave he shall pay one-half his price (§199). BC. If a man smite his servant or his maid with a rod, and he die under his hand; he shall surely be punished. Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished; for he is his money (Ex. 21: 20-21).

The cases are different, the CH referring to the maiming of another's slave; the BC to the killing or maiming of one's own servant. In the BC the old Semitic, or at least, the Hebrew idea that the slave is a person entitled to protection asserts itself, very much as among the Abyssinians the killing of a slave is a capital crime. In the CH the term slave has been generalized into a "bought slave," the property of his master as any other chattel. In general the Old Testament laws regarding servants were similar to the Babylonian. In the absence of a laboring class in Israel, servants were a necessity in the care of cattle and the cultivation of the soil. But their lot was scarcely at any time a hard one.

The CH, § 199, may be compared also with Ex. 21: 26, 27: "If a man smite the eye of his servant, or the eye of his maid, and destroy it; he shall let him go for his eye's sake. And if he smite out his man-servant's tooth, or his maid-servant's tooth; he shall let him go for his tooth's sake." The codes agree in not applying the *talion*. In the BC, the slave obtains his freedom; in the CH, a fine is imposed. As before, the higher philanthropic plane of the Mosaic law is noteworthy.

5. KIDNAPPING.

CH. If a man steal a man's son, BC. He that stealeth a man and who is a minor, he shall be put to death (§ 14). sellet him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death (Ex. 21: 16).

The object of the stealing was to sell into slavery or to procure a ransom. The severe penalty is due in part doubtless to the frequency of the crime. Deut. 24: 7, restricts the death penalty to kidnapping an Israelite. Here again a similarity exists, but it is largely, if not altogether, outward, for the "man's son" of the CH is an *awilum*, an upper-class man, who may not be sold into permanent slavery. No such beneficent law exists for the *ward-antum*, the slave. For him the law is: "If a merchant sell such slave, there is no cause for complaint" (§ 118). The Hebrew law strikes at the roots of slavery by conceding to every one certain personal rights and by making man-stealing a capital offense. The law grows out of a different system of thought, and so has a different meaning. Nothing is said in the CH regarding the kidnapping of a member of the third estate.

B. Similar Cases and Similar Laws.

1. DEPOSITS.

CH. If a man give to another silver, gold, or anything else on deposit and the latter dispute with him, they shall call that man to account and he shall double whatever he has disputed and repay it (§ 124). If a man have not lost anything, but say so, he shall declare his loss in the presence of the god and he shall double and pay the amount for which he made claim (§ 126).

BC. If a man shall deliver unto his neighbor money or stuff to keep, and it be stolen out of the man's house, if the thief be found he shall pay double. If the thief be not found, then the master of the house shall come near unto God, to see whether he have not put his hand unto his neighbor's goods. If it be stolen from him, he shall make restitution unto the owner thereof (Ex. 22: 7, 8, 12).

The CH and the BC have constructively four points in common: (1) The deposit^{ee} pays double for the article appropriated by him, or lost; (2) he makes simply restitution for the article stolen (§ 125); (3) if the depositor accuse the deposit^{ee} of faithlessness, but is convicted of falsehood, he pays double; (4) in case of theft, the deposit^{ee}'s only redress lies in the arrest and conviction of the thief. In the BC the master of the house "shall come near unto God," *i. e.*, before the judges; in the CH the man "shall declare his alleged loss in the presence of the god." Under any view these are remarkable parallels, but they indicate, not so much a dependence of the BC on the CH, as the incorporation of common laws handed down for centuries. The restitution of double the amount would at first seem like positive proof that the Hebrew law is based on the Babylonian; but this coincidence is more than neutralized by the fact that a similar law is found among a people so remote as the Bogos of Abyssinia. The law probably reflects old Semitic usage finding its way to other people.

2. ASSAULT.

CH. If a man strike another in a quarrel and wound him he shall swear: "I struck him without intent," and he shall be responsible for the physician (§ 206).

BC. If men contend and one smite the other with a stone or with his fist, and he die not, but keep his bed; if he rise again and walk about upon his staff, then he that smote him shall be quit: only he shall pay for the loss of his time and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed (Ex. 21: 18, 19).

The cases are essentially similar, as also the legal principles. The "he shall be responsible for the physician," corresponds to the "he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed." The unpremeditation modifies the severity of the punishment. In the BC the absence of malice is proved by the absence of a deadly weapon; in the CH by the oath of the accused. A similar law is found among the Abyssinians: "Whosoever wounds another with a stick, or stone, or any instrument, not of iron, comes not under the law of blood-revenge, but must

pay a fine." The XII. Tables say: *Si faxit vel alienum servum quadrupedemve pecudem occelsit, noxiam sarcito. Si membrum rupit, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto.*

CH. If he die as the result of the stroke, he shall swear (as in § 206) and if he be a man, he shall pay one-half mina of silver (§ 207). If he be a freeman, he shall pay one-third mina of silver (§ 208).

BC. If a man smite his servant or his maid, with a rod, and he die under his hand; he shall surely be punished. Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished; for he is his money (Ex. 21: 20, 21).

According to the BC a man smiting a slave so that he die "shall surely be punished." How? The Rabbis said: by death. But in that case we should expect the usual expression: "shall surely die," which indeed is the reading of the Samaritan text. It may be inferred from verse 21, that the penalty for killing a servant (presumably in chastisement) was less severe than for the death of a free man. Besides, according to 21: 13, 14, premeditated homicide merits death; unpremeditated allows asylum. If the servant survive, the master is not punished, for he has already suffered the loss of the servant's time. According to the CH a fine of one-half mina is imposed, if the man slain be an *awilum*; and of one-third mina, if a *mushkenum*. The case of the slave is not considered. Here, again, is class-legislation.

3. THE JUS TALIONIS.

We come now to the most remarkable resemblances. The penalties for personal injuries cover twenty paragraphs of the CH, nearly all of which find some parallel in almost consecutive verses of Exodus 21, and only there. We select the most important.

CH. If a man destroy the eye of another man they shall destroy his eye (§ 196). If he break a man's bone, they shall break his bone (§ 197). If a man knock out a tooth of a man of his own rank, they shall knock out his tooth (§ 200).

BC. If any harm follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, burning for burning, wound for a wound, stripe for stripe (Ex. 21: 23-25).

We have here in both systems a terse and comprehensive formulation of the *jus talionis*. The one committing the as-

sault is punished in theory in the same manner as he injured another. In reaching a conclusion as to the possible relation between the two codes at this point, several things ought to be noted. The *talion* in some form is found among all people. Herein neither the CH nor the BC deserves special credit; further, the mode of expression is naturally similar. The law grows out of a natural impulse to guard one's self against attack; and the idea at once suggesting itself is that of requiting in kind with interest. If one is struck, the impulse is to strike back and somewhat harder. So far forth, the Babylonians and the Hebrews occupied the ground of common law. But the incorporation of the talion in a system of laws, says Furrer, a German jurist, marked a signal victory for human self-control. It set a limit to revenge. Life for life is the principle of penal justice in both systems.

4. STRIKING A WOMAN ENCEINTÉ.

The six laws of the CH fall into two groups of three each.

<p>CH. If a man strike a man's daughter and bring about a miscarriage, he shall pay <i>ten</i> shekels of silver for her miscarriage (§ 209). If through a stroke, he bring about a miscarriage to the daughter of a freeman, he shall pay <i>five</i> shekels of silver (§ 211). If he strike the female slave of a man and bring about a miscarriage, he shall pay <i>two</i> shekels of silver (§ 213).</p>	<p>BC. If men strive together and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart, and yet no harm follow; he shall be surely fined, according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine (Ex. 21: 22).</p>
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The situations are similar, for not only in the CH (§ 206-208) but also in the BC, the assault grows out of a quarrel among the men, in which the women, presumably wives of the men, joined. The results are similar: (1) miscarriage without further injury; (2) imposition of a fine, either according to a fixed scale as in CH, or as determined by the judges in BC. The Babylonian distinction of society into high, middle and low caste comes prominently forward here. A fine of ten shekels is levied if an *awilum* strike the daughter of an *awilum*; of five shekels if he strike the daughter of a *mush-*

kenum; and of two shekels in the case of a female slave. The BC in principle places all Hebrew women on the same legal footing. The Babylonian distinction of rank emerges more clearly in the next group.

CH. If that woman (§ 209) die, they shall put his daughter to death (§ 210). If that woman (§ 211) die, he shall pay one-half mina of silver (§ 212). If that female slave (§ 213) die, he shall pay one-third mina of silver (§ 214).

BC. But if any harm follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, etc. (Ex. 21: 23).

Both codes refer to miscarriage with fatal consequences. The BC, assuming the equality of women in the eyes of the law, fixes the penalty of death absolutely. In the CH the death of a high-caste woman demands the death of the man's daughter, whereas the death of a daughter of a middle-class man is atoned for by the payment of a half mina, thirty shekels; and of a maid-servant, by one-third mina, or twenty shekels. In other words, the value of a woman's life on the basis of rank was life for life, thirty shekels, twenty shekels.

5. THE BUTTING OX.

CH. If a bull, when passing through the street, gore a man and bring about his death, this case has no penalty (§ 250). If a man's bull have been wont to gore and they have made known to him his habit of goring . . . and he have not tied him up, and that bull gore the son of a man, and bring about his death, he shall pay one-half mina of silver (§ 251). If it be the servant of a man, he shall pay one-third mina of silver (§ 252).

BC. If an ox gore a man or a woman, the ox shall be stoned and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner shall be quit. But if the ox was wont to gore, and it hath been testified to its owner, and he hath not kept it in but it hath killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned and its owner shall be put to death. If there be laid on him a ramson, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid upon him. Whether it have gored a son or have gored a daughter, according to this judgment shall it be done unto him. If the ox gore a man-servant or a maid-servant, there shall be given unto their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned (Ex. 21: 28-32).

The sequence of the laws is the same, as also, the fine discrimination between an ox casually goring and an ox "wont

to gore." The BC, however, contains a principle omitted in CH, but found among the pre-Mohammedan Arabs, namely the killing of the ox. According to CH no damage can be collected if an ox kill a man on the highway; according to BC the owner is not personally punished, but the slaying of the ox and the destruction of the flesh imply a penalty. The difference is greater in the case of an ox wont to gore. According to CH the owner pays thirty or twenty shekels. Nothing is said about the ox. According to BC the ox, as the instrumental cause, is stoned, and the owner also is put to death. The principle here is that the owner is morally responsible for the death and according to the talion pays the penalty. The judges may, however, allow a ransom. The coincidence of thirty shekels as the value of a man-servant in BC and of "the son of a man" in CH is noteworthy.

6. LIABILITY OF HERDSMEN.

CH. If a man lose an ox or sheep which is given to him, he shall restore to their owner ox for ox, sheep for sheep (§ 263). If a visitation of god happen to a fold, or a lion kill, the shepherd shall declare himself innocent before god, and the owner of the fold shall suffer the damage (§ 266). If a man hire an ox or an ass and a lion kill it in the field, it is the owner's affair (§ 244).

BC. If a man deliver unto his neighbor an ass, or an ox, or a sheep, to keep; and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no man seeing it: the oath of Jehovah shall be between them both, whether he hath not put his hand unto his neighbor's goods; and the owner thereof shall accept it, and he shall make restitution unto the owner thereof. If it be torn in pieces, let him bring it for witness; he shall not make good that which was torn (Ex. 22: 10-13).

Paragraphs 262 and 263 correspond substantially to Ex. 22: 10. The CH has four sections for the brief statement of Ex. 22: 11-13. Verse 13 expresses in general the same thought as § 244. The custodian of another's cattle is upon oath blameless for any accidental loss; but makes restitution in case of theft. For cattle torn by wild beasts he is not responsible. The cases and the legal principles of both codes are similar, but the literary form is peculiar to each. Similar laws hold among other people. Meminger records that among the Abyssinian Beni Amer a shepherd is not responsible for strayed or stolen sheep (*Ostafrikanische Studien*, Seite 79).

7. PERPETUAL SERVITUDE.

CH. If a male slave say to his master: "thou art not my master," his master shall prove him to be his slave and shall cut off his ear (§ 282).

BC. If the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife and my children; I will not go out free: then his master shall bring him unto God, and unto the door, or the door-post; and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl and he shall serve him forever (Ex. 21: 2, 6).

The BC, but not the CH, implies that the master allows comparative freedom; and that the servant under the circumstances prefers a mild servitude to full liberty. The ceremony of boring the ear indicates that obedience is now transferred to another (Dillmann, Nowack, Benzinger). The CH in addition to its barbarity denies the principle of freedom. With tragic irony the body of laws whose avowed purpose was, that "the strong might not injure the weak" ends with this Draconic enactment. But we have seen all along that the CH is constructed on the plan that justice is to be administered in the interest of class and caste. Since the slave is merely chattel, it is fitting that the very last paragraph should direct that his ear be cut off if he assert his manhood and freedom. The Mosaic law, moving on a higher ethical and social-political plane, recognizes servitude as a condition to be regulated, and not as a normal estate. The spirit of the two legislations is fundamentally different.

VIII. INFERENCES FROM THE COMPARISON.

Similar legal conceptions appear in relation to false accusation, burglary, son smiting father, maiming a servant and kidnapping; similar cases and similar laws occur in deposits, assault, the *talion*, striking a woman enceinté, the butting ox, liability of herdsmen and perpetual servitude. If in any of these parallels there occurred a marked similarity of language or even resemblance suggesting literary indebtedness, it might be inferred that the BC is dependent on the Code; but no such verbal or stylistic similarity exists. Examine the nearest approach to sameness in thought and language, the *jus talionis*

Ex. 21: 23-25 and CH 196-201. Here to a certain extent the same words are found, but in a different order. The Code expands the talion through five paragraphs; the BC sums up all in one terse sentence. Again, if we compare the Hebrew of Ex. 22: 1, 9, with CH § 8 we find indeed that the first six words are exactly the same, but that the thought and language of the remainder are entirely different. The first three words in the Hebrew are necessarily the same. A reasonable doubt would arise as to the next three, "ox or sheep," if the laws were similar from this point onward; but since they are diverse in language and setting, the similarity in the first few words arises from the similarity of conditional sentences in the two languages. An outward resemblance is discernible in the section on the butting ox, but this comes, as in the other cases, from the unavoidable use of similar words. Underneath the mere outer form is a marked difference in content and movement.

Another remarkable fact is the almost entire absence of Babylonian loan-words in the BC. One seeks in vain for a distinctively Babylonian terminology. Neither the ordinary words for servant, dowry, marriage, magic, concubine, etc., nor more than two or three special terms can be classed as Babylonian loan-words. A careful comparison of the CH in the Assyrian text (and in the Hebrew translation of Mueller), with the Hebrew text of the BC will fail to disclose to any appreciable extent the transfer of distinctively Babylonian words and expressions. Only a few general legal terms such as *dajan* (to judge) and *din* (judicial process) are the same in both and these signify nothing more than that Babylonian and Hebrew, as members of the Semitic family of languages, have certain root-forms in common. It is, however, a characteristic of every high civilization that it impresses upon another brought into contact with it, not merely its ideas, but its peculiar words and phrases. Such transfer applies in a marked degree to the forms and expressions of common law. This tendency is abundantly illustrated in the indebtedness of

Roman to Greek law, of Continental and English law to Roman, and again of American to both English and Roman law. If distinctively Babylonian legal conceptions had been impressed on the Hebrews, the corresponding words and phrases would to a greater or less extent have been transferred. This follows also from the philological and psychological truth that thought and language in their ultimate relation are inseparable. *Logoi* are inner and outer sides of the same thing. If the author of the BC had appropriated any *sui generis* principle of the CH we should have expected a like appropriation or adoption of the phraseology, unless perchance the Hebrews had ready at hand words previously without content, which would be a contradiction in terms. Critics differ as to the marks of literary indebtedness; but if we adopt the canon that there must be a clear dependence of thought and an undoubted similarity of language, no direct dependence of the BC on the CH can be established.

Such is the result of a comparison of the two codes considered in themselves. Before drawing the logical conclusions we ought to consider the Babylonian elements in the other JE sections of Genesis and Exodus, with the view of ascertaining the nature of Babylonian influence prior to 900 B. C. In at least fifteen instances the JE strata of the patriarchal narratives contain references to customs and laws confirmed by the CH and other sources as Babylonian. It has been held by Assyriologists that much of this Babylonian sub-stratum found its way to Canaan before 1000 B. C. and even before the Tel-el-Amarna period. In the recent discussion between Stade, Budde and Halévy on the date of the Jahwistic account of the Creation, Halévy furnishes ample proof of Babylonian influence prior to 1300 B. C. We quote, in his own language, the drift of the argument: "*En un mot, l'adoption de la langue babylonienne chez les familles dirigeantes en Syrie atteste que la civilisation babylonienne était déjà en haute estime de longs siècles avant l'établissement d'Israël dans cette contrée. * * ** L'histoire offre des preuves manifestes de cette tendance nat-

urelle par les nombreuses nationalisations des ces hôtes étrangers, comme celles de Ba'al et de Bêl, Astart et Ishtar, Hadad et Ramman, Dagon et Daganu. Le fait le plus intéressant que les documents d'El Amarna nous aient révélé est bien celui qui atteste le culte du dieu Ninib dans le temple de Jerusalem au XV^{eme} siècle avant l'ère vulgaire. Ce sont des faits historiques que, quoi qu'il nous coûte, il faut accepter dans toute leur gravité (*Revue Sémitique*, XII., Janvier, 1904, pp. 22-3)." Halévy then proceeds to show the same tendency in law and culture in Canaan.

In the light of the available evidence we state briefly three theories on the relation of the two codes. According to the first, little or no influence was exerted by the CH on the BC: "there can be no doubt that at one time Babylonian influence in Palestine had been paramount. But that time was long past. The Israelite invasion had done away with Babylonian institutions. The people who came in from the desert brought their own laws—or rather lack of laws—with them. Now, no doubt, in a society comparatively settled, they were developing a system of common law. The earliest Hebrew code, i. e., the BC which has come down to us embodies usage which is as old as Solomon or older. Its simplicity when compared with the code of Hammurabi confirms its independence. The points of resemblance, some of which are striking, are features common to oriental society." This is from page 174 of the latest "*Old Testament History*" by an American author, Professor H. P. Smith, of Amherst.

The second theory is that of *direct influence*. "The Babylonian and Mosaic Codes are conceived in the same literary form; they contain a considerable number of practically identical laws; they present not a few cases of actual verbal agreement, and both are designed for the regulation of a civilized community. The parallels are too close to be explained upon a somewhat vague theory of common tradition. It has been shown that, in Palestine, Israel learned and appropriated the ancient Babylonian myths. Why should they not learn Baby-

lonian law as well? The foundation of the Babylonian law was the Code Hammurabi, and thus the enactments of the old Babylonian kings passed more than a thousand years later into the Book of the Covenant, and so became the heritage of Israel and the world" (Professor C. Johnston, *Johns Hopkins University Circular*, June, 1903).

According to the third theory, the influence was *indirect*. "We may say that the Israelite legislation shows strong traces of Babylonian influence, and yet not destroy the independence of its origin. We cannot suppose that the author of any code set to work to draw up a comprehensive scheme of law. Each built upon the already prevailing custom. His attention would be directed chiefly to what was not matter of uniform treatment. * * * That any Israelite code shows marked differences from the Code Hammurabi is enough to show an independent origin. The absence of any difference would show complete dependence." Such is the view of Professor C. H. W. Johns, Cambridge, England, in Hasting's *Dictionary of the Bible*, Vol. V., p. 611.

Each of these theories has something in its favor, but the third, or a modification of it, seems to account for the greatest number of facts. We summarize our conclusions.

1. That some kind of connection exists between the matter of the two Codes would seem to follow from the similar grouping of certain parts, the extraordinary agreement in some points of view and the unique resemblance of a few laws.

2. The BC has Babylonian elements; but it is not Babylonian in spirit. Like the accounts of the Creation and the Deluge in Genesis, the old material is incorporated in a new system of thought and moulded in a new form. The difference is one of ethical setting and purpose. The Babylonian legislator is a great world-conqueror, seeking the commercial prosperity of his people; the author of the BC moves in the sphere of moral and civic well-being and subordinates his material to the establishment of a government of which Jehovah is the head. The articulation of this part of the He-

brew Bible turns on the fundamental significance of the moral law.

3. The CH, despite the pious phrases and the boastful array of gods and goddesses in the prologue and the epilogue, does not contain a single religious conception. Reverence toward the deity is nowhere enjoined as a moral duty. It may be said that the lack of such ethical principles ought not to be construed to the disparagement of the CH, since it is a purely civil code. It, however, professes to contain god-given laws and therefore must rest on ultimate conceptions of right.

4. The BC moves in the atmosphere of a comparatively pure monotheism; the CH in that of a thoroughly developed polytheism. "The Babylonian religion is a polytheistic nature-religion. The deity is revealed in the forces of nature. The temples are copies of their heavenly abodes" (De la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, I., 168). In Polytheism, however, man is regarded merely as in the world and in nature, as subject to their powers, and as without personality in any true sense; it fails to grasp the truth that man in his deeper self has something more divine than the forces of nature. This false view, God-ward and man-ward, deranges the whole Babylonian type of thought.

5. As the ethical ultimately grounds itself in the character of one Supreme Being, Babylonian law and civilization could not attain a true conception of right and justice. "The independent existence of two heads in the combined pantheon was sufficient to prevent the infusion of an ethical spirit into the monotheistic tendency; and unless a monotheistic conception of the universe is interpreted in an ethical sense, monotheism (or monolatry) has no great superiority, either religiously or philosophically, over polytheism" (Morris Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 696).

6. The CH is inspired by two motives: (1) That of conserving the interests of the highest class of society, the élite of the Babylonian world; (2) that of throwing every possible safe-guard around property-rights. These motives, laudable

enough in themselves, cannot in the absence of an underlying moral principle, save society or the state. In the BC, the commonwealth exists not merely as an expedient to secure certain temporal advantages, but as a divine-human organism for the realization of the true brotherhood of the race. The ruling purpose is to emphasize the moral and spiritual forces in society and to bring these to bear on the secular.

7. From the standpoint of human culture and as a mere collection of laws, the Code, as pointed out by jurists like Cohn, Kohler and Dareste, is superior to the Mosaic legislation. But the Code is likewise a striking illustration of the law that the higher the culture and civilization merely as such, the lower the morality. Witness the classic periods of Athens, Rome, Corinth, Alexandria, Florence. As soon as man by culture and self-evolution imagines himself a demi-god, he needs no Supreme Being, Redeemer, or special revelation; his culture is his religion; he is self-sufficient; he degenerates. These are truths of history, ethics and religion.

8. The BC moving in a different sphere of thought recognizes that sin and the ills of life spring from an abnormal development of the will, which issues in a false self-dependence; and anticipating the prophet that "the heart is deceitful above all things and exceedingly corrupt" (Jeremiah 17: 9), strikes at the root of evil, the bad passions of the soul, and teaches that man can discharge his duty to his neighbor only by first discharging his duty to God. Before he can develop normally he must be renewed in the inner man. Otherwise evolution becomes devolution. The decalogue (Ex. 20: 17), "thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house * * * nor aught that is thy neighbor's," implies that a criminal act in its initial stages is traceable to the outward manifestation of a criminal will and character. The CH has no cure for the ills of society because it has no adequate conception of the real seat and nature of human depravity.

9. The moral undertone of the BC, reverence toward God, love to neighbor, humane treatment of animals, and the great

underlying thoughts of the Decalogue, are lacking in the CH. The latter has no law implying even remotely the philanthropic grandeur of Ex. 23: 4, 5: "If thou meet thine enemy's ox or ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him. If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, thou shalt surely release it with him." We have here the paradox of a people low in culture producing the highest pre-Christian ethics and religion; and of a people of the highest culture lacking in the monotheistic and ethical instincts.

10. Among all the laws in the CH is not one which could not have originated either in the way of judge-made law or in the fertile brain of priest or courtier. The Sinaitic legislation breathes a spirit higher than mere human reason, not only in the unapproached Ten Words, but in the ordinances of the BC. As Baur said of the four great Pauline epistles that no psychological analysis can eliminate the divine side, so here no psychological or juristic analysis can eliminate the God-given element. If there had been no Moses substantially as the Old Testament represents him, we should be compelled to predicate some such character; and so the last dilemma of criticism would be worse than the first.

Other questions growing out of the discussion, such as the channels through which the Babylonian material reached Israel, the date of the BC, its possible Mosaic origin, and its inspiration under any view of authorship, cannot be considered here.

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III.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE PRESENT INDUSTRIAL ORDER.*

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Each age of the world has had its own industrial problem to solve. The discussions, the civil and social conflicts, or the internecine wars that have marked the history of its solution seem to have been the symptoms attendant upon the advance of civilization into greater complexity, and at the same time broader sympathy.

The character of the problem varies with the age, the genius of the people, their customs and laws, and the social, moral and religious forces active in the unfolding of their life. The awakening of Roman life, for instance, in the early years of the republic, and all along its history, produced the conflicts between patricians and plebeians, and introduced a problem which in its prevailing political character was peculiar to the conditions of the people and the time. The same thing might be said of Russia at the present day, where circumstances have in much the same way caused the problem to take a strongly political color. England's problem upon the eve of the awakening of modern life preceding the Renaissance, was quite different, when such rough leaders as Wat Tyler and Jack Cade voiced the grievances of their associates, and gave expression to their demand for such larger part in the life of society and the nation, as they were fast coming to feel they should possess. This conflict, agrarian rather than political, had its own questions which have continued through the centuries, and of which the various elements still remain to vex the statesmen of the present time.

* Paper read at the fourteenth annual assembly for spiritual conference of ministers and elders of the Reformed Church, Mt. Gretna, Pa., August 11, 1904.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have witnessed an awakening, new in character and differing from every one preceding it. This we might call the world's industrial awakening; and the problems it brings with it are peculiar to our own time. The questions of civil and political rights, the rights of land tenure, and with them questions of social status, have acquired a condition of comparative equilibrium, at least among the more progressive peoples. But new conditions raise new questions. The marvelous expansion of industrial life, and the rapid advance of invention and discovery in physical science have added to human well-being new and vast realms of creature comfort; these new conditions raise new questions and present new problems as to men's relations, rights and obligations in the new realms being won. The equilibrium of the world's thought and conscience throughout this new region is as yet unstable, and as the chemist would say—has not as yet been resolved into definite compounds of public sentiment and custom, nor crystallized into forms of law. It is this instability of equilibrium that constitutes the peculiar character of the present industrial order; and it presses upon every one questions on whose wise answer depends the well-being of countless multitudes, as well as the peace of generations yet unborn.

In taking a view of the present industrial order, first impressions would move one to describe it as an *industrial disorder*. In Bible times we are told it was the recognized custom at a certain season of the year for kings to go forth to war. To anyone observing the times now it would seem at first sight that the only change in this custom is that instead of kings it is labor leaders and trade unions, and instead of war it is the strike. Summer time never comes without its disputes and contentions, in whose settlement methods are resorted to which in their principle differ but little from open war. In fact the strike, the lockout, the boycott are admittedly the means and methods of warfare; while the third party to the contention, the general public, is put in much the same position as Manchuria

is in at present, in that it falls to her to furnish the seat of war, and to receive into her devoted soil the blood poured out in the conflict. Only in the case of the general public, they seem to be called on, in addition, to pay the war debt in the end.

Yet this, after all, we feel sure is a most superficial view. Industrial war does indeed exist, and even in the intervals of peace it is too often but an armed peace. But in and through it all there abides a strong and persistent desire for true peace; and there is, moreover a genuine desire to find a just and harmonious settlement of the questions at issue.

Sober reason asserts itself more and more insistently in the intervals when passions have had time to cool; public sentiment exerts a compelling influence that is increasing. And led by this and also forced by the painful experience of industrial warfare, rational and peaceful methods are being more frequently tried. Joint conferences between operators and workmen for the discussion of their mutual interests, and the fixing of a just rate of wage, have shown practically, at least in some instances, that there are better ways of settling differences than by force. Thus far at least, the recognition accorded the labor union in these settlements has frequently made for a better understanding between the two parties to the labor contract. Boards of arbitration and conciliation are coming to be tried. Or where they have not been actually tried, quite a considerable number of the states make provision by law for their employment. In Australia and New Zealand—those testing grounds for new industrial theories—the law makes these methods of arbitration and conciliation obligatory, and although the compulsory feature is seriously questioned by many, yet it is generally admitted that the system in the long run has avoided much friction and conflict. In Great Britain methods of arbitration are in extensive use and have secured the peaceable settlements of many disputes. Last and most recent, we have the Anthracite Strike Commission, which, whatever the ultimate results of its deliberations and awards may be, will still go down in history as one of the most

serious efforts of recent times to explore the new field of industrial equities—a project conceived by a public-spirited President, a commission manned by some of the best representative men of the nation, and an investigation continuing through five months, the most patient, painstaking and thorough yet attempted.

Besides these direct endeavors to find abiding peace, there are wide-spread efforts being made to gain a fuller understanding of the questions at issue. Within the past ten years even the newspapers have come to devote larger space to labor news and to the discussion of the situation. The Industrial Commission through a number of years of extensive investigation gathered an immense amount of material throwing light upon the general industrial situation at the close of the nineteenth century. The government has established a Bureau of Labor, whose carefully prepared bulletins, issued bi-monthly give results of careful investigation throughout a wide range of subjects sociological and industrial. The Civic Federation, so far as we know, is still in existence and continues its work. In some churches, movements of a similar character are being inaugurated, such as the Church Association for the Advancement of the Interests of Labor, an association of the Protestant Episcopal Church, which in the summer of 1904 held its second annual convention in Philadelphia. Representatives of labor unions were present as guests. The association professes to work practically as well as theoretically. All these efforts to come to a better understanding, while they have none of them had the success that could be desired, have still contributed towards clearing the atmosphere; and at all events they show that the questions at issue are being more widely recognized, and that there is an increasing desire to comprehend their merits and to assist in their rational solution.

While facts like these are hopeful indications, there is another side to the situation. There are influences at work that give cause for grave apprehension. There are situations to be faced which must be dealt with in the spirit of broadest

statesmanship and highest philanthropy, animated by vital Christianity, if their threatening danger to the state and society is to be avoided or remedied.

For one thing, we see a large foreign element among us, reinforced by a constant flow of immigration from Europe. This foreign element, coming from the central and southern countries of Europe possesses a different character and different ideals from the northern peoples that have heretofore made up the large majority of our foreign immigrants. They are more prone to concentrate in mining and manufacturing centers instead of spreading out in farming communities. Their loyalty to government, alienated by tyranny in the lands from which they come, is often defective, amounting at times to downright anarchism; while their ideas concerning the righting of private wrong center in the stiletto. So pronounced is the influx of Slavic peoples, that a careful investigator having examined the condition and trend of affairs in the anthracite coal regions, comes to the conclusion that forces are at work there which in time will displace other races and make large sections of the country Slav. Whether the reasoning is well founded or not we do not pretend to say, but it at least shows from what quarter the winds are blowing.

More serious than the danger of undesirable immigration is the attitude of large classes of the people toward established institutions. From anarchism we do not believe there is such danger as cannot be overcome by the sanity of the general body of our working people. But the tendency to array class against class—the poor against the rich, and wage earner against the professional man—the questioning of property rights and the agitation of revolutionary socialistic ideas, are symptoms of a deep-seated unrest. Closely related to this, and partly flowing from it, is a widespread suspicion of the courts and the judiciary, or an open accusation of them as being prejudiced in favor of capital over against labor. This same suspicion includes the church; and church members and ministers of the Gospel are ignorantly believed by a large

number of prejudiced men to be in sympathy with those they look upon as their oppressors.

All these things go to show the fevered condition of things produced by that clash of industrial ideals which has been mentioned, and are indications of the need of some influence that shall be more widespread than the ills from which we suffer, deeper than the passions that are being stirred, more powerful than the selfishness and greed entering so largely into the controversy, and higher than the ideals of any would-be philosopher.

This power is Christianity, an influence and inspiration that makes for the realization of all that is best in human life, that speaks peace to the passions in the deep places of their birth; that substitutes love and good will for covetousness, as light replaces darkness; and whose ideals are so high, so pure, that no æon can be counted too long and no development too sweeping if only humanity can be brought even to begin to realize their preciousness.

In considering Christianity in its relation to the present industrial order, and its power to properly coördinate all conflicting elements and deliver society from threatened anarchy, it is important to keep clearly in view its essential character. Christianity stands for *regeneration* rather than *reform*. It is a new order of life in the world, not merely a reorganizing influence. Mystical as our definition may seem to some, it means *the abiding presence in humanity of a triumphant, love-enkindling Personality with power to stir enthusiasm for gaining and possessing a spirit like unto His own*. It means a *transcendent* Personality, not our own, coming down from a kingdom above us and beyond us, the fountain of all those spiritual forces that through the ages have drawn humanity upward in its heavenward development. It means also an *immanent* Personality joined to our own—

Speak to Him thou for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet—

Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet,—

an imminent Personality with power to beget in us such a

yearning for the unattainable purity as will reckon all things else, even life itself, but a paltry price to pay if only we may possess a fuller measure of it. As one has said, than whom no one has made more sacrifices. "yea verily, and I count all things to be loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord: for whom I suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung, that I may gain Christ, and be found in Him." And finally, this immanent Personality of the Lord of life and glory crowns His work in humanity by giving birth (through the marriage of Spirit with spirit) to the new moral purpose and power in man to attain the realizing of the ideals awakened by the heavenly light.

This is Christianity, however it may be organized and whatever may be the particular department or form of work men carry on under its promptings. This is Christianity, in distinction from an incomplete definition so widely prevalent, which sees in it nothing more than a system of ethical teaching, illustrated by the beautiful life and sublime death of a hero, preserved to the world by the containing vessels of a human tradition and acting upon human motive through the ordinary impulses of reason and emotion. Christianity is all this, but it is vastly more than this. Christianity is all this, but if it were no more than this, then it would stand in a relation to the present industrial situation very similar to that sustained by trade unionism, socialism, nationalism, civic federalism, or any other practical philosophy that offers a cure for the ills of the time. Were Christianity no more than this, then its prime functions of the hour would be, through the activities of the church, to investigate social and industrial problems, and to furnish men with finished systems of ethics, sociology, and political economy.

This is not the function of Christianity. Its part in the resolution of the industrial situation is different in kind rather than in degree. Jesus Himself pointed this out most emphatically. With what indignation He refused that sordid waiter for dead men's shoes who tried to get His decision

for a bludgeon to wrest a part of the inheritance from an equally covetous brother! "Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?—take heed and keep yourselves from all covetousness." Jesus would not interfere in the dispute for the reason that His mission was to supply men that spirit which should make such disputes impossible. Socialism in its various forms at present aims to be the judge and the divider. But not so Christianity. Socialism would take present conditions and by a more or less forcible reformation produce the ideal state: Christianity, by the regeneration of human beings would introduce a new spirit and produce new conditions which make the old order of strife impossible. And so while in some ways it seems to be at one with socialistic schemes in that it seeks the well-being of men and deliverance from the evils under which they groan, its spirit is after all antagonistic to these schemes and represents their very antipodes. For while both seek the peace of society, socialism would get it through virtual war—the strife and clash of classes; Christianity on the other hand would accomplish it through love—love toward God and man. "Its object," as has been well said, "is to transform the socialism which rests on the basis of *conflicting interests* into the socialism which rests on the *consciousness of spiritual unity*." Its ideal is a fraternal organism in which the unifying principle is not the compromise of antagonistic interests and the equilibrium of opposing forces, but the mutual desire of each for the other's welfare. In this way alone the true solidarity of society comes to be felt. Obligations rather than rights come to the front as a matter of conscience: "What do I *owe* my neighbor" becomes the question rather than "what does my neighbor owe me"; what are the *obligations* I must *fulfill*, rather than what are the *rights* I must *exact*. And all this, not as a set scheme or watchword on which a community is to be segregated and built up, like all those attempts in different ages of the world, to reproduce the original type of the Christian community in Jerusalem. It is rather a spirit and a life

which lays hold of men in all ages and under all circumstances, and without taking them out of their environment, but rather operating through the social forms of that environment, transforms them as men, and so begins at the fountain source to cure the disease of humanity.

This message that God is the Father of all and all men are brethren is not the only message of Christianity to the age. True, it is a most important one from whose formative energy the fraternal community is evolving. But another equally important message is the profound importance of the individual as a free and independent agent, each with a distinct and specific function to perform in the social organism, and each with sacred rights that dare not, even in the humblest, be invaded without harm to the whole body. The significance of the individual, that polar opposite to the corresponding force of communism, we might even say is the most important message of Christianity to the times. For in these days when such irresistible currents are sweeping toward the building up of monster aggregations of power, financial, industrial, political, or social, the individual is in danger of being lost sight of. The right of the individual to labor as he chooses, to engage in business as he will, to find that trade, profession, or calling in which his particular talents can be most productive and his own manhood most completely unfolded, these individual rights are so vital that they may well constitute an impregnable rock against which the united forces of social aggregation should pause in their onward sweep. The dictum, "the greatest good to the greatest number," while rightly used, means the proper coördination of the individual and general, may become a specious sanction for gigantic wrongs which at the same time, on account of the fewness or humbleness of the number affected, are not noticed. And yet one individual with right on his side is something before which the world must stop. Here perhaps more than anywhere else the influence of Christianity is an abiding power making for better things. The kind of socialistic thinking that is percolating

through all strata, looks upon the individual as a mere unit which goes to make up the aggregate, and the welfare of this is the only thing to be looked after. In the mill or factory the man loses his name, and becomes merely number so-and-so. In politics he is ticketed with the name of his party; and if there is any question of his individuality it turns upon his price at election time. In society he is little more than a lay figure wearing a certain fineness of clothing, a certain brilliancy of medals, and living in a home of a certain degree of luxury, on whose wall hangs framed a family tree of greater or less degree of ancientness and renown.

If there was anything against which the life of Jesus was a protest it was this ignoring of the significance of the individual. Work with masses of men is conspicuous rather by its absence in His life. True, the multitude thronged Him, and no personal sacrifice was too great when these "sheep without a shepherd" appealed to His sympathies. But after all, the most effective influence of Jesus was exerted when it was with individuals He had to deal. His richest discourses and most pregnant sayings came at those times when He spoke to a Nicodemus or a Samaritan woman, or noticed a widow casting her living into the treasury, or an abandoned girl bathing His feet with penitent tears. And at the last when His life work was ended, its results were summed up principally in the twelve individuals upon whom His personality had impressed itself—one an awful lesson to the world of the results of withstanding Him, eleven to go forth and as individuals, stand for that liberty which at once began to emancipate society.

Another message of Christianity which acts as a solvent upon present industrial perplexities is its testimony as to man's relation to the present world and to the world to come. One thing which gives men a sane and sober perspective in which to make true estimates of the values and the relative importance of this world's good things, is the consciousness of the prime significance of the things that go to make up the substance and environment of the future life, and their trans-

cedent importance alongside present things. It is this that relieves the fevered congestion which is producing that insanity with which the strife for material good is being pressed. It relieves the abnormal tension in the case of poor and rich alike, predisposing both to conciliation. It says to the poor "Envy not," to the rich, "Despise not," and to all alike it shows that the pursuit and attainment of righteousness and justice and mercy is a thing so desirable that the gaining of wealth naturally falls into its own proper position of subordination.

Nor is this accomplished at the expense of the rights of present things. The objection we hear urged against Christianity that it is so taken up with other-worldliness that it neglects present obligations, holds only against a woeful perversion of true Christianity; and it is reiterated only by those who are so wilfully ignorant of what they ought to know, that it would not be worthy of serious notice, were it not that it is used to confirm the prejudices of those who might be better taught. Christianity will not join with unbelieving socialism in glorifying present well-being as the only thing with which we have to do, and it refuses to cease intoning its message of another world where there are treasures to lay up; but it does not follow that because it rejects unbelieving socialism, it does not believe in and teach Christian socialism, in which all creature comforts have their proper places—sanitation, ample remuneration of toil, sufficient healthful recreation, the comforts of science and the joys of art—in short all the best things of civilization and refinement.

Christianity thus bears testimony of the power of love in man's relation to his fellow as an individual in the community—it bears testimony to the power of faith in the unseen realities which make up man's true environment, and invest present things with an added significance; but there is another fact concerning which its influence is unique, and that is the fact of sin. In the face of the philosophy which sees in the ills of the world simply antitheses in an onward development

towards a higher and more perfect civilization, Christianity points, like a prophet of the Lord to the fact that down at the root of these ills is the sin of the human heart. Many of the disputes that continue to vex the world are not due to ignorance on the part of the participants, but selfishness, greed, stubbornness. One party cries, "They've got the money and we're going to have it"; the other "We've got the money and we're going to keep it." And in one way or another all individuals are drawn into the conflict, affected to a greater or less degree by the miasma of covetousness that is in the air. Christianity, refusing to furnish the combatants with prescribed rules, systems, or philosophies—even as the Divine Master refused to be made a judge and a divider—Christianity has but one message—"These troubles are a disease; it is the presence and power of mammon;—take heed therefore and keep yourselves from covetousness." We refuse to accept the theory of present social and industrial ills given by Edward Bellamy as he closes his "Looking Backward." The causes of the present stress, with its inhumanity of man to man, is not merely the stagnant waters of a swamp surrounding a beautiful rose-bush, and stunting its growth; the mere drainage of the swamp and the improvement of the soil would not of itself bring perfect growth and blossoming to the rose-bush of society. There is a disease within which needs the ministry of healing before things can become as they ought to be.

And here more than anywhere else Christianity goes beyond its teaching in that it furnishes not only the diagnosis but the cure. It says with the voice of divine authority that the example of the great Founder must become the rule of every life. Not only are men to follow this example in finding a *modus vivendi* with one another, in founding the fraternal community, or in their attitude towards worldly good: but they are to follow the example of Christ in the sublime self-renunciation in which He was willing to make the supreme venture of faith and love when He lived according to what

He saw to be right, in the face of the world's sin, without waiting for men to go along with Him. Men are to follow this example in the spirit in which He consummated His self-renunciation on Calvary, by acting for the right and living for the right no matter where the way might lead. "Hereby know we love, because He laid down His life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." This love covers the multitude of sins, and in covering them cures men and works deliverance from sin's power.

There come times in the storm and stress of the present when the still small voice of the Spirit of Jesus Christ may be drowned amid the cries of hatred and strife, the shouted watchwords of partisan bitterness, the rallying cries of legions gathering to war. There may come times when faith wavers and love despairs of ever permeating with the true leaven of the Gospel the mass of society, which is effervescing with the false leaven of grasping selfishness. There come times when to live true to this inward voice may get a man the name of "scab," and invest his home with a riotous mob, terrifying or injuring his wife and little ones. Or it may procure for him more bitter persecution yet, should the lines of his life be among those of the other side to the controversy who may know how to wield invisible weapons, which in their very refinement inflict all the keener misery. At such times the despairing question may arise, What has Christianity to do with this? What can Christianity do for me?

But let us remember what Christianity has done in the past. When, for example, we consider the hoards of ragged tattered demalions which, at the close of the fourteenth century, Wat Tyler led out of Kent upon London—a motley horde with murder in their hearts—bound to the land like serfs, driven like cattle, despised and spit upon by those who accounted themselves appointed of God to rule; when we compare what this peasantry was then with the prosperous intelligent farmer of a later day; when we see his rights in time freely granted, and loyally championed by the very class who were once blind

to the very existence of such rights; when we see this same riotous rebellious peasantry in time transformed into a body of middle class society, the very bulwark of the land; when we trace the influences back of all this marvellous transformation, and find they flow forth from Christianity; we can see that though the still small voice may be drowned temporarily by the storm, the earthquake, or the fire, yet in the silent caverns of conscience, as the glory of the Lord passes by, it continues speaking, with an authority that will eventually silence all resistance and command universal recognition.

And if at times the weight of unbelief and hardness of heart, and the present bitterness of party strife, seems too great for these silent powers to influence, we need only remember that the tremendous forces engaged in this age-long conflict were at the beginning, a tender Babe against a crafty king backed by all the resources of wealth and unscrupulous power. We must remember that when that hymn of peace and good-will was first sung into the deaf ears of a world, drunk with the false power of Rome, besotted with the false culture of Athens, and fanatical with the false religiousness of Jerusalem, it was heard only by shepherds and a few unknown saints who waited in faith for its revealing. When we remember how the principles of that world movement, then unknown or scoffed at, have come to be knit up into every part of the wondrous fabric of modern life, influencing its customs, maxims, laws and permeating its civil and social institutions: when we remember that the person who summed up in Himself the whole of that movement, has become for increasing multitudes a Divine Friend, the unquestioned authority for all their life: when we look abroad and see His spreading conquests in bringing about the actual reign of peace and good will: then we see that now as in every age, the greatness of the task and problem will be but the measure of the power of Christianity to conquer it, and that "with God all things are possible."

IV.

RECENT CRITICISM OF HABAKKUK— GIESEBRECHT AND STADE.

BY A. H. GODBEY.

"The most religious of all the prophets—and the most skeptical." Such is the expression of a thoughtful modern critic upon the prophet Habakkuk. But the accuracy of this remark is contingent upon the unity of the book. If the unique prophecy stands as the work, the expression of a single mind, battling with its doubts and problems, the above estimate cannot be amended. But if it is merely a *pot-pourri* of disconnected oracles tumbled together by some late devout Jew with a reverence for sacred numbers, who wished to make a twelfth minor prophet, there is little definite character assignable to the book as a whole: no connecting thread or purpose is imaginable. The conclusions attained by literary criticism of the prophecy are then of great practical importance.

The traditional view is well known to Bible students. Habakkuk is a real personality, a prophet living somewhere between the last days of Manasseh and the rise of the Chaldean kingdom; lamenting the social oppression in Judah and finding its punishment in the advent of the Chaldean; then wondering how so fierce and restless a nation could be used by Yahwe to punish one less evil than itself. The vision to be written on the tablet is uncertain; its relation to the problem obscure; interpretations of it are strained. Whether this is due to a faulty text or not may be considered later. As to the unity of the work, there has been a widespread impression that the third chapter is a separate production.

Now with rare exceptions, and those few conjectural rather than dogmatic, this view has been held by Biblical scholars generally, till within the last twelve years. Of the exceptions,

Horst, in 1798, suggested that the book was composed of three separate oracles collected at a late date, to make a twelfth minor prophet; and that the name Habakkuk is symbolical or mystical. Friedrich also suggested that the order of the three divisions was thus: III. 1-15, II. 5-17, III. 16-19, I.-II. 1-4. Von Gumpach, in his *Abriss der Babylonische und Assyrische Geschichte*, in 1854, said there were two divisions in the prophecy; the first division announced a Scythian raid, the second the deliverance of Judah. The first oracle consisted of chapters I. 1-4, II. 1-3, I. 5-11, III. 16-17. The second division contained III. 1-2, II. 4-20, III. 3-7, 15, 8-14, 18, 19, while verses 12, 13, 14 and 17^b in chapter II. were to be considered spurious. DeGoeje, in 1861, proposed a slightly different arrangement of the two oracles: I. 1-4, II. 1-3, I. 5-11, III. 16-17, III. 1-2, I. 12-17, II. 4-20, III. 3-7, 15, 8-14, 18, 19, and rejected as spurious, with von Gumpach, the verses 12-14 of chapter II.

But these dissections attracted no serious attention, and were practically forgotten till 1890, when the attack of Giesebrecht upon the unity of the first part of the book evoked others in rapid succession, and recalled to memory the earlier theorists. Wellhausen, Budde, Rothstein, George Adam Smith, all prominent in the world of Biblical criticism, have since been heard from, extending the work of Giesebrecht; and the minor voices are numerous.

Giesebrecht's views are embodied in his *Beitrage zur Jesaia-kritik*, 1890. His objections to the order and unity of the first section of the present book are as follows:

1. The words *rasha*, *tsaddiq*, in II. 1-6, and I. 12 certainly imply that the Chaldean is the wicked oppressor, and Israel the righteous. In vs. I. 1-4, the same words in contrast seem to refer to purely internal conditions in Judah. Hence the two sections cannot be by the same hand, if the present order be maintained.

2. It is impossible that internal disorder, social wrong, should be denounced, and the punishment of the oppressor bewailed, in the same moment.

3. The difficulty is not explained by considering that I. 12 marks a new beginning in a later time; for the suffixes to the verbs in this passage point unmistakably to the Chaldean mentioned before.

4. Nor does Kuenen help the matter by saying that I.-II. 8 were written after the beginning of the Chaldean supremacy; but that the method in I. 1-12 is a dramatic *rückblick*; a painting of the past as if it were future, in order to heighten the effect of the following passage. The voice of complaint found in I. 1-14 would then have been impossible.

5. The situation described in I. 1-4 is evidently continued in I. 12-17. Hence the interposing section must be misplaced, though the Chaldean be referred to in the verbal suffixes of the next section.

6. Verses I. 5-11 then form a complete, separate oracle, and properly precede vs. 1. The rest is unmistakably a unit; and the whole was an oracle of consolation, written after the beginning of Chaldean supremacy, and probably in exile. But this view implies precisely the sort of "*rück-blick*" or dramatic retrospect, which in criticising Kuenen, Giesebrecht believed impossible. And no adequate reason would appear for painting the Chaldean, after his supremacy, in Scythian colors.

Now it will be observed that this single transposition destroys the problem which the traditional view has always found in the book, and which forms its central fascination, so far as the prophet's personality is concerned. He is no longer left pondering the insoluble mystery of the ages: why a gigantic wrong is apparently used to chastise a far less evil. This would not, of course, form any logical objection to Professor Giesebrecht's view, unless it were shown that the problem should have occurred to the prophetic mind of the period, and that it did occur. There would then be strong *a priori* grounds for expecting its presentation in the speculations of Habakkuk. As a matter of fact it can be shown, not merely that the problem could have arisen at that time, but that in

view of prophetic precedents it was impossible that it should not have done so; that it did arise and was intellectually and theologically a disturbing force of tremendous power, and that no small proportion of Hebrew literature then and subsequently does discuss the question. But this phase of the question must be for the present reserved. It is merely desired to emphasize the fact that the transposition of this section eliminates the problem which forms the *motif*, the bond of unity in the present order of the book, and leaves further alterations not merely possible, but necessary, as other critics since Professor Giesebrecht have recognized.

It may be added that the point here emphasized answers in some measure the question some may ask: "Is the value of the book in anywise dependent upon the order of its parts? Is not the literary question wholly distinct from the teaching of the prophecy?" As regards many portions of the Hebrew scriptures, the first question could receive a decided negative. But with Habakkuk, the purpose of the book, and the interest in the author's personality and conclusions depend absolutely upon the arrangement. Without anticipating too much, whatever the difficulties critics have found in the present order of the contents, they are less than those consequent upon rearrangement. In the latter case we soon find a medley of things individually excellent, but as a whole meaningless.

Now, however plausible the small details of a critical process may seem, there often lies back of them a purpose or principle sufficient to bring them into disrepute. It is greatly to be feared that such is the case with Professor Giesebrecht's objections. His remarks upon Habakkuk have a questionable paternity, so far as concerns principles of criticisms. In the portion of his *Beitrag* referred to, he is endeavoring to establish, as an important principle for critical analysis, his assertion that it must be held impossible that in single prophetic writings or utterances there can be complete and immediate exchange of threat and warning for comfort or consolation. The consequences of such a method would be confusion and in-

security in the minds of the prophet's hearers as to the content and intent of his utterances.

With this principle in mind, with ulterior designs upon Isaiah, Giesebrecht examines Zech. I.-VIII., Amos, Hosea, Jer. XXX.-XXXIII., Ezek. XXXIV.-XLVIII., Isaiah XIII. 1-14, XXVI., XXI. 1-10, XXXIV., XXXV., XL.-LXVI. Habakkuk then comes into view. Clearly, the principle is unsound, if the present order of Habakkuk, with unity of authorship, be maintained. So much the worse for Habakkuk; the theory must be maintained at all hazards. Now, this method is not calculated to inspire one with confidence, so long as the principle is not demonstrated; and as the real reason for removing from its place the oracle announcing the Chaldean advent is that the chapter may harmonize with the unproven principle of criticism, the whole effort is to be rejected.

But what of the unproven principle? Can its accuracy be determined apart from the literature under consideration, that the argument may not proceed in a circle? It is clear that the point involved, as to the impossibility of denouncing the transgressor and bemoaning his punishment in the same breath, is a purely psychological one. May conflicting emotions struggle for expression in the mind of a man with consequent alternate expression? It is not unpleasantly dogmatic to remark that the point hardly admits of discussion. Anyone can satisfy himself by reference to his personal experience or observation. If the question be raised as to the recognition of the principle in literature, we might confine ourselves to representations of Jewish personalities, and show its recognition. Hear Salanio describe Shylock:

"I never hear a passion so confused
So strange, outrageous, and so variable,
As the dog Jew did utter in the streets:
'My daughter! O my ducats! O my daughter!
Fled with a Christian! O my Christian ducats!
Justice! The Law! My ducats—and my daughter!
A sealed bag, two sealed bags of ducats,
Of double ducats: stolen by my daughter!

And jewels! two stones, two rich and precious stones,
Stolen by my daughter! Justice! Find the girl!
She hath the stones upon her and the ducats."

Has anyone hitherto questioned the authenticity of the *Merchant of Venice*, or proposed to amend it, because of the elements of mental conflict in the character of the Jew? Or are the scenes in Scott's *Ivanhoe*, when Isaac of York more than once struggles between his affection for his daughter and his avarice, to be considered evidences of interpolation or derangement of the text? Or how could be proven the unauthenticity of the duel in behalf of Rebecca, in *Ivanhoe*, where the Templar is "slain by the violence of his own contending passions"? It would be interesting to know how much of the world's immortal literature, from Homer to the present, could remain intact if the proposed principle were applied. We have been taught to consider such touches as those referred to as marks of genius. But perhaps we are to believe in the impossibility of genius.

Reverting to ancient Israel, then, we should remember that in every prophet there are at least three men. The first, the elementary material in the making of a prophet, is the simple Israelite, intensely though narrowly patriotic, apparently absorbed heart and soul in the temporal prosperity and political ascendancy of his people. The second man is the sane statesman of practical foresight, realizing the folly of embroiling his petty state with the mighty empires at her doors; this man contrasts with the fanatical dervish, crusader, or false prophet with his blind unreasoning confidence that Yahwe will accord victory and prosperity to his people under any and all circumstances. Thirdly, there is the great ethical teacher, the unswerving enemy of wrong, stubbornly asserting its eventual overthrow. It is inevitable in the course of events in Israel, that these elements in a single personality should be brought into conflict. Is there one of the prophets of whom it is not true? Is there one of them whose personality can be properly appreciated, if this fact be not continually kept in mind? To

do this successfully requires an excellent historical imagination, it is true; and a cardinal difficulty may exist at this point in the intellect of many a critic, rather than in the literature studied. Professor Giesebrecht remarks that the net result of all previous criticism of Habakkuk is, that there is a certain unhistoricity in the arrangement of the book, and with this opinion he is in perfect accord. But our knowledge of the period is none too copious; and with only this in mind, we would be warranted in asserting that the verdict was somewhat premature, even if we did not suggest the possibility of a deficiency in historical imagination.

But, the fact of emotional conflicts in all the great prophets being admitted, may there not be truth in Professor Giesebrecht's contention that a free expression of these emotions of a prophet might confuse the minds of the auditors, and leave them in doubt as to the content and intent of the prophetic outcry? The best answer to this is given by the learned author himself; for he continues his theme by making three small reservations. A promise at the close of an oracle of threat or warning does not conflict with the principle, for the promise is to posterity; and, such a promise could show that the judgment was designed merely as a purification of Israel; and after a whole book of threats, the standpoint of the prophet is sufficiently clear, and he can allow the love of Yahwe for his people to be manifest in their behalf.

The unlearned man would doubtless be perplexed to know how it is determined that, when a promise or consolation follows a threat or warning, the latter is for the present generation, the former for a future one. The effort to make his auditor comprehend and apply such a principle as this could be safely depended upon to produce confusion in the minds of the prophet's hearer, even though none existed before. He would be apt to imagine that the second reservation mentioned would obviate the necessity of any such distinction. And the reason given for the third reservation leaves one wondering what has become of the great critical principle enounced. The prophet

can allow an entirely different element to appear in his message, when there is no danger that the people will mistake his view point. We may fairly be allowed the query, "Where or when was such mistake possible?" When were either threats or promises unconditional? Concerning what prophet's standpoint was the public ever in doubt? or what prophet was compelled to write a volume to make himself understood? What one of the prophets ever so wavered in his declarations of principles as to leave the nation uncertain as to his meaning? Tradition has it that Ahab knew perfectly well what Micaiah would say about him, ere he inquired. Jeremiah's unswerving attitude was known in Babylonia. Ahab and Hezekiah endeavored to keep certain of their intrigues from the knowledge of Isaiah, as he was rather pronounced in his views upon the subjects in question. A messenger went forth from the court of Jeroboam II. to interview Amos, but we are not given to understand that it was with the intention of securing a more explicit expression of the prophetic ideas. Nor do we gather that the weeping of Hosea was calculated to confuse the public in regard to his ultimate principles and beliefs. In short, if there were any men, if there was any class of men, who were unique in ancient Israel, for peculiar views, and unswerving adherence to them, such were certainly the prophets of Yahwe. The prophets, the sons of prophets, the schools of prophets, were as definite and distinct in the popular mind from other religious or ethical leaders as they were from the common people; and no evidence exists that, so far as concerns the few great voices that have come down to us, the people were ever uncertain for a moment as to their meaning. Their symbolical actions and enigmatical enunciations were designed to arouse the curiosity of the public and provoke inquiry concerning themes that certainly seemed hackneyed to the popular mind, so often had they heard them. Unless such uncertainty be demonstrated, Professor Giesebrecht's third reservation practically destroys his critical principle, by taking away the only plausible reason given for its enunciation.

But, granting the fact of conflicting emotions in the prophet, and the possibility of their being nevertheless generally understood by the public, in spite of alternations of mood or mode of expression, might not such interchanges of warning and promise really misrepresent the character of Yahwe? Are we to consider that such alternations constitute a false theology? This suggestion cannot be discussed here. The idea belongs in some form to all theologies devised by the human intellect, in every type of religious belief; and this part of our mental furniture we shall be compelled to work with for a few more millennia. The mental agony and conflict perceptible in Matt. XXIII. does not at present create insuperable theological difficulties.

But if we should allow Professor Giesebrecht's principle; if we should refuse to distinguish between the feelings of the Israelite as opposed to the Chaldean, and the feelings of the prophet as opposed to internal social wrongs and political insanity; if we should admit that the voicing of various emotions in public addresses or oracles would leave the public utterly at sea as to prophetic principles and purposes, it would still be necessary to insist upon their irrelevancy as regards Habakkuk, and the consequent lack of reason for the proposed rearrangement of the chapter. For it lies upon the very surface of the book that it is not a prophecy in the sense in which the other prophetic books are. There is no appeal to the people whatever. There is no reference, no hint, that points toward any contact with the public. It is not proper to style the various reflections as "oracles," in the sense used elsewhere. The whole book purports to be a colloquy between the prophet and Yahwe. Mighty problems beset the prophet, and he gropes for a solution. The alternations are the alternations of question and answer in the prophet's personal effort at ethical and theological reconstruction, not alternations of threat and promise occurring in a stated sermon to the public. So clearly is this the case that it seems to explain in part why we know absolutely nothing about the prophet. He is not men-

tioned in the struggles of Jeremiah and his friends, though internal evidence in abundance connects him with that period. In short, he was not a public figure at all, and his private reflections and devotions are more valuable on that account, as possibly affording us a peculiar insight into the mental turmoil and trouble of the righteous party in that period of dissolution and transition. The prophet in short, is not so much the Gladstone of his time as the Tennyson. He grapples with his problem of evil and suffering on his watchtower alone, to "know what he will say unto me." In such a position the pent-up emotions and speculations of the lonely seer would find fuller expression, and transitions of thought and feeling are to be expected that might perplex the unsympathetic or imaginative reader. But transposition or rearrangement of the outcries of a soul in such struggles in order to make them more intelligible is the last method in the world to employ. It is purely subjective in its origin, and results in as many different Habakkuks as there are critics. And it has not yet been proposed to rearrange some of Browning's character-studies in order to make them more comprehensible. The illustration is not inappropriate, for, as stated above, the reason for the dissection lies in the difficulty of understanding the present order. And it may be further remarked that even were Professor Giesebrecht's principle admitted, a poet or preacher in private reflection over grave problems may say things he would not say to the general public, or may say them in another order. The question can be fairly raised whether the book were ever intended for the people at large, whether it were not designed for private circulation among a few friends of the righteous minority of the period. On this point, with our present data, there can be no absolute conclusion. But it may be remarked, that the objections to the present order that are made by certain critics, give room for the opinion, if they are not tantamount to saying, that it is difficult to realize the usefulness of the book for the masses of the people at that time. Its chief problems are of no interest to them, but express the per-

plexity of one man, or at most, the righteous few. Take this fact, with the evident seclusion from the public manifest in the book itself, and we are not without grounds for conjecturing a limited private circulation as its primary object.

It will readily be perceived that if such attention has been given to the elementary observations of Professor Giesebrecht, it is because principles of criticism are involved that underlie all subsequent efforts at the reconstruction of the book. If the objections to Professor Giesebrecht's views be admitted, little general ground would then be left for further effort at dissection. But the details of the further efforts are full of interesting points, and should not pass unnoticed.

But in view of Professor Giesebrecht's remark that the general verdict attained by previous critical examinations of the prophecy was, that there was a certain unhistoricity about its order and content, a little examination of some processes by which this verdict is attained is in order, ere following the subsequent extension given to his own criticisms. The point might be conceded without examination, seeing that the book purports to be the record of personal struggles and perplexities, without conceding the further conclusions of the criticism considered. For, it is not psychologically true that struggling souls adhere closely to logic, or to the order of history, or even to the unvarnished facts of history, in their moments of wailing and questioning, their "wild and wandering cries." It is this very fact, that men swayed by strong emotions are not always logical, that makes the cardinal difficulty in giving life and movement to a portraiture of character, or in comprehending the rapid sketch of one when before us. To paraphrase Victor Hugo, if we had to deal with men constructed by Euclid instead of those painted by Homer, criticism would be a simple mechanical task. But though we are then clearly not compelled to find absolute historicity in Habakkuk in order to maintain its unity, an examination of this verdict of unhistoricity will be interesting and profitable. It will take our attention for a time from the first chapter.

The authenticity of the second and third chapters of the book has been more questioned than that of the first. Hitzig thirty years ago remarked that the unity generally accepted, and praised because of the artistic skill displayed in the construction could pertain only to section I.-II. 8: the very section that occasions difficulty to Giesebrecht. Stade in the ZATW, 1884, objects to the traditional interpretation of the taunt songs in chapter II. as referring to the Chaldean. In the ninth verse we have,

"Woe unto him that coveteth an evil covetousness to his house, that he may set his nest on high, that he may be delivered from the power of evil!"

Hitzig had proposed to interpret these taunts as directed at internal wrong instead of the Chaldean, and referred the denunciation to Jehoiakim, so vigorously assailed by Jeremiah in Jer. XXII., 13-17. Stade objects to the traditional interpretation, and to Hitzig's. For, the Chaldean can be in no fear of evil, and Jehoiakim can not be said to "set his nest on high"; further, this latter interpretation breaks the connection. He concludes that some petty Palestinian "robber-knight," with headquarters on some isolated crag, must be the object of the prophet's denunciation.

Now we should like to know if the expression "set his nest on high" must be taken only in a baldly literal sense; and if so, how this is to be proven. It may well be wondered if the average reader ever thought of putting such a narrow literal construction upon the phrase. And as to the impossibility of using in reference to the Chaldean the expression "that he may be delivered from the power of evil," the case is not so clear to others as it seems to be to Professor Stade. Certainly the Chaldeans had not found the path to political supremacy strewn with mosses and roses. Late comers into Babylonia, they had been engaged for a century or more in an effort to shake off the Assyrian yoke, and in their repeated insurrections had met with almost unvarying defeat. They were driven time and again into the marshes of southern Babylonia

or the islands of the Persian Gulf. Sennacherib had gone to the length of destroying Babylon, as the hotbed of rebellion, but Esarhaddon thought it wise to rebuild it. All this was well known to the Hebrew prophets, and Isaiah a century earlier had denounced the folly of Hezekiah, who lent an ear to the arch-rebel, Mesodach-Baladan, when the latter sought for help in Judah. And in view of the Chaldean failure in the struggle, in view of the eventual destruction of Nineveh by northern invaders, and not by Chaldeans; remembering that the hasty westward expedition to Carchemish was to prevent the Egyptian Necho from administering on the estate of the defunct Assyrian empire, we cannot see any impropriety in connecting the expression in question with the "bitter and hasty" people in the first chapter. Certainly the Chaldean's tenure of power, in face of Nineveh's overthrow by the hordes of the north, and the new life apparent for the moment in Egypt, with the active Greek mercenaries in her army, was not a sinecure.

Professor Stade also objects to verses 12-14. Compare 12 with Micah. III., 10: 13 with Jer. LI., 58: 14 with Is. XI., 9. Nothing is gained by the comparison. An interpolation is not proven: for if another person thought the sentiments worth borrowing, there is no reason why Habakkuk himself should not have thought so. Nor, in the case of contemporary prophets, is it possible to say which one borrowed. Nor can we be sure that both did not borrow from some source unknown to us. As the prophets were not concerned with questions of literary property but with social righteousness, the similarities are valuable only as showing the practical unity in sentiment to be found among them.

Very curious is Professor Stade's objection to the taunt-song contained in the next three verses. He suggests again comparisons with Hosea XI., 7-8, Isaiah XIV., 8, XXXVII., 24, XL., 16, and concludes that these verses cannot describe Jehoiakim; and as for the Chaldean, a world-conqueror has more important business than to go hunting, or hack trees.

We may be allowed here an illustrative quotation. In the account which Tiglath-Pileser I. gives of his campaigns, we find in column VI., lines 61-84, the following:

61. Under the protection of Uras (?) who loves me
62. from young wild bulls, powerful, large
63. in the desert in the land of Mitanni
64. and in the city of Arazigi, which (is) in front
65. of the land of the Hittites, with my mighty bow
66. a weapon of iron, and my pointed spear
67. their lives I ended:
68. their hides, their horns
69. to my city of Asur I brought,
70. Ten powerful male elephants
71. in the land of Harra and the bank of the *Khabur*.
72. I slew. Four elephants alive
73. I captured. Their hides,
74. their teeth, along with the live
75. elephants I brought to my city of Asur.
76. Under protection of Uras (?) who loves me
77. 120 lions, with my stout heart,
78. in the conflict of my heroism
79. on my feet I slew;
80. and 800 lions in my chariot
81. with javelins (?) I slaughtered.
82. all the cattle of the field, and birds of heaven
83. that fly, among my rarities, (?)
84. I placed.

In column VII., lines 4-16.

4. I took, I collected together, troops
5. of goats, fallow deer, wild sheep,
6. Antelopes which Asur and Uras (?)
7. the gods who love me have given
8. for hunting, in the midst of the lofty
9. mountains I have taken:

10. their herds I enclosed,
11. their number like that of a flock
12. of sheep I counted:
13. young lambs the offspring
14. of their heart, according to the desire of my heart
15. along with my pure sacrifices
16. annually I sacrificed to Asur my lord

Lines 17-27 recount his doings in the forests:

17. The cedar tree, the *Likharin* tree
18. the *allakan* tree, from the countries
19. which I had conquered, these trees
20. which among the kings
21. my fathers who were before me, none
22. had planted, I took, and
23. in the plantations of my country
24. I planted; and the costly fruit
25. of the plantation, which did not exist in my country
26. I took. The parks of Assyria
27. I established.

Elsewhere he mentions cutting down the trees in the mountains of the conquered countries.

Now this is not an isolated case. Tiglath-Pileser, the first great tiger of Assyria, elsewhere devotes an entire inscription to an account of his exploits in hunting; here he thought it worth while to include the story of his campaigns. Similar accounts, or references to their ravages in the timber of Lebanon and Amanus may be found in the inscriptions of Assurnasir-pal, of his son Shalmaneser, of Assur-akbal, of Sargon, of the Egyptian Thothmes III., of Sennacherib, or Assur-ban-apal. There was no great conqueror whose authority reached that district who did not exact heavy tribute of timber from the subject states. These war indemnities are the wearisome commonplaces of the ancient oriental records. We have also the accounts of efforts to secure timber from the

region by purchase or diplomacy, when the petty states were independent. It was the lumber-yard of the ancient world; neither the Nile Valley nor the Euphrates affording building timber, while the lower Euphrates was also without stone. Israel also drew upon the region continually. As to the hunting proclivities of the oriental monarchs the Assyrian conquerors repeatedly use figures or expressions drawn from the hunting field in narrating their campaigns. Esarhaddon says of the king of Sidon: "Abdi-Milkuti, its king, who before my arms had fled into the midst of the sea, like a fish from the midst of the sea I drew him forth, I cut off his head." Of San-du-arri, king of Kundi:

"Like a bird from the midst of the mountain
I drew him out, I cut off his head."

And again of certain captives he tells us that he chained them or caged them east of his city with dogs and wild boars. Examples need not be multiplied. They suggest the view point of the savage Assyrian. A campaign was a species of hunt after human game. The observation that a world conqueror has no time to hack trees or go hunting is very wide of the mark.

But it may be asked, if such assertions could be made of the fierce Chaldean ere his supremacy was a fact and his policy known. What has been already stated is a sufficient answer. Israel was perfectly familiar with the policy; had observed it for centuries; nothing else was expected of any rapacious oriental conqueror. Judah had some knowledge of Chaldean character also, from its century of fierce struggle with Assyria. That these historical commonplaces should be ignored in critical study of the period seems inexplicable.

Professor Stade also objects to the passage, that these things could not appeal to Israelite feeling; that an Israelite would not be interested in the wanton destruction of game or timber in that region. But the neighboring peoples are vitally concerned in the process. Theirs was the heavy drudgery of

getting out the timber, under the *corvée* or forced labor policy of the orient: and the Assyrian and Chaldean captives knew only too well what the transportation over weary leagues, and the labor of building implied. There was not a stone in the wall, not a stick of timber, that did not have its tale of blood and wrong to tell. And as to the Israelite sentiment, it must be observed that the Deuteronomic code, which was certainly the rallying point of the reform party of the time, whatever view may be maintained as to the date of compilation—has some specific injunctions against misuse of animals and wanton or needless destruction of timber. And as the crystalization of an idea into a formal code usually follows at some distance its growth as popular sentiment, we wonder why Professor Stade ignores these elements of Israelitish history in addition to those referred to in the conduct of contemporary nations.

Lastly must be indicated the most important factor in this question. Professor Stade's criticism ignores the passionate love of the Israelite for the rugged hills of his land. All his poetic outbursts are replete with figures drawn from the mountains and streams. His loftiest title for the ideal temple of Yahweh is "The mountain of the Lord's house." The one place on earth for it is "in the tops of the mountains." If in sorrow and bitterness of soul he remembered him "whose foundation is in the holy mountains," he "lifted up his eyes to the hills from whence came his help." The marvelously fertile levels of the Babylonian plain were as a wilderness in comparison. Their lurid sun glare, the scorching winds, the reedy marshes, the dull sand-clouds, but awakened unutterable longing in the hungry Jewish heart. The fervid imagination of the exilic prophet, who may never have seen those northern hills, planted the highway homeward with the favorite trees of that tract; so ineffaceable from the memory of the people were they. And of all these mountains, Lebanon is ever preëminent, in poetry and song. The glory of Lebanon, the excellency of Carmel, the dew of Hermon, have filled the ages

with their immortal beauty and fragrance. Indifferent to the ravaging of Lebanon, the pride of his land, the inspiration of his poets, his one earthly paradise, that filled all the dreams of the seer? The Jew could as easily have been indifferent to the desolation of the holy city itself. And if the quibble be raised that the prophets of Judah were not interested in this northern fragment of a dead kingdom, we must remember that Josiah's reform included an effort to reclaim the northern territory.

There certainly seems reason so far to consider the "unhistoricity" subjective. Nor is the impression lessened when we find Stade objecting that an Israelite prophet would not taunt a Chaldean king with idolatry! Others may not be certain of this; and the conclusion that this "woe" was appended after the fall of the Chaldean, while 18 is another interpolation, certainly makes liberal assumptions. If Professor Stade intends to suggest that the prophet would imperil himself by such denunciation during the life of a Chaldean monarch, it should be remarked that an exaggerated reverence for or fear of kingly authority was never a prominent feature of the prophetic character. There was not one of the prophets who did not imperil his life for his principles. Further, even if we admit that such peril would be considered by a prophet, it must be proven that this oracle or any other part of the book was written after the beginning of Chaldean domination in Palestine. Certainly the book as it stands purports to antedate that period; and no disproof is offered. Finally, there recurs the problem already suggested: were these utterances ever public at all? As stated, their whole setting and method is somewhat against the idea that they are oracles for the public. And we remember that according to the modern critical view, the poems of Isaiah of Babylon are full of this very contempt for idols, uttered at the very doors of Bel and Nebo, by one whose life may have overlapped chronologically the period of Habakkuk. Habakkuk's utterance can hardly be an anachronism. And the possibility of such treasonable

utterances, and the loss of the exilic prophet's name, resulting in the appending of the oracles to the work of Isaiah of Jerusalem, are alike explained by the assertion of their private anonymous circulation. It is curious that Professor Stade should forget this important doctrine of his own school; and not less remarkable that able critics like Kuenen and Cornill should be found assenting to the results of his investigation, and to his conclusion that verses nine to twenty form a later addition to the original oracle.

V.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA AND THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES.*

BY PROF. A. V. HIESTER, A.M.

In Connecticut, as in New Hampshire, the authority of the civil government to care for religion was fully recognized from the beginning; but political privilege, except the right to hold the office of governor, was at no time made to rest on church membership. There was also toleration; for, while the Congregational Church was established by law and maintained by public taxation, other forms of faith and worship were allowed by special permission of the General Court. But this proved after all a narrow sort of toleration; for, though a man was free to choose between particular forms, he was required to choose some form of public worship, inasmuch as non-attendance on public worship in some congregation recognized by law was made punishable by a fine of five shillings for every absence.

The arrival of the first Quakers was the signal for more stringent measures against dissent. The act of 1656 provided that no town should entertain a Quaker for a period of more than two weeks on penalty of a fine of £5 for every week. The law also imposed a fine of £20 on shipmasters who brought Quakers into the colony. The following year the act was amended by the requirement that the fine appointed for entertaining Quakers should be imposed on the person giving such entertainment instead of on the town. A third act was directed against the Quakers in 1658, when the possession of Quaker books was forbidden to all but teaching elders on penalty of a fine of ten shillings. All three of these acts were repealed in 1705.

* Continued from the January number.

With the repeal of these anti-Quaker acts there was a return to the policy of a qualified toleration which prevailed during the first two decades of the colony's existence. Thus the act of 1708 guaranteed to all dissenters full liberty of worship on condition that they qualified as dissenters by entering their names in the county court. The neglect of this requirement by some, and the appearance of certain irregularities, occasioned the act of 1723, which repeated the provisions of the act of 1708 concerning the qualifying of dissenters and denied to all persons, who neglected the public worship of God in some lawful congregation, the right to hold worship in private houses on penalty of a fine of twenty shillings for each offense; and any one, not a recognized minister, who administered the sacraments, was to be fined £10 and whipped.

The disturbances that accompanied the "Great Awakening" caused Connecticut, for the second time, to take a backward step in the matter of religious toleration. In consequence of the violent denunciations of the established ministry by itinerant preachers, stirred into a frenzy of excitement by the preaching of Whitefield, the General Court in 1743 repealed the act of 1708 and substituted a less liberal measure. Instead of permitting dissenters to qualify by merely entering their names in the county court the new law empowered the assembly to grant to Protestants, who soberly dissented from the established worship and ministry, the right of organization and worship only after such dissenters had presented themselves before the assembly and had there taken the oaths and subscribed the declaration against Transubstantiation prescribed by act of Parliament. This was the first piece of legislation to deny toleration to Catholics.

To anti-Catholic prejudices, too, must be ascribed a second piece of illiberal legislation. This was an act aimed at the Moravian missionaries in the colony, who were laboring among the Indians and whom the ignorant populace suspected of being Jesuits. The act declared that "foreigners and suspected persons, who sow and spread false and dangerous doc-

trines of religion amongst us, to stir up discord, to estrange the minds of the Indians from us," should be arrested and taken before the governor who was required to use such means as might be proper to protect the colony. Under this law the Moravian missions were broken up and the missionaries forced to leave the colony.

While freedom of worship was conceded to Protestants generally all forms of Protestantism were obliged to contribute to the support of the established church until 1727, when it was enacted that the taxes, collected from persons who declared themselves of the Church of England and who lived near enough to a society of that denomination, served by a rector, to attend its services, should be paid over to such society. Two years later the same privilege was extended to the Quakers and Baptists, and, after the Revolution, to all dissenters professing the Christian religion. It was not until 1818, however, that disestablishment became complete.

In the colony of New Haven a more intolerant theocracy than that of Massachusetts prevailed. It was ordained among other things in the "Fundamental Agreement," adopted in 1638, that the Word of God should be the only rule of government and that all officials and magistrates should be chosen by and from church members. Church and State were one, for the clergy exercised supreme control over both temporal and spiritual concerns, and the Mosaic code was the foundation of all law. All crimes punishable by death in the Mosaic economy, and only such, were made capital crimes. Trials by jury were unknown because they had no place in the Mosaic law. All the inhabitants of the colony were required to contribute to the support of the established church; and non-attendance at its public services was made punishable by a fine of five shillings for every absence. No strangers were permitted in the colony without a special license from the magistrates. With the single exception of capital punishment the legislation against the Quakers ran through the same gamut of penalties and disabilities as in Massachusetts. The union

of New Haven with the colony of Connecticut in 1662 put an end to the former's theocratic system, for under the articles of union the united colony inherited the laws and institutions of the latter.

Rhode Island was founded on the broad basis of the civil equality of all sects. The government, established at Providence in 1637, expressly disclaimed all power to interfere in matters of conscience. Four years later the right to hold any religious doctrine not subversive of civil order was guaranteed by legislative enactment. The first legislature under the charter of 1644 declared the broadest conceivable liberty of conscience and worship to be fundamental. In a petition for a new charter, presented to Charles II. in 1662, the following declaration occurs: "It is much in our hearts to hold forth a lively experiment that a most flourishing civil state may stand, and best be maintained, with a full liberty of religious concernments." The charter of 1663, granted in response to this petition, provided that "no person within the said colony, at any time hereafter, shall be in any wise molested, punished, disquieted or called in question for any difference in opinion in matters of religion; every person may at all times freely and fully enjoy his own judgment and conscience in matters of religious concernments." The following year religious liberty was established by legislative enactment in almost the exact words of the charter.

From this advanced position there were but two lapses. The first was a measure directed against the Quakers and which required an engagement of fidelity and obedience to the laws on pain of forfeiture of the franchise. The second lapse was the disfranchisement of Catholics by virtue of a law, which purported to have been enacted some time after 1688 and which declared that "all who professed Christianity, excepting only Catholics, of competent estates and civil conversation, obedient to the magistrates, though of different religious opinions," should be freemen and capable of choosing and being chosen to all offices. Bancroft contends that no such

law was ever enacted by the legislature but that it was interpolated in the public records by a committee appointed to prepare these records for printing. Be this as it may, it is certain that under the provisions of this act the Catholics were disabled both from voting and from holding office.

The rule of perfect religious freedom, which prevailed at first in Maryland, did not rest on Lord Baltimore's charter, for that instrument recognized no form of toleration not authorized by the laws of England; nor on any formal edict of the government; nor on any oath prescribed by the proprietary; nor on any act of colonial legislation. It grew up silently as the custom of the land and was primarily owing to Lord Baltimore's recognition of the fact, that in view of the political conditions prevailing in England an exclusively Catholic province was clearly beyond the range of possibility and that only by tolerating Protestants could he secure toleration for his fellow Catholics. The first legal expression of the principle of toleration dates from 1637. In that year the first assembly met to act on a "Body of Laws," prepared by Lord Baltimore, and adopted the principle that the church must be free from all interference by the civil power. That liberty of conscience was not based on any enlightened view of the rights of opinion is shown by the "Toleration Act" of 1649, adopted at Lord Baltimore's suggestion, and which limited the benefits of toleration to Catholics and orthodox Protestants. "No person," it declared, "professing to believe in Jesus Christ shall from henceforth be any ways troubled, molested, or discountenanced for, or in respect to, his or her religion, nor in the free exercise thereof in this province, or the islands thereunto belonging, nor in any way compelled to believe or exercise any other religion against his or her consent, so that they be not unfaithful to the lord proprietary, or molest or conspire against civil government." Under this act there was no room in the colony for Unitarians, Jews, Infidels or Pagans. Death was the prescribed penalty for blasphemy and for denying the divinity of Christ. For speaking re-

proachfully of the Virgin Mary or of the apostles a fine of £5 was appointed. Calling anyone by an opprobrious term descriptive of his creed was forbidden on penalty of a fine of ten shillings. Despite the harsh letter of the act there is no evidence that Lord Baltimore's government ever disturbed any person on account of his religious beliefs. The law was not enforced; in fact it is quite possible that it was not meant to be enforced but was designed only to satisfy Puritan opinion in England. It is true the Quakers were fined and imprisoned and their property confiscated. But this was owing solely to their refusal to bear arms and take oaths. Their right to meet publicly remained unchallenged; and after 1688 they enjoyed complete toleration.

In 1650 a movement to wrest the province from Lord Baltimore was inaugurated by the Puritan element in the colony, many of whom had been driven out of Virginia for non-conformity. The temporary success of the movement was followed by the immediate repeal of the act of 1649 and the disfranchisement of the Roman Catholics by the act of 1654. The act was disallowed, however, by Cromwell.

Lord Baltimore recovered his rights of proprietorship in 1658 only to be confronted with new troubles. The growing disparity between Protestants and Catholics deepened the discontent that a province peopled so largely by Protestants should be permitted to remain in the hands of a Catholic. A second difficulty was precipitated by the adherents of the Church of England who demanded an established church. In the third place, the proprietary had to reckon with the rising tide of democracy which broke fiercely against the principle of feudal sovereignty. In consequence of the frequent complaints against the proprietary government which reached England the home government ordered that all offices of government should be entrusted to Protestants. But this failed to satisfy the intolerant and discontented elements in the colony. A fresh insurrection in 1689 resulted in the overthrow of the government and the creation of a royal province.

The transition from proprietary to royal rule was quickly followed by the establishment of the Church of England by legislative enactment. Other Protestant sects were tolerated but the public exercise of the Catholic religion was everywhere interdicted, although wealthy Catholic planters were permitted by the act of 1704 to build and maintain private chapels. The same act provided a fine of £50 or six months' imprisonment for Catholic priests and bishops who publicly exercised their offices. To prevent the immigration of Catholics a tax of twenty shillings was imposed on every Irish servant imported into the province. The act of 1714 renewed this provision, provided a fine of £5 for concealing such importation, and prescribed certain oaths to be taken by immigrants in order that their religious opinions might be discovered. Under the act of 1715 children of a Protestant father and Catholic mother could be taken from the mother in case of the decease of the father. The acts of 1716 and 1718 disfranchised Catholics and disabled them from public office. It was not until 1777 that Catholics were enfranchised by the same act that swept away the established church.

The Carolina charter of 1663 vested the eight proprietaries of the colony with almost regal powers, among them the right of advowson according to the law of England. At the same time the principle of toleration was recognized and the proprietaries were empowered to grant to dissenters such indulgences and dispensations as they should deem proper. This power the proprietaries promptly exercised by pledging themselves in their "Declaration and Proposal," published the same year, that all who should settle in the colony should enjoy "freedom and liberty of conscience in all religious and spiritual things." The charter of 1665 repeated the provisions of the first charter guaranteeing religious liberty.

The liberal rule of the proprietaries attracted many dissenters into the colony, as was doubtless its purpose; but it was not long before a less tolerant policy began to prevail. The entering wedge in this departure from the broad tolera-

tion that marked the beginnings of the colony was the formal establishment of the Church of England in 1669 by the "Fundamental Constitutions." Article 96 of that instrument declared that "it shall belong to the parliament to take care for the building of Churches and the public maintenance of divines to be employed in the exercise of religion according to the Church of England, which, being the only true and orthodox and the natural religion of all the King's dominions, is also of Carolina; and, therefore, it alone shall be allowed to receive public maintenance by grant of parliament." At the same time all sorts of dissenters were tolerated save only Atheists and non-religionists. "No man," says article 95, "shall be permitted to be a freeman of Carolina, or to have any estate or habitation within it, that doth not acknowledge a God, and that God is publicly and solemnly to be worshipped." Article 101 went still further and practically outlawed all who were not members of some religious communion. "No person above seventeen years of age," it declares, "shall have any benefit or protection of the law, or be capable of any place of profit or honor, who is not a member of some Church or profession."

It is hardly necessary to add that the "Fundamental Constitutions" proved an impossible ideal for Carolina and that neither their civil nor their religious provisions were ever enforced with any degree of strictness. This is particularly true of the latter, for it does not appear that any one was ever outlawed or expelled from the colony because of a lack of religion. Of the eleven articles dealing with matters of religion but one was enforced and that was the one which established the Church of England; and even that remained long inoperative, the first law to settle a minister being enacted only in 1698, nearly thirty years later, while the first church in the colony was erected in 1681 and by private means.

The immigration of a large Church of England element toward the close of the century precipitated a bitter political and religious conflict. Many of the new arrivals were of

gentle blood and at once allied themselves with the official class in an effort to monopolize political power in the interest of the Church. The first step to this end was the act of 1696, which, while assuming the validity of the religious establishment provided by the now abandoned "Fundamental Constitutions," declared that all Christians, excepting only Papists, should "enjoy the full, free and undisturbed exercise of their consciences, so as to be in the exercise of their worship according to the professed rules of their religion, without any lett, hindrance or molestation by any power either ecclesiastical or civil whatever."

The evident purpose of this act was to lull dissenters into a fancied security through the semblance of a broad spirit of toleration, and to serve as a cloak underneath which more radical legislation might be accomplished later. In reality, the act, while purporting to be a reiteration of the principle of toleration contained in the "Fundamental Constitutions," was something much less liberal, for it made no reference to the civil rights of dissenters and confined toleration to Protestants. On the heels of this act came the act of 1698 which was the first act of legislation to settle a minister.

Nothing further was done to limit the civil and religious rights of dissenters until 1704, when the adherents of the Church of England, deeming themselves strong enough to take another forward step, attempted to rest the religious establishment on a firmer foundation than the shadowy one afforded by the ninety-sixth article of the abandoned "Fundamental Constitutions." In two acts of legislation passed that year it was provided that all members of the assembly should be members of the Church of England and have taken the sacrament according to the rites of that church at least once in the year past, that dissenters should be obliged to attend public worship at an established church, that disfranchisement and outlawry should be the penalties for blasphemy and denying the Trinity or the truth of the Scriptures, that churches should be erected, ministers supported, and plebes and parishes maintained at

public expense, and that the supreme authority in ecclesiastical matters should be vested in a court of twenty laymen. The bitter opposition excited by these high-handed measures, for probably three fourths of the inhabitants of the colony were dissenters, caused them to be disallowed by the Crown; and two years later they were repealed by the assembly. In 1707 a more moderate measure was substituted which, while it reestablished the Church of England, dispensed with the lay court of supervision and the high-handed invasions of the civil and religious rights of dissenters of the acts of 1704.

In both North and South Carolina after their separation in 1729 the Church of England retained its legal establishment down to the Revolution on the basis of the act of 1707.

The first scheme of government for New Jersey, after its separation from New York in 1664 by grant of James, the duke of York, to Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret, guaranteed the widest toleration in matters of religion. The "Concessions" of the new proprietaries, while authorizing the assembly to appoint clergymen of the Church of England to be supported at the common expense, declared that "no person * * * shall be any ways molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question in matters of religious concerns, who do not actually disturb the civil peace of the province; but all and every such person, or persons, may * * * freely and fully have and enjoy his and their judgments and consciences in matters of religion throughout the province."

In 1676 the western half of New Jersey was purchased from Berkeley by a number of English Quakers, who published the following year a "Fundamental Agreement" that practically reiterated the liberal terms of the "concessions" of Berkeley and Carteret which it superseded. "No men, nor number of men," it declared, "hath power or authority to rule over men's consciences in religious matters; therefore, it is consented, agreed and ordained, that no person or persons whatsoever within the said province, at any time or times hereafter, shall be any ways, upon any pretense whatsoever, called

in question, or in the least punished or hurt, either in person, estate, or privilege, for the sake of his opinion, judgment, faith or worship towards God in matters of religion; but that all and every such person and persons may, from time to time and at all times, freely and fully have and enjoy his and their judgments and the exercise of their consciences in matters of religious worship throughout all the said province." This principle the first assembly repeated and extended to the domain of civil rights in the act of 1681, which declared that "liberty of conscience in matters of faith and worship shall be granted to all people within this province, who shall live peaceably and quietly therein, and none of the free people of the province shall be rendered incapable of office in respect to their faith and worship."

In East Jersey a less liberal policy prevailed after a time. In 1682 it too passed into the hands of the Quakers by purchase from the heirs of Carteret. The following year the language of the original "Concessions" was reiterated in an act of assembly. But in 1698, for some reason not altogether clear, but probably in consequence of a large immigration of other elements than the Quakers, liberty of conscience was by law limited to persons "acknowledging one Almighty and Eternal God, and professing faith in Christ Jesus."

With the reunion of East and West Jersey under a royal government, and the attachment of the united colony to New York, a new policy was inaugurated. The instructions of Lord Cornbury, the first to be appointed governor of both provinces, after enjoining him to permit liberty of conscience to all except Papists, charged him further to "collate any person, or persons, to any Churches, Chappells, or other Ecclesiastical Benefices within Our said Province, as often as any of them shall happen to be voyd"; to see to it that "God Almighty be devoutly and duly served throughout the government, the book of common prayer, as by law established, read every Sunday and holy day, and the blessed Sacrament be administered according to the rites of the Church of England";

to care for church buildings and the support of ministers; to induct ministers certified to by the Bishop of London and remove scandalous ones; and to report to the Bishop of London who was vested with ecclesiastical jurisdiction over both New York and New Jersey. These instructions appear to have assumed either that the New York act of 1693 applied to New Jersey by virtue of their recent union or that the royal decree was sufficient to provide and maintain a religious establishment without the intervention of an act of legislation. This fictitious establishment continued down to the Revolution, each succeeding governor being instructed in practically the same terms as Cornbury. But no statute ever recognized the Church of England.

In Georgia liberty of conscience was guaranteed to all persons except Roman Catholics by the charter of 1732. Twenty years later this charter was surrendered and a royal government established. In 1758 the Church of England was formally established, although every faith but the Roman Catholic was tolerated. This policy continued to the Revolution.

In Pennsylvania, including Delaware, barring a few temporary lapses, religious liberty, not religious toleration merely, prevailed from the first. The distinction between the two consists in this that the former does not permit a state church maintained by public taxation while the latter presupposes such a religious establishment. But broad as Penn's conception of religious liberty was it was less comprehensive than that of Roger Williams. This can be seen from Penn's first frame of government which was provisionally agreed upon in England, May 5, 1682, and adopted by the freemen of the province in December of the same year. "All persons living in this province," it declared in the thirty-fifth section, "who confess and acknowledge one Almighty and Eternal God to be the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the world; and that hold themselves obliged in conscience to live peaceably and justly in civil society, shall in no ways be molested or prejudiced for their religious profession or practice in matters of

faith and worship; nor shall they be compelled at any time to frequent or maintain any religious worship, place or ministry whatever." A second article, the thirty-fourth, made all who profess faith in Jesus Christ eligible to vote and hold office.

It will be seen, therefore, that while Roman Catholics, proscribed in every other colony excepting Rhode Island, were neither denied the right of residence, nor disfranchised, nor even disabled from office, Atheists, Deists, non-Christian Theists and Jews were very seriously restricted in their civil and religious rights. The last could reside in the colony but could neither hold office nor vote. The first two were denied even the right of habitation. In Rhode Island, on the other hand, at first and so long as the spirit of Roger Williams dictated the laws, the civil equality of all forms of religious belief or disbelief, so long as they did not extend to the subversion of civil order, was recognized as a fundamental principle of government.

But even in Pennsylvania Roman Catholics were permitted to enjoy the civil and religious rights guaranteed by Penn only for a brief period. Soon after the accession of William and Mary, Penn, whose relations with James II. and whose acceptance of the benefits of the "Declarations of Indulgence" in behalf of large numbers of Quakers suffering the penalties of the laws against dissenters brought him under public suspicion and odium, lost his province. Pennsylvania was at once placed under the government of Governor Fletcher of New York, whose commission instructed him to summon a general assembly for Pennsylvania, the members of which before entering upon their duties should be required to "take the oaths prescribed by the act of Parliament to be taken and subscribe the tests therein laid down." The act referred to was the Toleration Act of 1689, which excepted certain classes of dissenters from the operation of certain statutes against non-conformity on condition that they manifested their loyalty by taking the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy and their Protestantism by subscribing the Declaration against Tran-

substantiation. Quakers were permitted to substitute a promise of fidelity to the government for the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy. On the other hand, an additional requirement was imposed upon them, viz., a declaration of faith in the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, according to the Athanasian formula, and also in the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments. These declarations and tests, which were designed to secure to certain classes of dissenters in England freedom of worship, became in Pennsylvania by virtue of Fletcher's commission indispensable qualifications for membership in the assembly. In 1703 they were extended by order of the home government to all offices of honor, trust or emolument in the province. Later, however, the test relating to the Trinity was discontinued.

In 1694 Penn regained possession of his province and two years later the third frame of government, embodying the declarations and tests of the Toleration Act and requiring them to be administered to all office holders, was adopted. Penn's acquiescence in what was clearly a backward step from the civil and religious liberty established by the first frame was doubtless due either to his fear of again losing his charter or to his conviction that no larger freedom of conscience was then possible. In 1699 Penn appears to have returned to his original position, for among the laws proposed to the assembly of that year was one concerning liberty of conscience, and another concerning qualifications for holding office which reaffirmed the principles of religious liberty contained in the first frame of government. The same principles were incorporated in the fourth frame of government, which Penn granted in 1701 and in which it was ordained that "no person believing in one God shall be molested on account of his religious persuasions nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any worship contrary to his mind" and that "Christians of all denominations are capable of office."

But Penn had plainly gone too far now in view of the inflamed state of public opinion in England, where, owing to Louis XIV.'s recognition of the son of James II., a fresh wave

of hostility to Catholicism was sweeping over the country. A bill was proposed in the House of Lords to deprive Penn of his charter. Penn, who was in Pennsylvania at the time, at once returned to England and succeeded in arresting the measure. Then Queen Anne issued an order in council requiring all who held any public office in any colony, whether royal, chartered or proprietary, to take the tests and subscribe the declaration prescribed by the Toleration Act. When the objection was interposed that the order did not apply to Pennsylvania, since the law of 1700 required office holders to be qualified in a different way, the Privy Council availed itself of the power reserved to the Crown of disallowing all laws enacted by the assembly any time within five years of their passage. Accordingly on February 7, 1705, it repealed the two laws concerning liberty of conscience and qualifications for office which had been passed in 1700 at Penn's suggestion. As soon as the assembly received notice of this action it passed a new law in conformity to the royal order of 1702. - This act remained in force until the Revolution.

Another of the laws enacted by the assembly in 1700 and disallowed by the Privy Council had empowered the proprietary to naturalize all foreigners settling in the province. It was disallowed on the ostensible ground that no such power was conferred by the charter; but the real reason is to be found in the Protestant bigotry of the home government. This appears from the fact that no objection was offered by the home government when the Swedes and Dutch were naturalized in 1682 by act of assembly; and from the further fact that the naturalization acts of 1708, 1729, 1730, 1734 and 1737, the first of which naturalized certain German Protestants by name, while the others provided for the naturalization of such foreigners as had lived seven years in the province and were Protestants and were willing to avow their Protestantism by taking the tests and subscribing the declaration prescribed by the Toleration Act, remained in every instance unchallenged. The effect of disallowing the act of 1700 was to exclude foreign-born Catholics, Jews and Socin-

ians from citizenship. Similarly by the act of 1730 only Protestants could legally hold property for religious and charitable uses.

From the foregoing examination it will be seen now that in the matter of religious liberty as evidenced by charters, frames of government, royal instructions and legislative enactments, Pennsylvania was far in advance of every other colony, Rhode Island alone excepted. Outside these two whoever did not conform to the established religion did not stand on the same plane of civil and religious rights as the conformist. A Protestant non-conformist, while generally free to exercise his peculiar form of worship, was everywhere required to support the established religion; and not infrequently he was both disfranchised and disabled from office. A Catholic non-conformist was everywhere disfranchised, disabled from office, forbidden the public observance of his religion, and in many instances denied even the right of habitation. In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, there was no established church and no one was ever required to maintain or contribute to any religious worship or ministry. No one was ever fined, imprisoned, banished, beaten, mutilated, burned or hung because of his religious opinions. No religious sect was ever denied the right of public worship. While it is true that foreign Catholics could not acquire the rights of citizenship, that only Protestants could legally hold property for religious and charitable uses, and that only orthodox Protestants could hold office, it must not be forgotten that these harsh and intolerant requirements were forced upon Penn and his province by the illiberal spirit of the mother country; and that wherever it was possible they were not enforced. A sharp distinction may always be drawn between the letter of a law and the manner of its administration. The former may be harsh and rigorous while the latter is mild and humane. It was so in Pennsylvania. If the peculiar political conditions could dictate laws that fell short of perfect liberty it was the mild and benevolent spirit of Penn that presided over their administration.

VI.

FREEDOM IN THE TRUTH.

BY REV. SAMUEL Z. BEAM, D.D.

"Who then is free? The wise man who can command himself."—*Horace*.

"He is the freeman whom the truth makes free."—*Cowper*.

The battle cry of freedom has been heard throughout the ages and among all peoples. It will, doubtless, continue to be heard as long as greed and power combine to impoverish and oppress the weak. It is the spontaneous utterance of the downtrodden and oppressed. It has often expressed itself in heroic deeds, as well as in murderous cruelty. Frequently the oppressor has been hurled from power by an enraged people who suffered under his tyrannical rule.

Sometimes the liberty thus gained has been a step up to a higher stage of civilization, and become a permanent advantage to the people. At others it has only opened the way for the elevation of another to the seat of power, who equally enslaved the people as before.

The history of mankind embraces a history of this struggle for freedom; and while much has been gained in the past, the advancement has been painfully slow. The principle has, perhaps, reached its highest development in our age and country. But a survey of the situation, even in America, clearly indicates an age-long continuance of the struggle before true freedom for all can be realized.

The reason for its sluggish growth, we believe, is to be found in the corruption of our nature, which is fettered by the bondage of sin. And however intelligent man may be, in other respects, the majority do not seem to comprehend the real nature of sin. Accordingly, while groaning under the oppressive yoke, they realize that something is wrong, but almost universally fail to recognize that outward oppression

is, after all, the natural consequence of inward corruption, and that sin is the real source of all forms of slavery. And failing to free themselves from its yoke, they have only partially succeeded in advancing the cause of human freedom. The love of power, the desire of esteem, the purpose to obtain wealth, all laudable and right in themselves, are prostituted to selfish ends.

This is true in our day. It was especially and more generally true before the introduction of Christianity, and the proclamation of the Gospel.

The nearest approach to the true idea of freedom, before the coming of Christ, was undoubtedly effected in Judaism, under the laws enacted by Moses by divine inspiration. But even there the yoke of bondage was heavy, though the law prohibited the oppression of Hebrew slaves, and provided for their periodical manumission at the Jubilee.

But even a divine law can not free men from sin. It could only bring them to the consciousness of sin. Or in the language of St. Paul, "The law came in besides that the trespass might abound,"* that is, that sin might be seen to be sin.

In the old world, represented by Greece and Rome, the helots and the plebs, from time to time, made strenuous efforts to secure liberty, but usually with unsatisfactory results. Revolts against the ruling classes were put down by force; and if, in any case, success attended the revolt it resulted in raising others to power, who became as oppressive as those whom they deposed.

The plebeians at Rome, after repeated struggles against the tyranny of the patricians, finally succeeded to a share in the ruling power, but they proved themselves equally cruel and tyrannical with the patricians. Many of them rose to positions of wealth and authority, and used their liberty to oppress the class from which they rose. So that after many bitter and bloody struggles, out of which some rose and others fell, there was little more freedom than before.

* Rom. 5: 20.

All this demonstrates that liberty, in the minds of the masses who clamor for its possession, is simply a license to do as one pleases, and lord it over others less fortunate. Or it is an expression of selfishness, the natural and necessary fruit of corruption in the human heart. And therefore what was true in the days of Greece and Rome, is equally true universally among sinful men. Thus the struggles for freedom, which history records, very clearly show the need, and the consciousness of the need of freedom. But they verify the statement, also, that the real want *was misunderstood*. Because whenever liberty was secured, it was used to enslave and oppress others, and not for their benefit.

Familiar instances, of such misapprehension of the true meaning of freedom, are furnished in our day by conventions, of so-called Reformers, assembled for the purpose of demanding "reforms," whether religious, social or political. They enumerate grievances of various kinds, the sum of which is, that the people's "rights" are ignored, or set aside, or taken away. And the people are impressed, by eloquent orators, that they ought "to rise up in their might" and demand those "rights." The creeds of the church it may be, are too exacting and the bars must be let down for greater latitude of belief.

Politicians go the rounds condemning those in authority, especially when the party in power has a different political faith from theirs. In all such efforts, the words, "Rights" and "Liberty," figure quite prominently. Those in authority are charged with defrauding the people, of these "inalienable" privileges: even the very best acts of the administration are condemned without scruple, notwithstanding such acts subserve the highest political and material interests of the people, whom they serve. The same is true, whatever party may be in power. The agitators, in these instances, usually have some ulterior and selfish motive. But, of course, it is all well understood. All intelligent people know that it is a travesty, a perversion, a falsification of the truth, and that it is practiced for some political end. But it is condoned, be-

cause every "one has a right to seek his own aggrandizement, in a democratic state"; and a political or social lie may help him to gain his end. But it proves that, even in enlightened America, the depravity of human nature is still unsubdued, and that liberty is far from being understood, or if understood, is miserably abused.

The same unwelcome truth confronts us further in the business world. Great corporations, or business firms, or "trusts," undertake to shape legislation, and control the judiciary, in the interests of their business, in this way giving expression to their idea of freedom. They demand laws to protect them in holding up prices, or reducing production, to raise prices, while their employes live on short rations, and consumers pay exorbitant rates on their wares. If laws are made to regulate such concerns, in the interest of the public, they regard their liberties as taken away.

On the other hand, we have trades unions, labor unions, knights of labor, contractors' organizations, etc., all alike clamoring for freedom, for each to have its own way, regardless of its effects upon the freedom of all others. As far as their efforts succeed they exert their power to break down or destroy the liberty of others.

The beggar, raised from the dung hill to place and power, asserts his liberty in cruel tyranny and rapacity.

Curious as it may appear, even in the sphere of literature and science, in men of high attainment and world-wide fame, the same misapprehension of the principle of freedom often manifests itself, and in ways that are disagreeable and offensive, to their peers. Their theories, for instance, must be accepted without the expression of a doubt. Any one who exhibits sufficient temerity to contradict, or even doubt, the correctness of their hypotheses, must be consigned to the limbo of ignorance or impudence. How often, for example, are we reminded of our ignorance, when we doubt what they proclaim to have been "verified by experiment"; albeit their "verified" theories have, time and again, been disproved by later

and better experiments. Thus destructive critics, relying on geology, astronomy, or ancient tablets, or inscriptions on the monuments of antiquity, have often overthrown the historical statements of the Bible. By a mere study of the text, or the original language in which it was written, they have proved its books to be comparatively modern in their composition. Thus the Pentateuch was written centuries after the time of Moses, and contains many mistakes both historical and scientific. So again, by their philological acumen they can fix the dates of most of the Old Testament books, assign different paragraphs or chapters to different authors, and show how unreliable and fallible their teachings are; especially when they relate to supernatural or miraculous events. This they are *free* to do. But, if any "uncientific" or "uncritical" theologian presumes to express a different opinion, they meet him with the all-powerful argument, that "all *intelligent* students accept their views." Yet these same men constantly demand untrammelled freedom of thought, full liberty to investigate, unhindered right to repudiate tradition, widest latitude in interpreting the creeds, and supreme authority to eviscerate the Bible of its most precious contents, while, at the same time, they deny to others the liberty of expressing an adverse opinion. Just as most men in other spheres of life, they claim for themselves the widest intellectual freedom, but are equally anxious to trammel the freedom of others, to defend the sacred treasures, or to uphold the faith, which they claim the license to destroy. What is true of the critics here named is true of some men in all spheres of learning, and in fact in all the walks of life. The true idea of freedom is thus misunderstood, misinterpreted, perverted, and misapplied, by the very people who vociferate most loudly for its enjoyment.

The social organism is no less injuriously affected by a similar one-sided and selfish application of the principle of freedom.

That "all men are created equal," to the extent that all are entitled to the "inalienable right of life, liberty and the pur-

suit of happiness," is ignored and set aside by many, who diligently use their own liberty to oppress others, and to repress the aspirations of less fortunate people, so as to keep them in an humble condition of dependence. One class, sometimes, the majority, at others the minority, exercises its liberty in efforts to curtail or destroy the liberty of another class. And so the struggle goes on. So it has gone on for ages, Greece and Rome furnish examples. Sometimes the rulers, sometimes oligarchies, and at others the people themselves, became the oppressors. At one time the state was supreme, the individual nothing, and again a multitude of individual tyrants obtained the upper hand, when all were free and all were slaves. The middle ages furnish a brilliant example, when the church, under the vicegerancy of popes, became the oppressive power, when kings, nobles, and peasants alike, were under the yoke. At the beginning of the modern period, when freedom from the yoke of the papacy was secured, the reigning monarchs and their nobles obtained supremacy, and individuals were enslaved. From the anarchy of feudalism came the tyranny of kings and emperors, which has been partially succeeded by democracy, and individualism, as now represented to some extent in Europe, but especially in America.

Perhaps we now enjoy the most advanced, and most desirable, form of liberty yet secured, because in the United States, at least, it is the most universal. It is enjoyed in a less degree in England. But some philosophers in our day demand the most absolute liberty for the individual, to say, think or do, as he pleases, in every particular, except in case he exhibits some overt act injurious to others. They will not allow society or the state to exercise any authority over the individual, except in extreme cases of criminal conduct affecting the immediate interest or happiness of others. This, if carried out practically, would be anarchy; for it limits authority to the minimum, by giving the individual unlimited license.

Now, if all of this is true, it only shows that human nature, under the limitations of the bondage of sin, can not, unaided, attain to the true level, or even the true conception, of genuine freedom. For nearly all efforts to secure it have been made on the plane of nature.

What is needed, is emancipation from spiritual darkness, and moral degradation. This is furnished through the regenerating power of the Gospel alone, or *the truth as it is in Jesus*.

Accordingly, after the introduction of Christianity, a marked change for the better began to show itself already, within the Roman Empire. Christian masters manumitted their slaves, and the condition of others gradually improved under the ameliorating influence of Christianity, although Christianity never attempted to change or overthrow existing institutions.

During succeeding ages, and in other nations, where the Church obtained a foothold, the principle of freedom became better understood, and at the present time, human slavery is practically unknown among Christian peoples.

This, of course, refers only to the slavery in which one man is owner, and others are slaves; and regards a form of servitude which is, by no means, the worst to which men can be subjected. A man may be absolutely free to do as he pleases, intellectually or physically, and yet be in the bondage of corruption, whose fetters are more galling, and far more degrading, than any bodily subjection to a human master.

But happily, in a higher sense, the true idea of freedom possesses the souls of many, who have come to appreciate the liberty wherewith the truth makes free. The liberty, that rests in authority, and is in harmony with "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, has made them free from the law of sin and death."*

And so, amid the turmoil and strife of the contending legions of sin, there is a growing apprehension of true liberty,

* Rom. 8: 2.

which will eventually fully illustrate and fulfill the promise of Jesus—"The truth shall make you free"; and—"If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed."*

Men will then recognize that real genuine liberty is the right to live in harmony, as far as possible, with others, and contribute to the advancement and elevation of society.

This is "freedom in the truth," and it is diametrically opposed to the bondage of sin, which has its root in the element of falsehood. But the truth, which makes men free, is not the abstract truth derived from the study of nature, or of psychology, or of the relation of God to man, which is the fruit merely of an intellectual process; it is truth in the concrete, embodied in a living person, and communicated to men in a living organic way, imparting to them, not merely a form of intellectual knowledge, but a vital principle, which permeates and illuminates our whole intellectual, ethical, and spiritual life; and develops in our experience a genuine freedom from the bondage of corruption. *To know this truth is to be free, for it is the truth that is in Jesus.*

This is in harmony with the declaration of Jesus, recorded in another place—"I am the way, *the truth* and the life: no man cometh unto the Father but *by me*."†

The same conception underlies that sublime utterance of St. John, in the prologue to his Gosple—"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him: and without him was not anything made that hath been made. In him was life; and the life was *the light* of men."‡

Here evidently "the Word" is *personal*, and is equivalent to "*Truth*"; for it declares Him also to be the "Light of men." And it is written in a subsequent verse—"The Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory,

* St. Jn. 8: 32 and 36.

† Jn. 14: 6.

‡ Jn. 1: 1-4.

glory as of the only begotten from the Father), full of grace and truth."*

Whether St. John borrowed the word, "Logos," from the Alexandrian philosophy of Philo, or whether he adopted it independently because it expressed his thought, is a question of indifference. It is easy to see, however, that he used it, and that it helped him to express the sublimest mystery of God. It shows God's most gracious thought, embracing His saving love, for mankind, expressed in *the person of His Son*, who is in Himself the embodiment of eternal truth. It exhibits Him, as such, bearing in His own person, and making known to men, the way of Salvation, in a form infinitely superior, for His purpose, to any mere verbal statement. Accordingly he reports John the Baptist as saying, "The law was given by Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, *he hath declared him.*"† And again Jesus is reported to have said, of "the Son of God," "and they that hear him shall live."‡ To see Jesus, therefore, is to behold the embodiment of divine truth; and to hear Him is to hearken to that truth as the Word of God, and to live in it. This will enable us to apprehend the meaning of Jesus when He says, "If ye abide in my word, then are ye my disciples; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."* As the personal Word and Truth of God, Jesus offers Himself, and those who accept Him, and abide in His Word, are made free from the *bond service of sin*.

Now it is abundantly clear that freedom is not universally enjoyed, even in nominally Christian countries, only for the obvious reason that Jesus is not universally accepted. All men, indeed, universally aspire to the enjoyment of freedom, but they seek it in ways that are alien to the true principle of freedom. The history of the struggle for liberty, at all times

* Jn. 1: 14.

† Jn. 1: 17, 18.

‡ Jn. 5: 25.

* Jn. 8: 31, 32.

and in all places, abundantly proves that the general notion of freedom recognizes it as nothing higher than the right of each one to do as he pleases, apparently without conditions or limitations of any kind, and ignores all authority as despotism, and regards law as a fetter to bind those who would, without its restraint, be free. This appears to be the kind of liberty advocated by socialists of a certain class, and by anarchists of every class, who boldly clamor for license to live and act independently of all law and order. Accordingly its aim is to secure a reign of lawlessness, fettered by no authority, human or divine. Its aim seems to be to destroy all law, and to overthrow all forms of government, in order that crimes may be committed with impunity, without incurring any penalty whatever. This, of course, is to be expected from that class of people. For laws and just "rulers are a terror, not to the good work, but to the evil."* And as violators are the sufferers from such laws, they naturally regard them as inimical to their personal liberty. They fail to see that, even if they could have the absolute freedom which they desire, they would still be in the most abject and debasing slavery. Liberty without law is anarchy, and anarchy is unmitigated lawlessness. And liberty of this kind, if universal, would subject all men to the bondage of fear, since no one would be safe in such a pandemonium as would thus be turned loose.

Human freedom, in the nature of the case, must have its limitations. It must be conditioned. According to the eternal fitness of things intelligent beings like men must be under law. To what extent individual liberty should be restrained, by the laws of the state, we do not at present intend to discuss. We only assert the general principle, that men are naturally under law, and liberty is enjoyed in the proportion that we keep ourselves in harmony with it. It is likewise true, in social life, that we are hedged round by social laws, and in our political life, our freedom must be restricted. But, in either case, we are free only as we submit to their just regulation. If, there-

* Rom. 13: 3.

fore, we accept these limitations, and make no attempt to evade or violate them, we enjoy social and political freedom.

Again, religious freedom, the most desirable and inspiring privilege we can enjoy, and which is worthy of our most strenuous efforts to maintain, can be justly possessed only by those who are willing to accord the same privilege to all others, whether they accept our religious and theological opinions or not.

But in any and all spheres of life true freedom can be obtained only in one way, *by deliverance from the bondage of sin*. This deliverance is effected by faith in Jesus Christ, and acceptance of the truth which meets us in Him. The freedom thus obtained is universal, for the individual, since it emancipates him in body, soul and spirit from the dominion of sin in his own nature, and elevates him above the debasing and corrupting influences of his environment. For one may be oppressed and downtrodden by his fellow men, and yet be free; more free, in fact, than the slaves of lust and greed who oppress him; and, we may add, he is far more happy. The new life of freedom in Christ, inspires him with hope, even under the yoke of despotism; and, in his efforts to promote the same blessing among others, he enjoys a happiness entirely unknown to the bondservants of sin. Self and selfish nature he freely keeps in abeyance, and the grovelling servitude of sin is overthrown. Thus he *abides in the word of Jesus*, advances in the light of truth, overcomes evil with good, and conforms his own will to the will of God.

This freedom in the truth, we believe, is destined to possess the world, when the lives of men generally, perhaps not universally, will be regulated in righteousness and peace. Such liberty is divine, has its origin in God, and is of the earth and human, only because it was revealed in Jesus Christ, by whom it is communicated to men, through the channels of the means of grace, which are the arteries of "the Church, which is His body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all," and convey the vital power of His life to those who believe in Him.

Christ is the One only perfect man, because the Son of God "became flesh and dwelt among us full of grace and truth." In His person we have the archetypal man, in whom God's ideal of human nature is completely realized and actualized on earth. In the incarnation, therefore, we behold the completion and perfection of human nature. In Jesus Christ the generic life of humanity is taken up into organic and personal union, with the divine life, and made one with it. In this mediatorial life, embracing the divine and human in one person, humanity was purified and *made free*. Hence in His person we find the *ideal Freeman*. In all things He was free, subject only to such limitations as He Himself imposed, during His earthly mission. And in His human life He preserved His freedom from corruption, through all trials, temptations and vicissitudes, to the end of His earthly career. And so He stands out to view, in all the majesty of His moral manhood, as the *model Freeman*.

The freedom which He so perfectly and beautifully preserved in His own life He is now developing among men through the Church. As humanity is generically descended from Adam, and developed and perpetuated in his posterity, so the life and freedom of Christ are communicated to men through His body, the Church; and they who abide in Him and are sanctified through His truth, *in the appointed way*, are made free.

This involves immeasurably more than simply accepting Christ outwardly, as our Master, and engaging to serve Him for the rest of our days. This is included, of course; but Christianity is the life of Christ, made over to us in a real living way, so that we become one with Him, in an actual, though mystical, life union, and thereby we become "partakers of the divine nature,"* in Him.

In this new vital relation we do not cease to be men, or lose our true humanity; but while we remain genuinely human, we are delivered from the corruption, the bondage and the

* 2 Pet. 1: 4.

power of sin "into the liberty of the glory of the children of God."† We are made temples of the Holy Spirit, "and where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty."‡ "Hatred and malice and all uncharitableness," if not completely eradicated, are at least held in check, and "the love of Christ constrains us,"* and we aim to live in peace, "as far as possible with all men."†

"On earth peace among men in whom He is well pleased."‡ This song of the heavenly choir announced in sublime strains the purpose of the incarnation; and the whole life of Jesus was a perfect manifestation of its fulfilment. While on earth He never once forfeited His righteous character, or departed from the principle and practice of love. Yet He was exposed to temptation, in its severest forms, and was necessarily associated with a generation of hypocrites, who were the veriest slaves to selfish ends and sunken to the basest moral turpitude. He never violated the laws of propriety, nor set at naught the principle of authority, but preserved His freedom with unwavering fidelity; and while He rebuked sin in the most withering terms, He invariably did it in love.

As the personal Word of God, He embodied in Himself, and exemplified, in His practice, the divine truth, which He communicates to all who believe and abide in His word. This is the truth that makes us free. In this He verifies the Old Testament prophecy, which He applied to Himself, "To set at liberty them that are bruised."§

But now He is personally in heaven, and not on earth; yet He dwells in the Church by His Spirit, making it "the pillar and ground of the truth,"|| and in communion with the Church He makes us free.

† Rom. 8: 21.

‡ Rom. 3: 17.

* 2 Cor. 5: 14.

† Rom. 12: 18.

‡ Luke 2: 14.

§ Luke 4: 18, quoted from Isa. 61: 1 et seq.

|| 1 Tim. 3: 15.

It is not sufficient, therefore, to say, "I believe the Bible; I accept Christ, but will not bind myself, by any obligations, to the Church and its creeds." To assert our liberty, in any such independent form, is simply to deny the truth, and to repudiate the very means Christ has appointed to convey its emancipating power into our lives. In that way we refuse the ministrations of the Spirit, we ignore the means of grace, we spurn the mystical body of Christ, and despise the provisions which God has made to secure our spiritual freedom.

It is only when we put ourselves in harmony with the methods and means of grace, the laws of the kingdom of heaven, that the true freedom, which elevates us into communion with God, can be appropriated. But when we have, in this right way, obtained the freedom which our nature craves, we may then "stand fast therefore, and not be entangled again in a yoke of bondage."* "But he that looketh into the perfect law, the law of liberty, and so continueth * * * this man shall be blessed in his doing."†

He has laid, in his individual experience, the foundation of the eternal truth, or Christ is born in him the hope of glory; and, resting on this immovable and impregnable rock, he is fully prepared to build up and develop that genuine freedom, religious, political and social, which is the glory of an ideal manhood.

The Church, the state and the social organism, are alike characterized largely by the same ethical standards which distinguish the individuals of whom they are constituted. If, therefore, a large percentage of their constituency are possessed of the freedom with which Christ makes us free, the leaven of their influence will be felt throughout the whole organism. As they are called to freedom, they will use it, as the bondservants of God, in the interests of all. For the man who is truly free is a temple of the Holy Spirit, and as such will be tenderly affectioned towards all men, and will seek to promote the freedom and honor of all.‡

* Gal. 5: 1.

† Jas. 1: 25.

‡ Rom. 12, 10 et 13: 7.

With such members the Church must be free, whatever may be the form or character of the government, of the state, in which it exists. In fact, her own influence on the state will largely affect the character of its government and laws and aid in developing the principle of freedom among its citizens. She will preach the Gospel and administer the Holy Sacraments, which will be recognized as her legitimate prerogative. In so doing, her chief aim, of course, will be the salvation and edification of men. She will not be fettered by worldly wisdom, nor invent sensational schemes to attract men to her altars. But, as "the pillar and ground of the truth," she will ever stand for the truth which makes men free. She will promote their spiritual elevation, and maintain her true position, as the type of the kingdom of God, in which men may enjoy their fullest "freedom within the bounds of law."

And so the will of God, recognized everywhere, in nature, as the "Reign of Law," will be accepted in its moral aspects as the ground of obligation among men; and its very limitations will be welcomed, as a wall of protection, whereby we are defended in the enjoyment of our liberty, against lawlessness and corruption.

In the state which is blessed with such influences, political freedom, resting on the same impregnable foundation of truth, must follow, as a necessary consequence. For there righteousness will prevail. And truth and righteousness are the bulwarks of civil as well as of religious liberty. Such a nation will be strong and permanent. "The righteous nation which keepeth truth may enter in";* that is, within the "walls and bulwarks," appointed of God for those who are saved.

On the contrary, chicanery and falsehood, political fraud and diplomatic equivocation must sooner or later bring disaster and ruin to any nation which practices them, and reduce the people to degradation and servitude.

It is easy to see that where truth prevails in Church and state the social organism will experience the exhilarating in-

* Isa. 26: 1: 2.

fluence of a similar freedom. Mutual social intercourse will be free, and the ameliorating effects of such intercourse will be felt with satisfaction in all the affairs of life. No need then will be felt for organizing men into one-sided brotherhoods, as a protection against opposing orders. Schemes to gain unrighteous advantages for ourselves and to restrain others from seeking the same privileges will be excluded. Labor strifes and trades disputes will be settled; and the long catalogue of social evils, upon which pessimists feed and flourish, will be put away.

An ideal state of things! impracticable! and, if you please, Utopian! Well, let it be so, if you will. It is a state of things devoutly to be hoped for; and it is the duty of every one to contribute his share towards making it a *reality*. It is very certain that, as long as we are controlled by selfish motives, promoting our own interests at the expense of others, scheming to array class against class, and using our so-called liberty for the oppression of our brothers, just that long we will be debasing ourselves, corrupting society and subverting the very principles we are pretending to advance.

But if, on the contrary, we receive the truth, and are made free thereby from the bondage of corruption, we each add our share to the sum of human freedom; and, to that extent, society will be free, and the people will rejoice in the common possession. Such will be the happy state, when "the kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord, and of His Christ: and He shall reign forever and ever" (Rev. 11: 15).

CARROLLTON, OHIO.

VII.

CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA.

BY THE REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D.

"Can Sin Be Forgiven?"—A remarkable revival of interest in this question is just now to be witnessed in the intellectual world. Scientists, men of letters and theologians are making contributions to the various phases of its discussion. Much of this is not only interesting but necessary and important. The article of the creed which expresses faith in forgiveness is challenged in certain quarters on the ground of the abstractions of the unity of nature and the inviolability of its laws. The truth of the article in question, it is evident, can be maintained as a Christian reality only by accepting the challenge and fighting the good fight once more for it. So far as the issue of the controversy is concerned, no one need be in doubt. Inadequate conceptions with reference to the essence of sin will be enlarged, erroneous ideas as to what is necessarily implied in forgiveness will be corrected, and in the new light thus obtained the grim horror of the one—as seen in both its own evil nature and its irremediable consequences—and the assured reasonableness of the other, will combine to make the scriptural doctrine at once more precious and efficacious than ever.

To call attention to the numerous recent utterances which give support to this anticipated issue cannot be attempted. One may be allowed, however, to refer to several distinctly able leaders of religious thought whose words are especially significant and the points emphasized by whom seem particularly timely and suggestive. One of these is the distinguished biblical scholar and eloquent preacher, Professor George Adam

Smith. Another is the sweetspirited and clear-headed teacher and writer, the Rev. Dr. James Denney. And the third is the renowned and versatile writer of some of the most thoughtful contemporary fiction, Mr. Hall Caine whose books always deal with problems of the spirit in an earnest and stirring way. Approaching the subject from different viewpoints, as these authors do, and treating it under different methods, should not the similarity of their general conclusions for this reason be all the more impressive and arresting to every unprejudiced reader?

The first point to be noticed on which these celebrated men are of the same mind concerns the meaning of sin itself. The notion that sin means the transgression simply of abstract law—the notion prevailing among those that argue against the possibility of forgiveness—is to their minds far from being an adequate definition of it. The arguments of their books* proceed upon the implicit assumption and the explicit statement that in sinning men violate the personal relations of love existing between God and themselves. If sin were simply the infraction of unfeeling laws or the failure of realizing in the evolution of the spiritual life the higher possibilities of our being, one can easily see, there could be no pardon. Then the only thing for man to do would be to arm himself with stoical courage or resolutions of despair to make the best of it whilst the results work out their inevitable issues. But when sin is regarded as the defiance and pushing aside of the holy will of the living God, instead of faithlessness to duty, or rebellion against blind law, or conflict with the natural order of things, a new and most important element is introduced into the question of its forgivableness. The living God is greater than any laws of nature and on the level of his infinitude one is bound to recognize not only that there may be, but as Revelation teaches and Christian experience abundantly testi-

* "The Forgiveness of Sin," by George Adam Smith, Armstrongs, N. Y., 1905. "Questions of Faith," sixth lecture by James Denney, Armstrongs, 1904. "The Prodigal Son," by Hall Caine, D. Appleton and Son, New York, 1905.

fies, there is forgiveness with God. "Man cannot introduce into nature any force which passes beyond the control of the Personal God. He can put right with himself again the soul which has become most desperately wrong." He is able to save to the uttermost.

Another point to be observed as insisted on by our authors is the necessity of revising the ordinary conception as to what is essentially implied in the forgiveness of sin. To define forgiveness according to Dr. Johnson as "not to punish" is the notion too many have as the fundamental and all-inclusive element of pardon. This however is at once erroneous and unwarranted by Scripture and human experience. To be forgiven means to be restored to a reconciled relationship of trust and love with God—a restoration which does not involve the supposed blotting-out of the consequences of the sins committed, nor the omission of their necessary punishment. Mr. Caine represents his "Prodigal" as deeply penitent after repeated transgressions had brought him into the lowest depths of conscious iniquity and guilt, and as departing from "The Madeline" where he came to himself, with the peace of God in his heart and joy of conscious pardon resting on his soul with the power of a divine Benediction. But his subsequent sufferings were great continually, and became increasingly so as the years wore on. In the psychological analysis of those sufferings and their vivid portrayal, the splendid genius of Mr. Caine in creating character true to life is strikingly evident. And the truthfulness of his representation is confirmed by the language of Professor Smith and Dr. Denney. "Brothers," the former exclaims with the solemn warning of terrible earnestness in his utterance, "Brothers, be not deceived, God is not mocked. Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. Sin, and you may be forgiven, but you shall never so long as life lasts, be able to count on freedom from the consequences. Sin, and though God's love sweep away the hopelessness of the future, and God's Spirit put in you a new will and a new courage, it shall be with heavier

weights that you run your race, with increased temptations that you must battle up to the end of the day—temptations besides that you shall never encounter without the shame and weakness of having been yourself their guilty cause.” By the latter the same stern facts are accentuated in tones equally impressive. “It is no part,” he says, “of the belief in forgiveness, nor of the experience of it, to deny what is so painfully true, namely, that there are things which do not pass with pardon—consequences of sin, and especially the habit of sin, which no one is allowed to forget or escape. There are consequences of sin both bodily and spiritual, on the physique, the imagination, the emotions, the capacity for particular kinds of service, that do not disappear with reconciliation. Nay, to accept the punishment of our iniquity is part of the experience of reconciliation. ‘They shall confess their iniquity, and if then their heart be humbled, and they accept of their punishment, then will I remember my covenant.’” How often in their form of presenting the truths of the Gospel, preachers are unmindful of these facts! How easy, according to popular teaching, to obtain forgiveness and to have the consequences of sin remitted! How much more awful and fearfully repulsive sin and its effects, when seen in the true light, than when spoken of in an easy-going way as magically removable by the sovereign act of the Divine Will!

A third point worth noting as held in common by these learned writers is the ground on which forgiveness rests. Their view is in entire harmony on this question with the teaching of the venerable Symbol of our Reformed Church, the Heidelberg Catechism. “The forgiveness of sin is rooted in the death of the Lord Jesus Christ.” The doctrine held by many in these latter days, based upon a misinterpretation of the Saviour’s parable of the “Elder Son and his Brother,” is that the Father bestows pardon on the ground of his bare authority, and that sinners can take the same of his mere clemency. Hence the undervaluation of the moral and religious benefits for which alone it is conceivable that forgive-

ness can be granted by a gracious Father, and for which alone it is worth receiving by his needy children. The Cross reminds us of the stupendous cost at which pardon has been made possible. Only as we come to feel and in some measure realize "what our pardon cost the love of God," Professor Smith declares, "and how much that love in Christ endured for us, can there be born in us a penitence, a faith, a gratitude which will give us a hatred of sin and a commanding desire for and a power of obtaining holiness. It is Christ's own testimony that in giving himself to death, he was earning for men the forgiveness of their sins, freedom to come to God, power to break away from evil, and in all that the assurance of a new life which can never be taken from them. And to this testimony the experience of men who have believed, has corresponded. At the foot of Christ's cross they were startled into feeling what sin is, what it costs, what it means in estranging God from man, and the suffering it therefore lays upon the hearts of both. At the Cross they have come to know a conscience for sin, a horror for it, penitence on account of it, and there they have been brought to God, assured of his love, and filled with fresh moral power."

The concluding pages of Dr. Denney's masterly lecture enforce the same truths with similar cogent and convincing eloquence. Those who are seeking the way to the personal experience of pardon, and who find it blocked by naturalistic conceptions of what broken laws entail, are directed to company with Jesus Christ in his Passion and Death where they will learn, he says, "if they learn anything, that the forgiveness of which we are assured in Christ, is forgiveness that has come to us at great cost." With or without an adequate doctrinal statement of that cost, "the Cross makes it manifest that God does not save us easily. Hence the power with which his dying and undying love appeals to us all, and makes all things new."

In certain regions, one constantly hears it asserted, the preaching of today no longer has the former power of winning

men from the error of their sinful ways and turning them to righteousness and life. So far as this is true, may it not be owing to the fact that the Gospel of Forgiveness is not there proclaimed with that fullness and positiveness of conviction warranted by the Saviour and his Apostles, and so thoroughly justified by the deep experience of Christians in every age? Where men withhold their response to the call of the message of the preacher, might it not be worth while making the experiment of changing the point of emphasis and in the light of the suggestions of the spiritual "diagnosticians" above referred to, seek to correct popular misapprehensions concerning the nature and consequences of sin, and of the Divinely provided ground on which alone its forgiveness is possible?

"Science and Immortality."—Since the appearance of Fiske's little treatise on "The Destiny of Man," perhaps no volume of similar size has called forth so much spirited discussion as Dr. Osler's recent Lecture* at Harvard on the Ingersoll Foundation. Neither the great professional eminence of the author, nor anything like a real contribution made by his pages to the essentials of the question of immortality, can explain the widespread attention his book is receiving. It is rather certain incidental observations which coming as they do from one whose "work lies on the confines of the shadow-land," and whose wide experiences have brought him exceptional "opportunity to study the attitude of the mind of his fellowmen on the problem of personal life in the future"—that make his modest work sufficiently significant to command general interest. Especially should those who labor for man's ethical uplift and his comforting support amid the trials and temptations, the sufferings and sorrows of every-day experience by preaching the Gospel through which life and immortality have been brought to light, take account of what is thus incidentally suggested. Too often, it is to be feared, ministers of the Word rely almost exclusively for their information on such topics on those who are regarded "professionally

* "Science and Immortality," by Dr. William Osler, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., N. Y.

competant" to deal with them, instead of welcoming also what "outsiders" may have to offer with reference to the actual posture of the public mind on this and kindred questions.

According to this medical authority the absence of a living faith in and a controlling desire for continued life after death, is far more general at present than it is ordinarily supposed to be. The "man in the street" as Dr. Osler knows him is practically indifferent to the question whether if a man die he shall live again. "He has only two primal passions, to get and to beget, and the gratification of these satisfies him entirely. The society set of the modern world which repeats with wearisome monotony the same old vices and the some old follies, cares not a fig for a life to come. Among the educated and refined, much less among the masses, is there to be found any ardent desire for a future life. Immortality and all that it may mean, is a dead issue in the great movements of the world. And without a peradventure it may be said, that a living faith in a future existence has not the slightest influence in the settlement of the grave social and national problems which confront the race today."

That which is so surprising if not alarming in these and similar declarations of our author, is the confidence with which he speaks of the absence of this faith in immortality among large classes in modern society. Religious literature and biography have long been furnishing us with individual instances of such a fact. Symonds stood by the casket of his departed daughter and frankly declared that he had no desire for her to live again in another world. Harriet Martineau speaks of longing for rest and confesses that "she should tire of the Forever." James Russell Lowell's "hold on a belief in a life after death," Mr. Howells informs us, "weakened with his years." Robert Louis Stevenson asks us to put aside "the fairy tale of an eternal tea-party where our friends shall meet us all ironed out and still be lovable." And Charles Bray declares that while thankful for the present life, he has

no wish to begin another under entirely new conditions. Individual instances like these are not so rare, but that this feeling is general should give us pause and move us to inquire what has brought it about and how an intelligent faith in one of the fundamentally important articles of the Christian Creed may be revived?

The cause of the disturbed condition of what has long been supposed to be a practically universal and most persistent instinct of the human soul, is not to be charged to the revelations made by the physical sciences. There was a time when it was feared that the general acceptance of the Darwinian theory of evolution would rob man of his belief in himself as a spiritual being and jeopardize every interest of the soul, but that fear now disturbs but very few. With the exception of possibly one or two instances, there are no prominent physicists today who would risk their reputation by affirming that the results of scientific investigations put a veto on the possibility of immortality. In his famous "Three Essays" John Stuart Mill says "there is no evidence in science against the immortality of the soul but that negative evidence which consists in the absence of evidence in its favor," and that certainly compels no one to cease looking for a "city which has foundations whose builder and maker is God." And so one need not be greatly surprised to hear the foremost evolutionist in our country say: "I believe in the immortality of the soul, not in the sense in which I accept the demonstrable truths of science, but as a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God's work."* Nor do the results of physiological and psychological inquiries such as those of Herbert Spencer and his school, give firmer support to the skeptically disposed classes of the present day. Their method of accounting for the origin of the belief in a future life, instead of alarming anyone, is now seen not to touch the vital point of belief in "something after death." The roots of this belief lie imbedded in the soil of human affections and it is these that

* John Fiske in "The Destiny of Man," page 116.

prompt the longing that those whom we have loved long since, may be lost for awhile only. Whatever robs those affections of their hope of being realized, shakes the fabric of faith to its foundations, and it is here facts are suggested which direct us to the causes explaining the deplorable conditions which exist according to Dr. Osler.

In a remarkably clear and discriminating article by Mel-lone, Examiner in Mental and Moral Science in the University of London, on "Present Aspects of the Problem of Immortality,"* several of these disturbing causes are specified and their far-reaching influence set forth. One of them is the spiritualistic conception of the life that is to come. Instead of an existence in a "disembodied spirit" or as a "pure indivisible immaterial substance"—as life hereafter is often so inadequately represented in our times—men desire an immortality which shall signify a personal life in the full sense of the word—an embodied life in highest ethical social relations. The second of these causes is the disproportion between the abilities and just deserts of men, and the recognition of them in this life. The universal moral consciousness of men is chafing under a sense of this discrepancy today as never before. Life's injustice and inequality is so flagrant and unbearable—the very goodness of the good bringing upon them suffering which the very badness of the bad allows them to escape—that men lose all desire to live on under the reign of the same Lord even in another realm. The third cause is the sympathy felt with others in the unrelieved miseries which for no fault of their own, they are bearing. The motive actuating the higher ethical endeavors of our time is "the pain felt in brethren's side," and this pain ever becoming more real and increasingly oppressive, makes the promise of a future life less and less interesting and attractive to multitudes around us. They have lost confidence in God, on which in the last analysis, belief in and desire for immortality must always depend, and hence trust in the truth of the immortal hope has suffered eclipse if it has not been destroyed.

* Published in *The Hibbert Journal*, Volume 2, Number 4, July, 1904.

What, under these circumstances, can be done to counteract the influence of such fallacious notions and remove the causes to which they are due? Grave responsibilities certainly rest upon the pulpit and the religious press, but likewise also upon the entire Christian fellowship! The voice of Science may leave the way open for a belief in a life after death, the facts of the moral and rational constitution of our nature may affirm that man ought to be immortal, but so long as the hindrances to faith of another order, as above noticed, are not removed, the broader, basal facts of Christianity will not regain their commanding power. So long as men remain under the sway of those misleading views, the great assurance of the Gospel, that God is able to deliver us from death, "according to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead," will count for naught. Is it not plain, therefore, that the nature of the life to come must be shown to differ widely from the mythical thing that a spiritualistic philosophy makes it, and even from the description given of it in the figurative language of the Apocalypse? The latter, Dr. Osler points out, "repels rather than attracts the matter-of-fact occidental mind," and the former is as empty of moral appeal for the wide-awake modern intellect as any other shadow. The teaching of Jesus on the question needs to be reëxamined, the light thrown upon it by his resurgent Life must be re-studied, and the results of scientific psychology, which thoroughly dispel, as Professor James has declared, "the whole classic platonizing Sunday-school conception of the body and soul being two separate things," must be intelligently employed, if the life to come is to mean a thing of continuous growth, a progressive fulfillment or realization of man's latent capacities and powers, instead of an eternal sameness or uninviting and endless monotony. Is it not plain moreover, that in contravention of the current error, that God is unmindful of the inequity and injustice from which men here are suffering, it is necessary "to assert eternal Providence" with Milton, "and justify the ways of God to

men"? What is our Religion if it is not the acceptance of God's call to fellowship and friendship with himself? Unquestionably there is much in this world that seemingly contradicts this, but it is here in spite of God, and it is the office of faith to lift the soul above these apparent contradictions. In the case of Christ an unfaltering trust in the Father's love is maintained amid untold indignities and cruel sufferings, all of which he patiently bore in his spotless purity and absolutely holy character, and the bearing of these facts on human life now, if properly presented, can't but impress disquieted hearts and remove weighty burdens. God remains true to the friendship to which he invites his children in Christ, and can it be thought possible that he will allow it to be thwarted by death when life's little day here shall end? Does not faith in the faithfulness of the Father involve faith in a glorious and blissful immortality?* And is it not plain, once more, that with reference to the social application of the ethical principles and precepts of the Gospel for the removal of unjust sufferings and wretched conditions, a vast deal remains to be undertaken and achieved? Even where the brotherhood of man in Christ Jesus is theoretically acknowledged, only a faint beginning has been made of its exemplification in all social relations. The "new heavens and the new earth" promised by the Evangel of the Lord will not appear until the Spirit of the Master is far more generally enthroned in the family, in the factory, in counting-room, in corporations, in legislative halls, in civil courts, in national and inter-national government. "The first need for a better world," Principal Forsythe reminded a large audience in a recent address, "is a holier Church." One of the primary needs for the rehabilitation of faith in a life to come, is for Christians in the life they are now living, to illustrate in every motive, pursuit, ambition and relation, the moulding and controlling power of their glorious hope.

* Cf. Carnegie Simpson's Lecture in "Questions of Faith," page 201.

VIII.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

OUR WANING DENOMINATIONALISM.

It is said, at the present time, that Church union is in the air. This means that there is felt in the different denominations of Christians an earnest desire to approach each other, to coöperate in Christian work and to effect actual union between the different organizations, so that the body of Christ may no longer be divided. As evidences of this tendency, we may refer to the fact that there is scarcely a Christian denomination in existence now, large or small, that has not felt the impulse to seek fellowship with other bodies, or discussed the propriety of effecting a union with bodies to which it is most closely allied. It is a well-known fact that both in the Roman Catholic and in the Episcopal Churches, the feasibility of a union between the two has been discussed. The great obstacle in the way is the inability of the Roman Catholic Church to recognize the validity of Episcopal orders in the Anglican Church. The Congregationalists, United Brethren, and Methodist Protestants have measures under way to effect a union of their respective bodies. The different Churches represented in the Alliance of the Reformed Churches, holding the presbyterial system are at the present time discussing the feasibility of a federal union, which, whilst leaving the different organizations intact, will secure their coöperation in many lines of Christian work, and bring them in closer touch and fellowship. These tendencies in the different Churches prove that there is a growing sense of the importance of coöperation and union. The various, sometimes hostile, creeds, into which Christians are divided, are felt to be an anomaly, and good men strive to reach a plane on which at least hostility

should cease, and a broader and more catholic spirit than has hitherto prevailed, should hold sway.

To do justice to the Christianity of the present day, it is desirable to glance for a moment at the origin of the various denominations of Christians. Some would say these denominations are due to the spirit of schism, and failure to recognize and unwillingness to submit to the properly constituted authorities, the assertion not simply of private judgment, but of self-will in many instances, resulting in the rending asunder of bonds which should hold all Christians together as members of the body of Christ. We are persuaded, however, that this is an error. The causes which led to the establishment of the different denominations, of course, are various, and the motives of men may not always have been pure; or, even, their conscientious judgment may have been mistaken. But, aside from this, it is easy to see, basing themselves upon a fundamental principle, as in the events which brought about the division of the Churches in the time of the Protestant Reformation, resulting in the Roman Catholic Church on the one hand, and the different Protestant Churches on the other, the leaders in the movements which resulted in different denominations were by no means governed by selfish considerations. The conditions which determined the forming of distinct denominations were of three different kinds. These were historical, doctrinal, or practical. To illustrate, we may refer to the fact that the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, for instance, originated under different historical conditions and that these Churches, transplanted to our own country, have a life and a body of traditions and mode of worship and discipline, that have been historically developed. Apart from certain fundamental differences in doctrine, the Churches have to some extent a different spirit. That is, the principle of Christianity works itself out historically in different forms. Again, in the various sections into which the Lutheran Church itself is divided, and the different sub-divisions of the Presbyterian Church, minor points of doctrine were the underlying

motive of separation between the different branches. And finally, modes of Church government, involving episcopacy on the one hand, or the presbyterial system on the other, in the stress laid on educational religion, or on experience, and emotional manifestations, as in the case of the Methodist Church, have influenced and given direction to the building up of denominational systems.

It is easy to see that, looking at the whole question from the standpoint of a free, historical development, the existence of different denominations of Christians may readily be justified, and such denominations could not be abolished without doing violence to the life and faith of the different bodies of Christ.

But religious denominations are one thing, and the denominational spirit is quite another. A conscientious belief in the truth of one's position is necessary to make sound character, but that narrow spirit of denominationalism and bigotry, which condemns all others who do not hold to every iota of faith and doctrine, is quite another thing. This narrow spirit, leading to disputes and hatreds and bitter animosities, has wrought incalculable mischief in the Church, has detracted seriously from real work, has proved a stumbling block to earnest seekers, and very often scandal to the Church, to the delight of scoffers and unbelievers. The spectacle of one portion of the Church of Christ unchurching another, and putting it under the curse of eternal reprobation; of men who profess faith in or allegiance to our common Lord and Master failing to recognize as brethren others who are equally sincere and earnest in the acceptance of all the essentials of Christian doctrine, because they do not accept the pet tenets of a particular denomination, is enough to make the angels weep. It is, therefore, a matter of rejoicing that the tendencies of the present day show the welling up of a deeper spirit of love to the Master, because it is broader in its comprehensive charity toward others.

The Christianity of the present day, throughout its whole extent, shows a changed spirit. There is a softening of as-

perities, a recognition of the earnestness and conscientiousness of others, a disposition to approach men of other religious denominations, who confess their faith in our common Lord, and the fundamentals of Christian truth, as set forth in the Apostles Creed, in the spirit of friendliness and charity. There is to-day a spirit of comity between the different religious denominations, which makes it possible for them to meet on the same platform, to engage conjointly in Christian service, to confess together their faith in the form of the Apostles Creed, and to deal with one another generally in a spirit of fairness and consideration, such as could not have existed a short time ago. It is refreshing to hear Cardinal Gibbons speak of the Protestants as "our brethren in dissent," and a recent writer in a Roman Catholic Quarterly, discussing the question who shall be saved, finds it possible for Protestants to enter the Kingdom of Heaven, not simply on the ground of "invincible ignorance," as the phrase used to go, but on the ground that all who earnestly and sincerely believe in Jesus Christ, and who would at any future time accept the doctrines of the Catholic Church if they could be convinced that they were the true doctrines, may be considered as members of the universal church, even though outwardly they may hold allegiance to Christian denominations other than those of the Catholic Church.

And why is this? One explanation offered is that now less stress is laid on dogma and more on practical life. There is a disposition in certain quarters not only to be generous and liberal, but to run into liberalism. It is often said that when the heart is right, it does not matter so much what men believe. This tendency, we think, is fraught with danger. For the heart is not likely to be right if there is no proper apprehension by faith of the great supernatural verities upon which our Christianity depends. A better explanation of the phenomenon to which we have referred is found, we think, in the recognition of a difference between the essentials and the non-essentials of Christian belief. Christ, the atonement, the

Church as a supernatural agency for the salvation of men, historically perpetuated in the world, not indeed mechanically outlined and fenced off, but efficiently organized for work and operative in the conversion and regeneration of men through the activity of the Holy Spirit—these are things which no one who professes to be a Christian can afford to ignore, things without which Christianity could not be maintained as a living power for the salvation of the world.

On the other hand, modes of Church government, modes of worship, modes of administering the sacraments, many of the details in faith and practice, whilst they belong to Christianity, are not of the essentials of Christianity. A large hearted spirit of love and charity may overlook differences in the latter, while it holds firmly to all that is involved in the former.

Progress in the Kingdom of Heaven is by growth, and growth, in the nature of the case, is based on processes within the organism. The mere ignoring of differences will not produce true unity, because such a process is purely mechanical and leaves out of consideration questions which will, after all, in due time, demand solution. To reach union, both sides must advance to a higher plane of spiritual apprehension, so far as the fundamental truths of Christianity are concerned, in the light of which the significance of minor shades of opinion may become clear. Union before the uniting bodies are ripe for it, will not necessarily diminish the number of denominations, for sometimes the result will be three instead of only two. Take the case of the Evangelical Church, in Germany. The state Church in the German Empire is called Evangelical and is supposed to be the union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. But not all the congregations of either church were willing to enter the union, and now you have besides the Evangelical Church, the Reformed Church, strictly so called on the one hand, and the Lutheran Church on the other. Again, in the case of the United Presbyterian Church, in Scotland. In the recently effected union

between the United Presbyterian Church and the Free Church, a recalcitrant minority of thirty-one ministers held control, according to the recent decision of the House of Lords, of the vast property and revenues of the United Free Church, thus crippling all the Church operations of the latter and having on hand property, for the administration of which they are by no means competent.

It is highly important, therefore, that all efforts toward union should be carefully considered, and all the details which may be involved be carefully studied. It will be found, in the first place, that there are financial and administrative differences, which are by no means easily adjusted. Invested funds, endowments and property rights in general, may be endangered and possibly sacrificed where organic union is aimed at. Instead of simplifying matters, such steps may involve danger and seriously jeopardize the best interests of Christian work. In the second place, there is danger that the enthusiasm which usually accompanies such efforts, may bring about a union on the surface, when the inner life of the respective churches, in point of doctrine and practice, is not ready for such union. In Medicine, wounds sometimes heal over on the surface, but there is great danger if there is festering corruption within. And the same principle, we think, applies to the body of Christ. In the third place, the tendency to flatten out Christian doctrine to make it less explicit, or to undervalue the importance of the doctrinal aspect of Christianity, is to be deprecated. There is a great difference between sharp animosity or keen recrimination, and the honest apprehension of various forms of Christian doctrine, as seen from divers points of view, or as brought before the Christian consciousness by different phases of historical development. The former may well be dispensed with. The time for angry recrimination, in the light of a broader charity, is surely past. But the latter cannot be ignored, without endangering the wholeness of Christian growth and development. As we have already said, differences of that kind can

be overcome only by a process of growth, which lifts both sides of a controversy to a higher plane, where the different tendencies become intelligible and discords are eliminated in the light of a more profound apprehension of the truth, toward which all are struggling.

Denominationalism may well decline. The narrow, bigoted, spirit which fortunately has never been predominant in the Reformed Church, may pass away to the advantage of all Christians. Different denominations, however, are likely to remain, for the reason that they have their historical origin, and that in their development there is an aspect of Christianity, emphasized by each, which contributes something toward the development of the Christian life in its wholeness. It is not safe to discard doctrine and a positive faith. In-sipid flatness is not an ingredient of healthy, virile Christianity. Men need to cherish positive convictions and labor for the development of Christianity from historical starting points, and in harmony with a life transmitted from generation to generation. It is, however, pleasant to notice the growth of the spirit of unity from within. That is the only way in which real unity can ever come, and there is enough progress on these lines, resulting in a larger measure of charity, in a desire for a heartier coöperation in Christian effort, to cheer the hearts of all true Christians, and to make them look forward with hopeful confidence to a time when there shall be one fold and one shepherd.

JOHN S. STAHR, LL.D.

JAPANESE PROPHETS.

The fearful crash of the Battle of Mukden fills the air with its echoes. The inevitable nemesis has overtaken the Machiavellian policy of Russia in the East, and by the grace of God Japan now faces a supreme opportunity to bless the world with wise statesmanship.

In these stirring times it is very reassuring to note the calm, steady tone of the Christian press of Japan. Editors and

contributors are minding their proper business as religious teachers. Glancing over Japan's most influential religious weekly, the *Fukuin Shimpo*, we feel that it is within bounds to say that there is more genuine religious doctrine in one of its issues than in a whole month's output of an *Independent* or *Outlook*. In making such a comparison it must be remembered, of course, that the conditions are different. Yet the *Fukuin Shimpo* does not neglect the topics of the day.

Here is a report of a sermon preached in Tokyo on the eighth of January. The preacher is Mr. Uemura, pastor of the Bancho Church, president of the native board of missions, lecturer on theology and editor of the *Fukuin Shimpo*. In each capacity he is a conspicuously successful leader. The text is John 6, 1-15, the "Feeding of the Five Thousand." The sermon begins with a brilliant sketch of the scene, the green grass spread out like a rug beneath, the setting sun reflected in the stream of the Jordan, the blue sky above, the banquet in which all distinctions of rank are abolished. Then the preacher goes on to say in effect:

The crowd was wildly enthusiastic; but in the eyes of our Lord it was a pitiable, shepherdless flock of sheep. Now the streets of Tokyo are packed with men drunk over the celebration of the fall of Port Arthur. But in their noisy demonstration there is nothing that can comfort the women who have been widowed by the war. This nation too is a shepherdless flock. The hearts of the people are now turning toward Christianity and it is not unlikely that they will flock to Christ as did the multitudes in Jewry. But our country is in great peril unless there are some of us who in the midst of exultation think seriously as Jesus did.

What was the motive of the miracle? We may think of (1) our Lord's desire to avert acute distress, (2) an impulse to prefigure the passover-offering of his own body and (3) the need of testing the crowd. As one analyzes a liquid by dropping some chemical into it, so it must have been the purpose of Jesus by this miracle to analyze the souls of the Jews.

His favor proved to be only fuel to the flames of their selfishness and worldliness. Even the disciples must have succumbed; for he had to constrain them to leave the place. Will not we too be demoralized by our victories? In the midst of the hurrahs let us not forget to go into the mountain with Jesus and pray.

It may seem marvellous that Jesus could feed five thousand with five loaves and two fishes. But we have just such a miracle before our eyes. It is but fifty years since we were cowed by a single shot from an American man-of-war; but ten years since we had to endure the humiliation of the retrocession of Liaotung. I remember an argument that I had twenty years ago with Admiral Serata in which I insisted that it was folly to think of building a navy to oppose any of the occidental powers. The resources of Japan, it seemed to me, amounted to no more than five loaves and two fishes. But "the sons of this world are for their own generation wiser than the sons of the light." They had faith, and now we see the wonder. Some will say that our success is due to our *bushido* (the knightly code). But this is not a war of knights; it is a war of the whole patriotic country, a war of common peasants and shopkeepers, of people that not many years ago were utterly devoid of concern for the welfare of the nation. Our progress is largely due to occidental civilization, the new education, constitutional government. Not a few of the elements of our new code are to be attributed to the influence of Christianity. When I think of the changes that have been effected in the nation I see great reason to hope for its conversion. Let us not complain of the insufficiency of our power but consecrate with thanksgiving the little that we have, our five loaves and two fishes, and we shall see that we have enough to feed the thousands. "Give ye them to eat," says our Lord.

This is the substance of the sermon. Numerically and financially the Japanese Church is still pitifully weak, and no one knows that fact better than Mr. Uemura; but there is

no weakness in his faith, and that is the principal thing. We believe that he is a true prophet, and that his sermon is a harbinger of the coming glorious springtide in the Orient.

In the following week's issue of the *Fukuin Shimpō* we find a discourse which sounds like a chapter of Isaiah. The author, Mr. Sakamoto, was a countryman and comrade of the late Speaker Kataoka, with whom he once endured a term of imprisonment for political agitation. He afterwards went with a Christian colony to the northern island of Hokkaido and has been a successful editor and politician in the city of Sapporo. He once told the writer that his friend, Speaker Kataoka, regretted that he had devoted his energies to politics, feeling that he might have done more for his country by direct Christian work. Mr. Sakamoto has forsaken his secular business to do evangelistic work. The text of his discourse is Matthew 3, 12, concerning the cleansing of the threshing-floor; the theme is "Preparation for the coming of God's Kingdom in the Orient."

God is burning the Russian chaff that the kingdom may come. Russia claims to be a Christian country. A Russian paper at the beginning of the war contended that it was Russia's solemn duty not to restore Manchuria to pagan China but to retain and christianize the province, and moreover that in the name of her historic mandate Russia must not allow Korea to be subdued by Japan or any other country, that is not orthodox, even though it be Christian. Another Russian paper asserted that war caused by such love is no evil, that the Japanese are the Canaanites of the twentieth century, and that Russia is fighting for Christ to rescue Europe from the yellow peril. Thus they use the name of God as a cloak for their covetousness. They pray for victory, but God replies: "When ye spread forth your hands, I will hide my eyes from you; yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear: your hands are full of blood." Within and without Russia, the cries of those who suffer from her violence must reach the ears of the Lord of Hosts. Russia says that the Asiatics are

idolaters. They are that. But did not God more than once reject his chosen people in favor of the Gentiles? Consider what Jesus said in the synagogue at Nazareth. As by the loss of the Jews God brought salvation to the Gentiles, so now by the loss of Christian Russia He vouchsafes the grace of salvation to the orientals who are despised as idolaters. In a political way our countrymen are engaged in cleansing the threshing-floor. We Christians are responsible for the work to follow. When an occidental missionary is killed there are always candidates ready to fill his place. Will not some of our young men be missionaries? Those of our countrymen who as soldiers have laid down their lives are numbered by the tens of thousands. Will you be idle spectators? Obey the summons and do your part with the sword of the Spirit!

Such is the gist of Mr. Sakamoto's message to his young countrymen. Certainly the threshing-floor is being cleansed with an efficiency that leaves scarcely anything to be desired. No nation is so well adapted to the work of healing the political sores of China as is Japan. Even America has more than one lesson in politics to learn from the same quarter. We have fresh proof of the administrative capacity of the Japanese in the fact that a commission appointed to devise the best method of controlling the opium evil in the Philippines, after careful investigation has frankly recommended imitation in this respect of the colonial government of Formosa. Nor is the talent for politics their chief qualification for taking a great part in the world's work. They have as a nation had a wonderful discipline in self-sacrifice. Their ideas of the scope of that principle may be pitifully narrow and inadequate; but the conviction is ingrained in their very nature that life is vain and senseless without achievement by self-sacrifice. Here is material for hosts of invincible missionaries when once the young men of Japan catch the spirit of their Christian prophets.

C. N.

X.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

OLD TRUTHS IN NEW FORM, the Swander Lectures delivered before the Faculty and Students of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in U. S., at Lancaster, Pa. Introduction by George W. Richards, D.D. Reformed Church Publication Board, 1306 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa. Price \$1.00.

This volume is the first the Swander Lectureship has given to the public. We hope it may be followed in the course of time by many others. It is not as well known, perhaps, as it ought to be, that the Rev. John I. Swander, D.D. and his wife, Mrs. Barbara Swander, founded this Lectureship, known as the Sarah Ellen and Nevin Ambrose Swander Lectureship, in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States, in memory of their son and daughter, and for its maintenance have given to the Board of Trustees of that institution the sum of twenty thousand dollars, the interest of which is to be devoted to the remuneration of the lecturer and the publication of the lectures.

Dr. Swander, by his writings, has achieved for himself, not in this country only, but in England as well, a wide reputation for general culture, broad scholarship and liberality of mind; and in view of this fact, as well as of their appreciation of his generous gift, it was fitting that the Faculty of the Seminary should choose him to deliver the first course of lectures—a choice which was confirmed by the Board of Visitors, and by the Eastern, Potomac and Pittsburg Synods, under whose jurisdiction the Seminary stands.

These lectures, numbering seventeen in all, were read before the Faculty and students of the Theological Seminary at intervals in the course of the years 1901-1904. They enlisted the closest attention of the audience, at the time often calling forth expressions of great delight, sometimes even rapturous applause, which could not fail to be gratifying to the lecturer as a mark of appreciation on the part of his sympathetic hearers. With some verbal changes, they are now given to the public with the hope that they will be found both interesting and profitable.

These lectures cover the following wide range of themes: "Thoughts on Christological Thinking"; "Thoughts on the Elements of Christianity"; "The True Conception of Christianity"; "Christianity as Related to the Church, the Bible and the Word of God"; "Divine Revelation and Human Discovery"; "The Interpretation of the Bible"; "The Church as Related to the

Christian Ministry and Christian Unity"; "The Nature and Scope of the Ministerial Office"; "The Man for the Ministry"; "The Relation of the Minister to Himself and Society"; "The Minister with a Message"; "Christian Cultus"; "Art an Element in Worship"; "The Church the School of Christian Cultus"; "Christianity and Religion in the Outer Court"; "Christianity in Relation to Religious Dissipation"; and "Christianity as Related to the Underworld."

It may seem to some readers that, where the scope of thought is so broad, it must necessarily lack unity. That, however, is not the case. Dr. Swander's thinking is organic, not mechanical, or, to use his own terms, systematic, not separatistic, scientific, not fragmentary. The one method puts asunder what God has joined together; the other considers things in their constitutional relations. "According to this latter method the facts and constituent parts of creation are marshaled before the reasoning faculty as things which belong to one stupendous whole. This is absolutely necessary to safe progress in the right direction. Because the opposite method is too generally adopted and practiced we are witnessing an age of sham battles and imaginary victories. We must not overlook the ordained relation of things."

Dr. Swander has a mind open to new truth. He does not believe that for all questions answers have been found that will prove satisfactory now and in all time to come. In this respect he is liberal. While unwilling to be slavishly bound by the traditions of the past, he is yet, by no means a radical who would ignore the past and start anew. "Individual thinkers must stand in organic relation with the thinking of the world. If in scholarly humility they bow themselves to the ground and listen to the mighty tread of the world's intellectual battle-march, they will have no desire for individual bushwacking. They will hear the world of mind saying to their mind: 'Without me ye can do nothing.' The general mind is in the order of being before the individual mind."

Dr. Swander's watchword is: Advance fearlessly to the new, but always keep in close touch with the old. Accordingly, we are not surprised to hear him say: "Occupying the proper position of legitimate inquiry, everything within the compass of time and space belongs to us as devout students—at least to the extent of the means at hand, and our ability to use these means in our efforts to solve the problems lying within these categories. In this position of commanding eminence, we propose to make the most of it. No pent-up Utica will be allowed to contract our limited powers. Consistent courage to the front! Cowards to the rear! We are not disposed to be found among those who draw back to the charnel-house of dead traditions; neither do we

propose any attempt to spring forward with a radical bound, or fly upward in a silly effort to scrape the skies for truths not yet revealed to the children of men.

The thinking of our author is ruled throughout by the christological idea. In his own words: "Jesus Christ, as the great teacher sent from God, is thus helpful not only to the best philosophic and scientific thought of the world, but also, and rather as, the principle and personal embodiment of the truth he teaches. Hence his recognition of such character is (to use a newly-coined word) *sinequanonimous* to the world in the solution of its own problem. Without such recognition all so-called scholarly thought must evaporate, in its last analysis, into something little better than alternated thoughtfulness. Jesus may be regarded as primarily neither a scientist nor a philosopher, and yet only in the light of his person can the most valuable knowledge of the world be reduced to a system; and in his religion there is more divine and sublime philosophy than the world ever dreamed of in all its consecrated traditions of the past and in all its inspired imaginations of the future. In a broad sense, Christ is not only the Atlas who carries the sins of the world and the government on his shoulders, but also the Root of David who opens the world's great book, unseals its seven seals and lifts it out of the shadow of an otherwise insolvable riddle."

We have made these extensive quotations from the book in order that the author's standpoint and method may be set forth as far as possible in his own words, but also that the reader may form a judgment of his original and characteristic style.

We regret that the volume came to hand too late for a careful, critical notice in the forthcoming number of the *REVIEW*, whose matter was already nearly all in type before we received the volume; and this must be our excuse for a notice altogether inadequate to the merits of the book.

F. A. GAST, D.D.

FAITH AND MORALS. I. Faith as Ritschl defined it. II. The Moral Law as understood in Romanism and Protestantism, by Wilhelm Herrmann, D.D., professor of Dogmatic Theology in the University of Marburg. Translated from the German by Donald Matheson, M.A., and Robert W. Stewart, M.A., B.Sc. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons. Pages 415.

This volume is the sixth in the series of the Crown Theological Library which contains translations of some of the leading theological works of Germany and whose purpose it is to continue such publications for the English reader. The two essays, named in the title of the book, are characteristic expressions of the theological views of Dr. Herrmann, who with Kaftan is the leader of the dogmaticians in Germany who profess to be influenced by the principles of Ritschl. Probably there is no theologian to-day

who is a slavish follower of that great master. His pupils criticise and revise his positions at many points. Yet he occupied a certain standpoint and labored in a certain spirit, which have attracted many of the greatest scholars of Germany. No two subjects are more central for Protestantism on the subjective side than Faith and Morals. In fact they are cardinal points in Christianity. Yet their proper relation has always been defined with difficulty in the various stages of the Church's history.

Herrmann finds the chief defect in present-day Protestantism to be an erroneous conception of faith. In answer to the question, "What is faith?" thousands of Protestants say: "Faith consists of two parts, acknowledgment that all that we read in the Bible is God's Word and therefore true; and at the same time a given trust in what is taught and narrated in the Bible." The kind of faith described in these words the author considers to be Roman Catholic faith. The difference between the conception of faith in the two branches of the Church is quantitative rather than qualitative. The Roman Catholic acknowledges as true all that is in the Bible and in the Church. He adds Church tradition to Bible doctrine. But in both instances, in Protestantism and Romanism, faith consists in holding for true certain narratives and doctrines offered us with divine authority.

Such a conception of faith is not truly Protestant. Luther constantly combatted the idea that faith is the acceptance of what is written in the Bible, an acceptance which one must set before himself and to which he must compel himself. The Heidelberg Catechism is clear on this point; faith is more than a certain knowledge. It is a hearty trust. Yet the original protestant conception has been lost, or has not dominated protestant thinking. Protestants have unconsciously fallen back to the position of Romanists. The writer claims that this view of faith is a hindrance to the spread of Christianity. "In the first place a wall is raised that shuts many in our time out of Christianity, if they are told that in order to become Christians they must hold for true this or that doctrine because it is announced to them as God's Word, although it may be by no means clear to them." The Christian, who feels himself bound to appropriate and repeat with firm resolution as his own convictions all that Paul or John has said, deludes himself and is in danger of religious cant and hypocrisy. All that these saints have said is doubtless true but only so much of their truth is ours as has entered into our personal life. "A word can have for men the significance of a word of God only when it brings him to true self-examination under the circumstances in which he stands at the moment. Every religious thought which does not become intelligible to us in this way remains foreign to us, although we may give it out

ever so defiantly as the expression of our own conviction and excite our imagination ever so strongly with it."

He not only criticises the Roman Catholic conception of faith but also that of a certain class of liberal theologians. While the latter feel that it is wrong to "reduce faith to the level of a human act that goes against the conscience," they wish "to put in the place of this false faith not Christian faith, but a religiousness which, in their view, is rooted in the nature of the human soul." They failed to recognize that "Christian faith is unconditional submission to a Power which a Christian distinguishes from his own inner life—that is, to the Revelation of God." Faith cannot be a natural product of powers inherent in the soul of man. It is not natural for men to believe. Nor is it the result of scientific argument or investigation. "Because we are members of a university we must not make it our business to establish this faith by scientific means. That is impossible, just as it is always impossible to bring any one by proof to surrender himself to the impression made by a person and trust in him."

We naturally ask now what is true faith and how is it wrought in the heart of man? Two elements enter into faith—it must save a man, and it must be submission to the Revelation of God. Saving faith, however, is not a "ready acceptance of the thoughts and words of others. The longing of our souls after true life will not be stilled by receiving a doctrine about God, but only by finding God Himself." But when has a man found God? "A man can only say he has found God when it has become clear to him from some event in his own life to which he can assign a definite date that God has therein sought him out and touched him." We do not believe in an almighty God when we accept a power or a person that can do anything. "Faith in the almightiness of God is the conception of a Power which at this particular moment is for our sake causing the whole reality in which we stand."

The God who works faith is presented to us by revelation in Jesus Christ. "Not to despair of oneself because Jesus Christ is a real constituent of this our world—that is the beginning of Christian faith." Through the historical Jesus in the Gospels God lays hold of our hearts and we have a living experience of his love and his grace. Men are convinced that their sins are forgiven and are brought into obedience to him. When a man understands that experience of the Person of Jesus as the unmistakable touch of a Supernatural Power full of love and truth, he will for the first time know that he has found God. He henceforth "not only cherishes thoughts about God which others have handed down to him or which he excogitated, but he lives in the midst of an experience in which he traces God working

upon him." Christian faith, therefore, is created. It is simple trust in Jesus, which He wins by his personal life. It includes joyful submission to God who manifests himself in Jesus and works through him.

What then is to be the attitude of the believer to the Bible as a whole and to the dogmas of the Church? The author clearly answers this question. He says: "One who has come so far, that is, trusts in Jesus, is no longer able to look with indifference on the Bible as an ordinary object of historical research. For he certainly hears in it the Word of God to humanity, a recapitulation of things history has produced and which no advance of history can render out of date. But he is certainly also far from the presumption of holding everything for true that stands in the Bible. * * * A person truly awakened to faith hears quite calmly that much stands in the Bible which cannot and never was meant to become part of our own intellectual property; for example, the whole ancient theory of nature and the traces of rabbinical theology and Jewish eschatology in the New Testament. When a truly earnest faith sure of its ground freely acknowledges this—Luther, again, is an illuminating example—it will give free scope to that historical inquiry about the Bible which is the scientific task of theology. A faith, on the other hand, which withholds that acknowledgment enters necessarily into an alliance with insincerity, and must, for punishment, stand in fear of the facts."

The Church, however, demands also the acceptance of a rule of faith or system of doctrine. The author grants that it is necessary to present in a summary the Christian knowledge inherited from the Fathers and offer it to the Church. "But we should not do this with a claim we will prove it, or with the demand that every one shall, by a stormy mental decision, make it his own. We should rather put it forward as the expression of the inner world in which believers have lived, and tell Christians that they, too, will some day grow up to the comprehension of such things if only each in his own special situation exercises a right faith; and this right faith is something quite different from an assent resulting from a decision of the human mind."

From this extended analysis of the first essay the reader will recognize the controlling principles of Dr. Herrmann's position. He seeks to counteract rationalism as well as ecclesiastical formalism. He lays all stress on an experimental Christianity. He finds no room for scientific proof in the sphere of religion. "Thus all religions are alike in their inability to compel anyone by scientific proof to take up their standpoint."

Space will not permit us to discuss the second essay but its value is proven by a number of editions which were called for

and by the vigorous replies which were written by Roman Catholic writers.

The volume opens with a biographical sketch of the author and each essay is preceded by an introduction of the author and by one of the translators. The latter half of the book, over two hundred pages, is an appendix containing the objections raised to the positions of Dr. Herrmann, mainly by Roman Catholic writers, and the answers to the objections. A copious index concludes the volume. The translation is well done. The book will be a valuable aid to those who are seeking light on the theological positions of leading German theologians at present, and to those who are wrestling with the problem of the relation of faith to science and to the standards of the Church. In many parts it rises to a devotional plane and at every point it is the testimony of one who has been with Jesus.

G. W. RICHARDS, D.D.

SERMONS ADDRESSED TO INDIVIDUALS. By Reginald J. Campbell, minister of the City Temple, London. New York, A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West 18th St. Pages 328. Price \$1.25.

The specific character of the sermons in this volume is described by the author's words in the preface. He says: "The sermons included herein are not literature, they are extempore speech; they are face to face teaching and exhortation addressed to an audience which, at the time, and to the preacher, consisted as it were of but one individual. They are human documents called forth by living human experiences. Every one of these sermons came into existence because some one asked for it or some life story suggested it." On this account the title of the volume is especially appropriate. That the sermons were addressed to individuals not only of the preacher's imagination but of real existence, the introductory note to each sermon proves. The sermons are answers to letters, personal inquiries, afflictions and doubts. Some are spoken to young men, others to business men and others to sceptics and scoffers. A particular circumstance is behind each sermon.

The table of contents contains the subjects of seventeen sermons. Among them we find the following: "Quo Vadis?"; "The Death-Song of Jesus"; "The Measure of Divine Power"; "The Way Through the Flood"; "Eternal Punishment and Eternal Life"; "The Highest Self-Offering," etc. Without attempting to analyze one or all of the sermons in detail we shall briefly characterize them as a whole.

Dr. Campbell is a prophet in his age. That is he has deep insight into the mysteries of Christian revelation, and into the conditions of human life in his generation. He knows Christ

and he understands men. He is able to interpret the one to the other in simple language, with deep feeling and broad sympathy. His sermons are not of the intellectual nor of the emotional type. Yet there is enough of solid thought and deep feeling to satisfy the thinker and the emotionalist. The truth of the Gospel is passed through the personality of the preacher and humanized, as it were, by his own experience. In these respects he stands out preëminent as a preacher for the times. He is bold yet humble, he is critical yet reverent, he is scholarly yet of a childlike faith. One feels that he hides nothing from his audience and treats it with the frankness and freedom of one who has confidence in the ultimate victory of truth and in the ultimate salvation of men. He has been called the Robertson of the twentieth century.

Both for the contents and method of composition we would commend these sermons to the preacher. They cannot easily be reproduced by another person, yet they suggest lines of thought which will grow into original discourses. For laymen who desire to read sermons we have found no volume lately published that will be more satisfactory and helpful. Many questions which claim the attention of the popular mind are discussed and answered by one who combines scholarship and religion in a marked degree.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS, D.D.

THE ATONEMENT AND MODERN THOUGHT. By Rev. Junius Remensnyder, D.D., LL.D. With an Introduction by Professor Benjamin B. Warfield, D.D., LL.D., of Princeton Theological Seminary. Published by the Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia, Pa.

This is a book of 223 pages, written in plain language, well printed and consequently is easily read. The style and the mode of treatment of its subject would indicate that the author had in view the general Christian public rather than ministers and theological students. We question, however, whether the discussion of theories of the atonement will be edifying to the laymen of the Church. Hence the book before us will be valuable only to such readers as possess some theological knowledge. The author divides his treatise into twenty-eight chapters; this large number of divisions prevents us from giving the sub-headings of his book.

Both the writer of the introduction and the author of the book are advocates of the penal suffering or substitutionary theory of the atonement, and both take the position, no doubt correctly, that modern thought is in conflict with that theory. And as a consequence they unite in declaring modern thought to be faulty and censurable because it refuses to accept the substitution theory

as first formulated by Anselm. We are glad that Dr. Remensnyder has come out in defence of the Anselmic idea, and only wish his argument had been more definite and pungent; not that we can agree with his position, but as the general trend of modern thought is away from the conception of substitutionary atonement it is desirable that it should be held up in the strongest light possible. It is always well for persons interested in any theological question to study the conservative in connection with the progressive views of it. We therefore welcome this book and trust that it may be carefully read by the theological public.

What in our opinion is a serious defect in Dr. Remensnyder's treatment of his subject is that he fails to make a proper distinction between the atonement as an objective reality and his theory of the atonement. He assumes throughout that the Anselmic conception of the atonement and the atonement itself are one and the same thing. This is a misrepresentation of the case. And we doubt whether he would be willing to accept the logical consequences of his position. During the first thousand years of the Christian era the writers on theology did not hold this substitutionary theory at all. They viewed Christ's suffering and death as a sacrificial offering made to the devil for the purpose of delivering man from his right and power. Would our author say that those earnest, faithful and scholarly Christians did not believe in the atonement? Would he deny the Christian character of such great servants of the Lord as Irenæus, Athanasius, Augustine and others of their day who believed in the atonement though they held a view of it entirely different from that advocated by himself?

Again, Dr. Warfield on page 17 of his introduction admits that a different view is widely prevalent among the sounder thinkers of the time; is practically universal among Wesleyan Arminians; is found among orthodox nonconformists in Great Britain, among orthodox Congregationalists in America, among Scottish Presbyterians; and is widespread among the saner teachers on the continent of Europe. Shall all these be set aside as not believing in the atonement? Surely not. They believe in the atonement, but not in the *Substitutionary Theory* of it. In our opinion the author weakens his cause by the assumption that the atonement is identical with the Anselmic theory. And further we think he would find some difficulty in substantiating his position that the penal suffering conception of the atonement is essential to the efficiency of the preached Gospel. For the Gospel was fully as powerful in the conversion, regeneration and sanctification of men from the second to the eleventh century as it was from the eleventh to the sixteenth; and as far as observation goes the word of God preached in the present day under

other conceptions of the atonement is just as fruitful in good results as when preached by those holding the Anselmic theory.

The theory of the atonement advocated by this book may be thus expressed in brief: Mankind is sinful and depraved; under the curse of God; and is utterly unable to make satisfaction to God for its sin and guilt. Christ by His sufferings and death paid the penalty to God for the sin of mankind, and thereby set men free. A double imputation is involved; man's sins and guilt are imputed to Christ and Christ's righteousness is imputed to man. Christ takes the place of guilty man and suffers in his stead, and thus God is satisfied. This seems a very plain and simple plan of Salvation. But a large number of earnest Christians, thoroughly analyzing this theory, find themselves unable to accept it. They do not believe that either guilt or righteousness can be transferred from one person to another in any such outward way as is here proposed. And while this theory claims that God's justice is satisfied by the sufferings of Christ endured in the place of the sinner, many persons regard it as the height of injustice to punish one person for the guilt of another, even though the former be perfectly willing to be punished as a substitute for the latter. And further the opponents hold that imputed righteousness would not be moral righteousness at all. The theory advocated by the book before us involves the thought that, as Christ as the Son of God and as equal with God, as being God, makes satisfaction to God by suffering for the sins of the world, God satisfies Himself. The author distinctly approves the saying—"God sheds His blood, suffers and dies," a proposition which many regard as an absurdity. For these and other reasons the substitutionary conception does not find acceptance by a large number of modern thinkers.

But the supporters of the Anselmic theory claim that it is taught by the Scriptures. That, however, is the very question to be decided. If that theory has the support of the Scriptures then it is true and must be accepted by all Christians. But a goodly number of learned men have searched the Scriptures carefully and analyzed them critically and are unable to find the substitutionary conception in them. The idea of Christ's substitution for the guilt of man has indeed entered so largely into the confessions, the preaching and hymnology of the Church that all persons, learned and unlearned, are predisposed to look upon scriptural facts and statements as supporting that view. But when one frees his mind from all preconceived notions and studies the Scriptures bearing on this subject critically and logically he will likely be surprised to discover that they do not contain the doctrine taught eight hundred years ago; that the penal suffering idea has been put into them rather than is

found in them. Substitution in the sense of one person suffering for the sins of another so as to free him of its guilt is foreign to the Scriptures. To show how Dr. Remensnyder causes the Scriptures to support his theory we call attention to the fact that by one general sweep he makes the prepositions *anti*, *dia* and *huper* all mean one and the same thing and construes them in the sense of *anti*—instead. *Anti* is used in but few passages referring to the subject and in those does not mean substitution; *dia* is used only a few times and does not mean substitution; *huper* is most frequently employed and does not mean the substitution of one person for another. Neither does the meaning of passages referring to the sufferings and death of Christ, when they are strictly and logically construed, contain the idea of substitution. At least such is the opinion of some very good authors. That Christ died, the just for the unjust, for the sins of the world is a very precious scriptural truth which everyone accepts. But that is a matter very different from the idea that He suffered in place of the sinner.

The question may, however, arise, why did Anselm discover his theory in the Scriptures and why has it had such a deep and lasting hold on the minds and hearts of believers? A good and sufficient reason, we think, can be given for this fact, but we have no space to go into this subject now. The substitutionary theory instead of being the most profound, as our author holds, is to our mind the most general and superficial in its statements and terms. To formulate a theory of the atonement that is scriptural and consistent throughout, satisfying justice and all the requirements of the moral sense is perhaps the most difficult problem before the mind and heart of the Church. No such theory has as yet been wrought out. Perhaps under the fuller illumination of the Holy Spirit the question may be solved in the future to the satisfaction of the whole Church. Christ is our Saviour; Christ is our Mediator; Christ died for our sins. In Him we find the ground and hope of our salvation. God is in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself. This is a blessed scriptural truth, satisfying the conscience and comforting the heart. That God is in Christ reconciling Himself unto the world no sacred writer states anywhere.

We wish to call attention in conclusion to a somewhat remarkable statement made by our author on page 171. Dr. Remensnyder is a Lutheran; no one will censure him for that. But as is the case with some others of that persuasion his love for his church seems to blind his eyes to such an extent that he cannot see things as they really are. He says that "whatever misgivings and uncertainties" "in regard to the atonement" *there may exist in other denominations* "*there are none such in the*

Mother Church of the Reformation," numbering in all lands 70,000,000 members. We have underscored the part of the statement which is remarkable and will be amusing to all persons acquainted with the theological status of the Protestant Church at the present day. He evidently claims the entire evangelical church of Germany as being Lutheran. Such is not exactly the case, but let us admit it for the moment. Where in all Christendom is there to be found more higher criticism of all grades, more new theology, more radicalism, more breaking away from confessionalism and traditionalism than in the universities of Germany? With a large number of German professors the Anselmic theory of the atonement has no standing at all. From a reliable source we learn that fully seventy-five per cent. of the theologians, not pastors, of Germany belong to some school of modern thought. Yet in the face of this condition in the very stronghold of Lutheranism Dr. Remensnyder proclaims to the world that the Lutheran Church holds fast to the traditional view of the atonement! Man muss wahrlich lachen. Had he said that the Lutheran Church of this country was free of modern thought and wedded to Anselmic atonement the statement could be accepted as true. Another thing to which we will call attention in closing, whatever may be its significance, is the fact that the author makes as much if not more use of Reformed authorities to substantiate his theory as he does of Lutheran authorities.

We recommend this book to all persons interested in the live theological questions of the day and advise them to study it; but we suggest that they study Dr. Burney's work on Soteriology in connection with it.

A. E. TRUXALL, D.D.

MEYERSDALE, PA.

WHAT IS THE BIBLE? By J. A. Ruth. Chicago, The Open Court Publication Company. Pages 172. Price 75 cents.

This in some respects is the most remarkable book that has come into our hands for some time. From statements here and there we infer that Mr. Ruth is a layman, a member of some orthodox church, and has been a Sunday-school superintendent. He is a man considerably past middle life. Not long since he was led into an earnest and serious consideration of the question, whether the Bible is the Word of God. He consulted ministers, professors, business men and friends on the subject but their replies were unsatisfactory to him. He accordingly entered upon an investigation of the matter for himself. He set before himself these propositions: "Either God is responsible for the Bible in a manner in which He is not responsible for other literature or He is not. He either immediately caused men to write

it or He did not. He either has made special revelations to man by methods differing from the methods by which man acquires any knowledge or He has not." For the purpose of satisfying his mind on these propositions, Mr. Ruth examined the Bible thoroughly and read various authors on the subject; and the conclusions he reached were that the negative members of the above propositions must be accepted as true. The book before us accordingly endeavors to show that the Bible is a purely human book. The views of the Bible which he rejects in toto as being without any foundation in fact are the traditional ones, prevailing yet in a large degree among the body of believers. He admits that he is a destructive critic but maintains that his efforts are to destroy error not the truth. The latter he seeks to support and establish.

In analyzing and comparing various portions of the Scriptures in the Old Testament and the New he applies the arguments ad absurdum and ad ridiculum very effectually. He points out the numerous disagreements, contradictions and manifest errors in the Bible and shows how these things are fatal to the idea that God is the author of this book (according to the traditional conception). If He were directly or indirectly the author of many things attributed to Him in the Old Testament He would be such a God for whom no one could have any respect much less love and reverence. Hence as he believes in a God of wisdom, righteousness, justice and mercy, he concludes that the Scriptures are the product of men, and contain the words and ideas and conceptions of men. And consequently the imperfections and mistakes found in the various books of the Bible no longer give him disturbance of mind and heart. He rejoices in the freedom to which he has attained. The Old Testament is the product of the Jewish religion, and the New of the Christian. Instead of believing that the Bible constitutes the foundation of the Church he holds that the Bible is the outgrowth of the Church. The Scriptures contain the sum and substance of the truth claimed for it by orthodox believers, but its writers did not receive it by divine revelations but by discoveries which they themselves made from time to time. And the truth is just as precious and valuable whether discovered by men or received by divine revelation.

The author believes in development which he regards, as a universal law. Whether organic evolution be true or not that the law of development rules in science, art, morals, religion and every other human acquirement cannot be questioned. And he also does not hesitate to accept the logical result of his position, namely that the religious world has progressed beyond the Scriptures of several thousands of years ago. For example on the question of polygamy, witchcraft, slavery, liquor traffic et

cetera the Bible has been left behind by the Christian consciousness of the day. But he does not look upon the Bible as having been superseded. He regards it as a fountal source of truth. He believes that it contains practically all the truth that orthodox believers claim for it and that it will be a guide for faith and morals as long as the world lasts; but, according to his convictions, the writers of the Scriptures came to a knowledge of the truth they present not by revelations from above, but by the exercise of their minds, hearts and conscience. The truth of the Bible was discovered as really as the laws of the heavenly bodies have been discovered by astronomers. And because it is the product of men therefore it is also full of discrepancies, contradictions and misconceptions. The conception of God, for example, which evidently was in the mind of the writer of the ten commandments was incorrect and is no longer held by anybody. The rotundity of the earth and the law of gravitation are facts that will always be true; so the spiritual truths contained in the Bible will remain forever.

The purpose of Mr. Ruth is to present the evidence which goes to show that the Bible is purely and entirely a human book. And he does establish beyond a doubt the human side of the book. He shows conclusively that the traditional view of the Bible is utterly untenable; that it has no foundation upon which to rest. But why go to the other extreme? If the Bible is not a divine book as formerly held must it therefore be purely a human book? Is that the only alternative? We think not. There is a middle ground. This statement seems absurd to the author, to his mind the Bible is either divine or human; one or the other. But this phase of the subject he needs to investigate and study. If he does so he will likely discover a line of truth that will lead him to convictions different from those that now possess his mind. He admits that man may through his spiritual nature enter into communion and fellowship with God. It is a psychological law that no two persons can be in communion with each other without being affected by each other. And there is another law that the weaker is always affected and influenced by the stronger. If man enters at times or lives all the time in fellowship with God will he not then be greatly influenced by the divine mind and heart? If a man by faith and righteousness and purity and the surrender of his will to the divine will enters into communion with God will he not see things and know things, discover ideas and conceptions, that would otherwise be impossible for him? Would not God's spirit flow over into his spirit and would he not receive inspiration from such communion with God? Notwithstanding the human in the Bible, the imperfections, misconceptions, mistakes and moral and religious errors in it, the great

spiritual and ethical truths which it contains, which have "turned the world upside down" and will continue to revolutionize society, are an unmistakable evidence that the prophets and apostles had been in communion with God, and while the ideas and conceptions which they proclaimed were discovered by themselves they were enabled to discover them by the inspiration which they received through communion with the "Father of their Spirits." That a little country like Palestine, a little people like the Jews, should produce such men as the prophets and such a man as Jesus, regarding him now only as human, that they should rise so high above the great and cultured nations around them in their religious conceptions and ideas, that their teaching should above all other teachings work so mightily for the uplifting, purification and inspiration of the human family is unanswerable proof that God was with and in them and that their Bible is God's Book as no other in the world is or indeed can be. Here is where we think our author to be in error. He fails to recognize the fact that God is as really and as much present and operative in human history as He is in nature, and that as history holds in the sphere of the moral His presence and operations here are of a different and higher order than those in nature. Consequently God may have had a great deal to do with the production of the Scriptures and more than with any other book. The Bible may contain (as we believe it does) a record of revelations and divine communications, though they were not given in an external and magical manner. The very fact that man can enter into fellowship and communion with God constitutes the basis for divine inspiration. To our mind Mr. Ruth is guilty of another error by his efforts to reduce all truth to the subjective apprehension of it. He does not realize that truth must first of all be objective; and that the mind must be confronted by it from without before it can work it up into the contents of its conceptions. Knowledge of the truth is not simply an evolution from within independent of the power and coöperation of the truth from without. Truth discovered by one person or one age becomes a posit to control by objective authority the minds and hearts of those coming after. All truth comes originally from God and consequently He has His part, and an essential part, in the process of bringing man to a knowledge of the truth. But our author may say that all this is accomplished by the laws of God. We say yes, but the laws operating in mind and in truth are not fixed and stiff as they are in the physical world, but are of a free character according to the nature of truth itself. Mind does not work upon mind, and heart upon heart, and truth upon thought, as matter does upon matter. The divine authorship of the Bible and the operations of God in the development of mankind are not discerned in an outward way, so

that one can say—Lo here, Lo there. There are some things that come not by outward observation, and yet they are real and exist. We know them by the demands of the original and fundamental proposition with which we start. This brings us into the sphere of faith; not blind faith, not superstition as much of our faith is inclined to be, but a real rational faith. We must stop here.

The remarkable thing about this book is the spirit of the author. He is humble and devout, an earnest seeker after the truth which shall give peace to his own mind and heart. He passed from one extreme conception of the Scriptures to the opposite extreme, but his faith in God, in the truth, in immortality, and rewards and punishments has remained with him. He has clearly set forth the human in the Bible. It would be helpful and beneficial to him now to take up the question as to how God is related to the world, to human history, to the Bible and to the individual person and how He is operative in them, and to investigate and study it in the same earnest and thorough manner as he did the subject of this book. If he will do so we feel sure that he will swing back to a middle ground. We are convinced that the Church is under the necessity of restating her doctrines on the Bible and kindred subjects if she would retain within her fold the intelligent laymen in this age of ever-widening knowledge of the physical world *ad extra* and *ad intra*, and of the human world in the spheres of morals and religion under the changing conceptions of God and righteousness. We commend this book to intelligent readers with discriminating minds.

A. E. TRUXALL, D.D.

MEYERSDALE, PA.

LIFE OF THE REV. CALVIN S. GERHARD, D.D. Edited by Thomas W. Dickert, A.M., pastor of St. Stephen's Reformed Church, Reading, Pa. Philadelphia, Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States.

The subject of this biography, the Rev. Calvin S. Gerhard, D.D., was a man much above the ordinary. In his life the theoretical and the practical were harmoniously combined. He was a man of profound thought, but he was no less a man of vigorous action. His thought was always with a view to life individual and social. The questions which engaged his mind and called forth his highest powers were questions of vital importance, never of a merely speculative interest.

This is apparent in all his writings; and it is this that made him a strong power for good in every community in which he lived, in every pastoral charge he served and in the general life of the Church of which he was an honored minister. He was a man of strong convictions and having the courage of his convictions he threw himself earnestly and energetically into every movement that commended itself to his mind as right.

Of such a life we wish to know all that it is permitted us to know. It was not a life to dazzle the eyes of men. It was spent quietly and unostentatiously in a comparatively narrow sphere, and without brilliant achievements to call forth the applause of the great world. But it was a life spent in the interest of intelligence, morality and religion and was powerfully felt in many other lives. As here recorded by friends who knew him best, it should prove an inspiration to others, especially to young ministers just entering upon their life-work. The book reveals the secret of his success; he was a studious, broad-minded, warm-hearted, godly man, who put his whole mind and heart into the work he was called to do. That is the lesson his life teaches us. It is a lesson we all need to learn.

This volume is a tribute of love and esteem to Dr. C. S. Gerhard by his worthy successor, the Rev. Thomas W. Dickert, A.M. It was his happy thought to call in the assistance of others most intimately acquainted with the subject, in order to present in all its various phases the life and character and work of this noble and useful man. Accordingly we see him here as a man, as a student, as a Christian minister, as a pastor, as a laborer in the Church at large, as a theologian and as an author.

The book is fitly introduced by Dr. Stahr, who, from close communion with Dr. Gerhard for a whole generation and more had learned to appreciate the many excellences of his mind and heart. The biographical sketch which follows the introduction is the loving tribute of an elder brother. It gives us a glimpse into the quiet life of a pious family where affection circled from parents to children and from children to parents and to one another. Amid such favorable surroundings Dr. Gerhard received his earliest impressions. Here already in childhood we see the manifestation of some of the qualities which characterized his manhood. Once at a family consultation on the important yet difficult question whether or not to remove to Lancaster, the children were properly requested by the parents to give their answer in writing; and Calvin with all the thoughtfulness, earnestness and decision of his later years wrote, "I say we go." Here we see the truth of Wordsworth's saying: "The child is father to the man."

This well told story of a brother's life is replete with interest. How touching is that letter written by Calvin to his youngest sister to whom, at eighteen, life seemed so sweet, but who was slowly dying at her home at Lancaster. In it he says: "I sometimes think that perhaps our heavenly Father wants you to leave us and come home to Him. We don't like to give you up. We would much sooner have you stay with us, but we must all go some time, and if He calls you first, dear sister Ellie, you won't be afraid to go, will you? You will be happier there with our

heavenly Father and with His Son, Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and with the holy angles and the happy saints than you can ever be on earth." How characteristic of a simple, childlike, affectionate nature!

Dr. Ellis N. Kremer records with evident delight many pleasing reminiscences of his classmate in college, not forgetting even the pardonable boyish pranks played on the tutor, which he cannot recall without a smile.

The several portraits of Dr. Gerhard as seen in various lights are true to the life. They exhibit the characteristics of his ministry in general, his wisdom and fidelity as the shepherd of his people, his earnestness and consciousness in Classis, Synod, and the Church Boards on which he served.

Dr. Richards gives us a careful study of him as a theologian, whom he regards as neither a traditionalist, clinging obstinately to untenable statements, whether dogmatic or historical, nor yet as a radical, using his freedom to overthrow the essential truth of beliefs handed down from the past, but as a liberal progressive thinker, whose test of truth lies in its power to authenticate itself to the mind and heart of the student. He sets forth the fundamental principles by which the Doctor was guided in his investigations: the self-evidencing force of spiritual truth; freedom of research; loyalty to facts, and the necessity of theological reconstruction because of the constant growth of knowledge; and then defines some of Dr. Gerhard's more important views on the relation of the Bible to revelation, of science to theology, and of Christ, the perfect revelation of God, to men.

The editor of this book contributes the last paper, in which he traces out at length the course of Dr. Gerhard as an author, from the first of his known articles, which appeared in 1866, the year of his graduation from college, to his sermon before the General Synod, May, 1902, the closing year of his life. From this historical review of his writings, with its extensive extracts and full analysis, we learn, as we could in no other way, the general progress of his thought. It presents many stages, the later differing widely from the earlier, yet through them all there is apparent a unity in the advancing movement, which has been determined by the historic conditions of the age.

Mr. Dickert deserves the thanks of the Church for preparing for it this life of one of its worthiest ministers. It is a labor of love, and as such it should be appreciated. It should find a place, not only in every Reformed pastor's library, but also in many families of the Reformed Church.

F. A. GAST, D.D.

THE MAGNETISM OF CHRIST: A Study of Our Lord's Missionary Methods.
By Rev. John Smith, M.A., D.D. New York, A. C. Armstrong & Son.
Pages 336. Price \$1.75.

This volume comprises the Duff Lectures on Evangelistic Theology delivered during the academic year 1903-4 to the theological students of the United Free Church of Scotland at Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen. The titles of the twelve lectures given are: "Introductory—The World into Which Jesus Came"; "Methods of Jesus—The Earliest Movements of His Ministry"; "The Distinctive Method of Jesus"; "The Magnetism of Christ—How He Drew Men to Himself"; "The Lines of His Aggressive Activity"; "The Ministries Normal and Exceptional by Which He Would Accomplish His Work"; "Christ's Immediate Aim: The Awakening of Faith"; "Christ Dealing With Individual Inquirers"; "Christ Meeting Questions and Opponents"; "Christ's Use of Reserve"; "Prayer as Bringing in the Kingdom of God," and "Christ's Appeal to the Future as a Motive for the Present."

This table of contents gives the best idea of the task which the author has set for himself. In a general way it may be said that his aim in these lectures is to set forth the power and the methods by which Jesus drew men to Himself. Christ lived in conscious filial unity with God the Father. In His own person He confronted men with the spiritual ideal. He threw around those with whom He came in contact the light and effluence of His own spirit, and in the consequent spiritual illumination men stood revealed to themselves. He did not reason men into the Kingdom. His method was not that of persuasion or argument, but of revelation. He revealed God to man, and He revealed to man his own divine possibilities. This He could do because He stood also in conscious fraternal unity with man, and thus He became not only the revealer of God to man, but also the revealer of man to himself. These are the points in which the modern preacher or evangelist is urged to imitate Christ. Being comes before knowing. The thing of first importance is to become one with God, and one with one's fellow man. These are the primary qualifications for successful evangelism.

The lectures also abound in specific illustrations of Christ's method of dealing with all sorts and conditions of men, and in many cases they throw new light on such familiar incidents as that of the Syrophenician woman, the call of Matthew, the visit of Nicodemus, etc.

The style is often involved and the sentiment obscure. Sometimes, especially in the earlier lectures there is the promise of more than one actually discovers in them. The last three or four chapters are by far the strongest and most satisfactory to the reader who looks for practical help in this volume.

The author is a conservative Scotchman, but he does not allow his theological opinions to dominate the vital and ethical interests of his theme. Upon the whole this volume can be heartily recommended to those who wish to learn more of Christ's power and method in dealing with our complex human nature, and thus qualify themselves more thoroughly for the task of winning men away from self to God.

C. E. CREITZ, A.M.

THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE FLOCK. Scripture Studies for every Sunday of the Year. By the Rev. G. H. Morrison, M.A. New York, A. C. Armstrong and Son, 3 and 5 West 18th Street. Pages 388. Price \$1.75.

Here we have a volume containing one hundred and four sermonettes. There are two for each Sunday of the year, one being based on a Scripture passage from the Old Testament, and the other on a passage from the New Testament. They were originally intended for Sunday-school teachers and were prepared for and at first appeared in the Scottish edition of the British weekly. But they found such a large number of interested readers that their author was prompted to cast them into book form so as to give them wider and more permanent circulation. The book is worthy of a prominent place in every minister's study and at every fireside. The author selects well-known and familiar passages of Scripture and clothes them with new meaning and significance. In well chosen language he sets forth the cardinal truths that underlie the passage under consideration. He has the happy faculty of suggesting ideas which do not immediately appear in the passage to the ordinary reader but which make the book interesting and helpful. The studies are partly of an expository and partly of a devotional and practical character. For example, when he gives his study of "the wise men and the star" based on Math. 2: 1-23, he derives the following lessons from the passage: First, "that God speaks to men in ways they can understand." Second, "by what unlikely ways men may be led to Jesus!" Third, "the intense curiosity of these men about the King." Fourth, "the most anxious inquirers about Jesus were men who were very far away from Him." Lastly, "the apparent insignificance of what they found." Every one of the 104 studies is of a like suggestive character. The style is so chaste and beautiful that, coupled with its rich contents, the book will prove helpful not only for the minister in the preparation of sermons, but also for brief talks at prayer-meetings or before Bible classes or Young People's Societies, and for devotional reading around the fireside of Christian homes.

REV. C. E. SCHAEFER, A.M.